Leaning west, barely
On the headline question, Serbia tilts west - barely. Asked on a 1-to-10 scale whether the country should build closer ties with Russia or with the European Union, 42% lean toward the EU and 30% toward Russia, while 21% would prefer neutrality and keep their distance from both, and 7% do not know.
It is a plurality for Europe, not a settled majority, and the sizeable neutral bloc is a standing reminder that a large share of the public is unpersuaded by either pole. More important, that 42-to-30 average combines two groups with almost opposite views.
It is a plurality for Europe, not a settled majority, and the sizeable neutral bloc is a standing reminder that a large share of the public is unpersuaded by either pole. More important, that 42-to-30 average combines two groups with almost opposite views.
Split by age and education
The first divide is generational and educational. Among citizens aged 18 to 29, 62% lean toward the EU and just 15% toward Russia; among those 65 and older the balance inverts almost exactly, 52% for Russia and 22% for the EU.
Education pulls the same way - EU orientation runs from 17% among those with only primary schooling to 60% among the university-educated - and Vojvodina is the most pro-European region, at 54%. A pro-EU Serbia and a pro-Russian Serbia already coexist, separated largely by age and schooling.
Education pulls the same way - EU orientation runs from 17% among those with only primary schooling to 60% among the university-educated - and Vojvodina is the most pro-European region, at 54%. A pro-EU Serbia and a pro-Russian Serbia already coexist, separated largely by age and schooling.
The same domestic fault line
The sharper divide is political, and it maps onto the fault line that runs through the rest of the survey. Only 15% of ruling-party (SNS) voters want closer ties with the EU, against 60% who favour Russia; among student-list supporters the figures are almost the reverse, 75% for the EU and 10% for Russia.
The media divide is just as large: audiences of the public broadcaster (RTS, 56% pro-Russia) and the commercial channels (Pink, Happy, Informer, 61%) lean heavily toward Russia, while followers of N1 and Nova S (69% pro-EU), social networks (62%) and portals (58%) lean just as heavily toward the EU.
Foreign policy is not treated as a standalone calculation about interests; it is bound up with the same political identity - by party and by news source - that shapes how citizens see democracy, corruption and their own institutions.
The media divide is just as large: audiences of the public broadcaster (RTS, 56% pro-Russia) and the commercial channels (Pink, Happy, Informer, 61%) lean heavily toward Russia, while followers of N1 and Nova S (69% pro-EU), social networks (62%) and portals (58%) lean just as heavily toward the EU.
Foreign policy is not treated as a standalone calculation about interests; it is bound up with the same political identity - by party and by news source - that shapes how citizens see democracy, corruption and their own institutions.
The media environment behind it
Part of that lean is produced upstream, in the media these voters watch. CRTA's media monitoring of the main news and morning programmes on the national broadcasters (RTS 1, Pink, Prva and Happy) found that in the first half of 2026 the European Union was covered overwhelmingly negatively - 84% of EU mentions were negative and only 16% positive - while Russia was framed positively in 88% of its mentions and China in 99%.
This is not incidental: narratives against the EU make up 40% of all recorded manipulations about foreign actors, almost three times the next category, and the main source of that content is not foreign outlets or social media but domestic television itself, which produces between 67% and 79% of it.
The audiences that lean hardest against the EU in the survey - ruling-party voters and viewers of the public and commercial channels - are the same audiences consuming this picture day after day. The point is not that television alone dictates opinion, but that the anti-EU tilt among government-aligned citizens has a clear and measurable source in the information they are given.
This is not incidental: narratives against the EU make up 40% of all recorded manipulations about foreign actors, almost three times the next category, and the main source of that content is not foreign outlets or social media but domestic television itself, which produces between 67% and 79% of it.
The audiences that lean hardest against the EU in the survey - ruling-party voters and viewers of the public and commercial channels - are the same audiences consuming this picture day after day. The point is not that television alone dictates opinion, but that the anti-EU tilt among government-aligned citizens has a clear and measurable source in the information they are given.
