What citizens think matters

Public opinion data based on CRTA research, examined in their political and societal context.

The collapse of the canopy at the Novi Sad railway station, the response of institutions and authorities, and the beginning of the protests pushed public sentiment to a historic low: by December 2024, a record 57% of citizens believed the country was heading in the wrong direction, while only 36% felt it was on the right track.

The wave of civic mobilization that followed, and the unprecedented turnout at protests across Serbia, briefly reversed that trend. By February 2025, the share of those who saw the country moving in the wrong direction had dropped sharply to 38% - a sign that many citizens felt change was within reach.

That optimism, however, did not last. As elections were not called, and as pressure on protesters, students, and civil society intensified, public confidence eroded. By September 2025, the share of citizens who believe Serbia is moving in the wrong direction had climbed back to 53% - a clear majority, and a return to the pessimism that defined the period before the protests.

Corruption remains the most frequently cited problem in the country, though its prominence has declined over the course of 2025 - falling from 32% in February to 26% in September. In parallel, the share of citizens who identify the ruling parties and Aleksandar Vučić as the country's main problem has more than doubled, rising from 9% to 23% over the same period. These trends suggest that part of the public increasingly associates corruption directly with those in power, rather than viewing it as an abstract or structural phenomenon.

Meanwhile, personal economic concerns have remained broadly stable, cited by around one in five citizens throughout the year. The student movement and blockades, which emerged as a major political force in early 2025, are also seen by roughly one in five citizens as the country's most pressing issue - a share that has held steady since April despite the protests losing some of their initial momentum.

A significant shift in public opinion on EU membership was recorded in April 2025, when the gap between those who would vote in favor of joining the EU and those who would vote against reached 18 percentage points - the widest margin recorded in a long time. This shift is likely linked to two specific events that took place during this period: a cycling relay to Strasbourg and a run to Brussels, both organized by student activists and directed at European institutions. These actions brought the question of European integration back into public focus in a direct and visible way. The data suggest that a substantial share of previous opponents moved into the undecided category during this period rather than switching directly to support.

By September 2025, the balance had returned to near parity, with 51% saying they would vote against membership and 49% in favor. These findings indicate that reducing resistance to EU membership requires a more direct connection between EU institutions and non-state actors - and a politics of integration that speaks to citizens rather than governments.

Public support for the protests that erupted following the collapse of the canopy at the Novi Sad railway station has remained consistently high throughout the period monitored. At the peak, in February 2025, nearly two thirds of citizens - 64% - said they supported the protests, while only 34% opposed them.

Since then, support has gradually declined, reaching 58% in September 2025, while the share of those who do not support the protests has grown to 39%. Despite this erosion, a clear and stable majority of Serbian citizens continues to back the movement. The share of those who say they do not know has remained negligible throughout, suggesting that the protests have left very little room for indifference - citizens have largely taken sides.

Among ruling party voters, only 5% see EU membership as the best way to protect Serbia's national interests. Thirty-six percent favor an alliance with Russia and China, while half believe neutrality - in effect, maintaining the current course - is the best option available.

Among those who voted for the student list, the picture is almost a mirror image. Forty-two percent view EU membership as a strategic goal, 41% prefer neutrality, and only 9% favor an alliance with Russia and China.
These data reveal a deep geopolitical divide between the two electoral blocs. While the ruling party's electorate is considerably more inclined toward alternatives to Western integration, supporters of the student list predominantly see EU membership as Serbia's strategic direction. The contrast is sharpest on the question of Russia and China: what one in three ruling party voters see as a desirable alliance, only one in eleven student list voters would endorse.