Believing in it, unhappy with it
Two findings sit at the centre of the June 2026 survey. Fifty-nine percent of citizens say democracy is preferable to any other form of government, and only 15% that authoritarian rule can sometimes be better; at the same time, 60% are dissatisfied with how democracy actually functions in Serbia, and just 37% are satisfied.
These are not in tension, because they measure different things: one is faith in democracy as an ideal, the other is the lived experience of the Serbian state. Citizens have kept the first and lost the second.
These are not in tension, because they measure different things: one is faith in democracy as an ideal, the other is the lived experience of the Serbian state. Citizens have kept the first and lost the second.
Dissatisfaction is also rising: it stood at 55% in February 2024 and is 60% now, even though most citizens still consider democracy the best system. The widening gap between a democratic ideal that holds and a state seen to fall short of it is the central point of this chapter.
Two publics, not one
The dissatisfaction is not evenly shared. The survey's defining finding is that attitudes to democracy split almost perfectly by party and by news source. Democracy is called preferable by 85% of student-list voters but only 38% of ruling-party (SNS) voters; the idea of a president governing without oversight is acceptable to 78% of SNS voters but just 2% of student-list supporters; and acceptance of overriding constitutional limits climbs to 58-66% among ruling-party voters and audiences of the pro-government commercial channels, while staying in the low single digits among those who follow critically oriented media.
The crucial point is what this pattern means: the pro-authoritarian position is not a drift of the whole society but a concentrated bloc, anchored in the governing party and its media. Democratic norms command a clear majority everywhere else.
The crucial point is what this pattern means: the pro-authoritarian position is not a drift of the whole society but a concentrated bloc, anchored in the governing party and its media. Democratic norms command a clear majority everywhere else.
So the pressure on Serbian democracy is not coming from a public that has turned against it. A governing bloc whose own base is unusually comfortable with unchecked power sits over a public that, in the main, still wants limits, oversight and accountability. The direction of public opinion, if anything, runs the other way: acceptance of an autocratic ruler has fallen steadily, from 44% in November 2022 to 31% in April 2025 and 28% now. The pressure on democratic limits is coming from the top down, not from the public.
Who really holds power
The imbalance shows even in what citizens know. Under Serbia's constitution the government, led by the prime minister, is the centre of executive power - yet only 53% can correctly name the current prime minister (Đuro Macut), while far more can identify and rate the president. That a public can barely place the person meant to run the government, but holds firm views on the president, points to a gap between the constitutional order and where power is actually seen to lie.
Where the public itself is divided
Where the public is more divided is on the trade-off between democracy and results - and that split is itself largely partisan. Overall, 46% say it is more important for a government to be effective even if it is not democratic, against 41% who would keep democracy even at the cost of effectiveness.
But the near-tie dissolves by camp: 73% of ruling-party voters, and 65-70% of pro-government-media audiences, choose effectiveness, while 66% of student-list voters and 62% of N1/Nova S viewers choose democracy. What looks like national ambivalence is, again, two camps pulling in opposite directions.
But the near-tie dissolves by camp: 73% of ruling-party voters, and 65-70% of pro-government-media audiences, choose effectiveness, while 66% of student-list voters and 62% of N1/Nova S viewers choose democracy. What looks like national ambivalence is, again, two camps pulling in opposite directions.
Where the camps come closer
The clearest exception to the pattern is minority rights, where the camps move closer together. Half of citizens (50%) accept that a real democracy must protect minorities even when that limits the majority, and 31% reject it; agreement runs from 46% among ruling-party voters to 61% among student-list voters - a far narrower gap than on other questions.
A committed authoritarian minority
The outcome is not benign. A stable majority for democracy in principle still coexists with a substantial minority ready to set it aside: 15% say authoritarian rule can sometimes be preferable, and 28% would accept a president governing without oversight.
The problem, then, is precisely located: not the public's belief in democracy, but the state's failure to practise it. The demand for democracy is intact and, as the protests and the vote intention show, increasingly organised: the same citizens who defend constitutional limits are turning out behind a movement that now leads the electoral field. The gap Serbia has to close is not between the public and democracy; it is between the public's democratic expectations and a state - and a governing party - that half the country no longer trusts to meet them.
The problem, then, is precisely located: not the public's belief in democracy, but the state's failure to practise it. The demand for democracy is intact and, as the protests and the vote intention show, increasingly organised: the same citizens who defend constitutional limits are turning out behind a movement that now leads the electoral field. The gap Serbia has to close is not between the public and democracy; it is between the public's democratic expectations and a state - and a governing party - that half the country no longer trusts to meet them.
Source: CRTA public opinion survey, conducted with the Democracy Action Lab (Stanford CDDRL); fieldwork by Pulse Research. Face-to-face (CAPI), n=2324, representative of the adult population of Serbia (excl. Kosovo), 10-24 June 2026, margin of error ±2.08%. Historical figures (commitment to democracy 2016-2022; the 2022 forced-choice; acceptance of autocratic rule 2022-2025) are from earlier CRTA surveys using the same face-to-face method; the decade series tracks the "democracy is the best system" item, a slightly different question from the 2026 "democracy is preferable" item.