CRTA media monitoring 2026
Anti-EU narrative dominates; pro-Russian messaging stays strong
Numbers above bars = share of negative (ANTI) coverage that year
PRO
ANTI
Average negative:EU 73%RUSSIA 13%
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
Jan-Jun 2026
EU
25%
56%
74%
79%
86%
88%
84%
72%
82%
84%
RUSSIA
10%
7%
4%
9%
5%
27%
20%
20%
22%
12%
Dashed line = 50% (negative becomes the majority). Hover a bar for exact figures.
Source: CRTA media monitoring; Sample: selected national TV channels
CRTA media monitoring 2026
Anti-EU narratives dominate manipulative media coverage
Number of mentions in TV segments
EU ANTI
40%
RUSSIA PRO
15%
US ANTI
14%
NATO ANTI
10%
CHINA PRO
12%
US PRO
9%
Source: CRTA media monitoring, January 1 - June 14, 2026; Sample: selected national TV channels
The same picture a year earlier
The same divide showed up a year earlier, on a different question. In a September 2025 CRTA survey, citizens were asked the best way for Serbia to protect its national interests - and the same divide appeared.
Among ruling-party voters, only 5% chose EU membership, against 36% who favoured an alliance with Russia and China and around half who preferred neutrality; among student-list voters, 42% named EU membership and just 9% an alliance with Russia and China. Set beside the June 2026 reading - 15% of ruling-party voters leaning EU against 75% of student-list voters - the picture is strikingly consistent across a year and across two differently worded questions.
A citizen's orientation to the world follows their domestic political camp, not the other way round.
Among ruling-party voters, only 5% chose EU membership, against 36% who favoured an alliance with Russia and China and around half who preferred neutrality; among student-list voters, 42% named EU membership and just 9% an alliance with Russia and China. Set beside the June 2026 reading - 15% of ruling-party voters leaning EU against 75% of student-list voters - the picture is strikingly consistent across a year and across two differently worded questions.
A citizen's orientation to the world follows their domestic political camp, not the other way round.
It moves with the domestic contest
Two things follow. First, the pro-European plurality is real but concentrated - strongest among the young, the educated, and the roughly half of the electorate outside the governing bloc, and weakest exactly where the government and its media reach furthest.
The EU's domestic constituency, in other words, is largely the same as the pro-democracy, anti-government constituency; European integration is tied to the domestic contest, not separable from it. Second, because orientation is bound so tightly to political identity, it will not shift on the strength of foreign-policy arguments alone - it will move with the broader fight over who governs and whom citizens trust.
The one genuinely open space is the neutral fifth of the public, the segment least tied to either camp. The direction Serbia faces abroad, in the end, is inseparable from the divide it is living through at home.
The EU's domestic constituency, in other words, is largely the same as the pro-democracy, anti-government constituency; European integration is tied to the domestic contest, not separable from it. Second, because orientation is bound so tightly to political identity, it will not shift on the strength of foreign-policy arguments alone - it will move with the broader fight over who governs and whom citizens trust.
The one genuinely open space is the neutral fifth of the public, the segment least tied to either camp. The direction Serbia faces abroad, in the end, is inseparable from the divide it is living through at home.
Source: CRTA public opinion survey, conducted with the Democracy Action Lab (Stanford CDDRL); fieldwork by Pulse Research. Face-to-face (CAPI), n=2324, representative of the adult population of Serbia (excl. Kosovo), 10-24 June 2026, margin of error ±2.08%. The comparison on protecting Serbia's national interests, by voter group, is from CRTA's September 2025 survey (CATI, n=2020) - the chart currently shown on the Public Sentiment page. The media findings are from CRTA's media monitoring of national broadcasters (RTS 1, Pink, Prva, Happy), 1 January - 14 June 2026, n=5,384 mentions of foreign actors.
