Update
REM bans TV Prva and Informer programmes in first serious sa...
Ruling on content aired during the election campaign, the REM Council banned three programmes for on...
On 4 November 2026, the European Commission published its annual report on Serbia as part of the 2026 Enlargement Package. The report finds that Serbia made no progress in Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights) and recorded further backsliding in freedom of expression. Backsliding was also recorded in public administration reform, in education and culture (Chapter 26) and in external relations (Chapter 30). In its enlargement communication, the Commission concluded that Serbia "did not make any substantive progress in accession negotiations". The Commission's recommendations from 2025 on the judiciary and on freedom of expression were assessed as not implemented and remain valid.
In its introduction, the report places these findings in the current political context. It notes that mass student and citizen protests continued across the country over allegations of government corruption and the perceived lack of accountability and transparency, particularly in relation to the 2024 Novi Sad railway station canopy collapse, which killed 16 people, and that the incident and its aftermath "further deepened the polarisation of Serbian society". Early parliamentary elections were held on 25 October 2026; according to the preliminary results cited in the report, the Student List, which grew out of the mass student and citizen movement, obtained an absolute majority of mandates.
The Commission also observes that the anti-EU narrative remains present not only in media outlets but is "also used by political office holders, including at highest levels", and calls on the authorities, as a matter of priority, to take much more responsibility for communicating proactively and objectively on the EU accession process and for countering disinformation. The report further states that the funeral of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić in September 2026, held with official support and in the presence of senior officials and military, contributed to the glorification of a convicted war criminal "in a manner contradicting the values underpinning Serbia's path towards the European Union".
On freedom of expression, Serbia is assessed as being between an early stage and some level of preparation. The report describes a deteriorating environment for journalists, inconsistent implementation of media legislation and a more concentrated media market. The Council of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM), absent since November 2024, was established in July 2026, but, according to the report, it was unable to decide on expanding the list of media outlets subject to campaign monitoring or to rule on complaints during the campaign. The Commission cites the preliminary findings of the international election observation mission (IEOM), according to which "the REM failed to provide effective oversight and timely remedies for election-related violations". CRTA.Plus has followed the election of the REM Council and the work of the media regulator.
On elections, the report describes the adoption of six electoral laws in May, July and August 2026 as a step forward, while noting that not all of ODIHR's key recommendations were implemented. The Commission for auditing the voter register was set up in February 2026, but the audit "was not fully performed before the October parliamentary elections", and "widespread mistrust in the integrity of the voter register persisted". Priority recommendations that remain outstanding include the separation of state and political parties, a meaningful audit of the voter register, oversight of campaigns and their financing, and measures to prevent voter intimidation. These findings correspond to those of CRTA's preliminary report on the election campaign and to CRTA's monitoring of electoral reform.
On the judiciary, the report finds no progress. It recalls that in January 2026 Parliament amended laws governing the judiciary and prosecution under urgent procedure, on the proposal of a Member of Parliament and without a transparent and inclusive consultation process. In its ex-post assessment of April 2026, the Venice Commission found that these amendments removed some of the safeguards for judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy introduced by the 2023 constitutional amendments. Subsequent amendments adopted in May and June 2026 addressed a considerable part of its recommendations, while two remain partially implemented. Nevertheless, according to the Commission, undue political pressure on the judiciary and the prosecution "increased significantly with little to no follow-up from the relevant institutions".
In the fight against corruption, the Commission assesses limited progress. It cites the Second Compliance Report of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) of 18 August 2026, according to which Serbia had satisfactorily addressed only three of 24 recommendations from the fifth evaluation round. The corruption investigations launched after the canopy collapse at the Novi Sad railway station have yet to be completed, attempts to unduly influence the Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime (POOC) increased, and a majority of the activities of the 2024-2026 anti-corruption action plan were not achieved. Amendments to the laws on lobbying, corruption prevention and political financing were adopted, but the latter two did not address all recommendations of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).
The report further states that political debate and decision-making continued to be "de facto steered by the President in a manner not intended by the Constitution". Parliament held only one session for MP questions to the government in 2026, and the use of urgent procedure increased to 18%. Civil society continued to operate in a restricted environment, facing increasing pressure, smear campaigns and attacks, including from high-level officials. The police search of four civil society organisation offices in February 2025 has resulted in no indictments and, according to the report, was widely perceived as an act of intimidation. The report also notes new reports of spyware attacks on human rights defenders, student activists and opposition politicians, with little judicial follow-up.
In foreign policy, the Commission finds no progress: Serbia aligns only partially with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and does not align with EU restrictive measures against Russia, which, combined with recurrent anti-EU narratives, "raised questions about Serbia's strategic orientation". The Commission reiterates that the overall pace of negotiations depends on progress on the rule of law and on the normalisation of relations with Kosovo. Against this backdrop, the report places legislative steps adopted in 2026 - on elections, the judiciary and media regulation - alongside an assessment that implementation and results remain limited. The findings follow the Commission's 2026 Rule of Law Report on Serbia; further international assessments are collected on the Serbia in reports page.
In its introduction, the report places these findings in the current political context. It notes that mass student and citizen protests continued across the country over allegations of government corruption and the perceived lack of accountability and transparency, particularly in relation to the 2024 Novi Sad railway station canopy collapse, which killed 16 people, and that the incident and its aftermath "further deepened the polarisation of Serbian society". Early parliamentary elections were held on 25 October 2026; according to the preliminary results cited in the report, the Student List, which grew out of the mass student and citizen movement, obtained an absolute majority of mandates.
The Commission also observes that the anti-EU narrative remains present not only in media outlets but is "also used by political office holders, including at highest levels", and calls on the authorities, as a matter of priority, to take much more responsibility for communicating proactively and objectively on the EU accession process and for countering disinformation. The report further states that the funeral of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić in September 2026, held with official support and in the presence of senior officials and military, contributed to the glorification of a convicted war criminal "in a manner contradicting the values underpinning Serbia's path towards the European Union".
On freedom of expression, Serbia is assessed as being between an early stage and some level of preparation. The report describes a deteriorating environment for journalists, inconsistent implementation of media legislation and a more concentrated media market. The Council of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM), absent since November 2024, was established in July 2026, but, according to the report, it was unable to decide on expanding the list of media outlets subject to campaign monitoring or to rule on complaints during the campaign. The Commission cites the preliminary findings of the international election observation mission (IEOM), according to which "the REM failed to provide effective oversight and timely remedies for election-related violations". CRTA.Plus has followed the election of the REM Council and the work of the media regulator.
On elections, the report describes the adoption of six electoral laws in May, July and August 2026 as a step forward, while noting that not all of ODIHR's key recommendations were implemented. The Commission for auditing the voter register was set up in February 2026, but the audit "was not fully performed before the October parliamentary elections", and "widespread mistrust in the integrity of the voter register persisted". Priority recommendations that remain outstanding include the separation of state and political parties, a meaningful audit of the voter register, oversight of campaigns and their financing, and measures to prevent voter intimidation. These findings correspond to those of CRTA's preliminary report on the election campaign and to CRTA's monitoring of electoral reform.
On the judiciary, the report finds no progress. It recalls that in January 2026 Parliament amended laws governing the judiciary and prosecution under urgent procedure, on the proposal of a Member of Parliament and without a transparent and inclusive consultation process. In its ex-post assessment of April 2026, the Venice Commission found that these amendments removed some of the safeguards for judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy introduced by the 2023 constitutional amendments. Subsequent amendments adopted in May and June 2026 addressed a considerable part of its recommendations, while two remain partially implemented. Nevertheless, according to the Commission, undue political pressure on the judiciary and the prosecution "increased significantly with little to no follow-up from the relevant institutions".
According to the Commission, undue political pressure on the judiciary and the prosecution "increased significantly with little to no follow-up from the relevant institutions".
The report notes that the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council "both remained largely passive", and that neither Parliament nor the government acted on cases of undue influence.In the fight against corruption, the Commission assesses limited progress. It cites the Second Compliance Report of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) of 18 August 2026, according to which Serbia had satisfactorily addressed only three of 24 recommendations from the fifth evaluation round. The corruption investigations launched after the canopy collapse at the Novi Sad railway station have yet to be completed, attempts to unduly influence the Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime (POOC) increased, and a majority of the activities of the 2024-2026 anti-corruption action plan were not achieved. Amendments to the laws on lobbying, corruption prevention and political financing were adopted, but the latter two did not address all recommendations of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).
The report further states that political debate and decision-making continued to be "de facto steered by the President in a manner not intended by the Constitution". Parliament held only one session for MP questions to the government in 2026, and the use of urgent procedure increased to 18%. Civil society continued to operate in a restricted environment, facing increasing pressure, smear campaigns and attacks, including from high-level officials. The police search of four civil society organisation offices in February 2025 has resulted in no indictments and, according to the report, was widely perceived as an act of intimidation. The report also notes new reports of spyware attacks on human rights defenders, student activists and opposition politicians, with little judicial follow-up.
In foreign policy, the Commission finds no progress: Serbia aligns only partially with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and does not align with EU restrictive measures against Russia, which, combined with recurrent anti-EU narratives, "raised questions about Serbia's strategic orientation". The Commission reiterates that the overall pace of negotiations depends on progress on the rule of law and on the normalisation of relations with Kosovo. Against this backdrop, the report places legislative steps adopted in 2026 - on elections, the judiciary and media regulation - alongside an assessment that implementation and results remain limited. The findings follow the Commission's 2026 Rule of Law Report on Serbia; further international assessments are collected on the Serbia in reports page.
