Update
Polling stations
There are 8,392 polling stations, 119 more than in 2023; for 18 per cent of them the area voters com...
Chapters of the report
1 Political context Unresolved violence, attempts to discredit observers and an ever more open use of state institutions for party purposes. 49 people pardoned or granted abolition, with no published list 2 Conduct of the elections: electoral institutions and actors The institutions formally carried out their tasks, but did not resolve the key problems of transparency, lawfulness and equality in the electoral process. the Agency ruled on 12 of CRTA’s 37 complaints 3 Voter register The register was closed without an audit; notes by members of the Commission describe it from the inside for the first time. 6,450,523 voters in a register closed without an audit 4 Polling stations More polling stations than in 2023, but also confusion over some addresses that has not been corrected since the last elections. 328 addresses listed under two or three polling stations 5 Position of observers From claims of bias to calls for arrests, while the impartiality of international missions was disputed in advance. 274 pro-government media articles on CRTA, 85 per cent negative 6 The course of the election campaign The core of the report: field findings on violence, pressure on voters and the use of institutions for party mobilisation. 116 incidents of physical and verbal violence in 34 municipalities and cities 7 Media and information A pronounced imbalance in favour of the authorities on television, polarised portals and manipulative front-page headlines. 72 per cent of airtime on broadcasters with national coverage went to the authorities 8 Observation methodology How the report was made: the scope of observation, media monitoring and the standards it rests on. 5,546 reports from 45 long-term observersSummary of the report
The course of the election campaign was marked by circumstances that threatened free participation in the elections, reflected in attempts to restrict freedom of information, the exercise of the right to vote, participation in the campaign, freedom of expression and association, and independent election observation. Efforts were recorded to bring the flow of information under control to the benefit of the authorities, from control of the media and attacks on social media channels to deepening distrust of independent domestic and international assessments of the elections.
Most indicators deteriorated compared with the first part of the campaign, which had already been assessed as unprecedented. Instead of applying the law equally and ensuring equal conditions for all electoral contestants, some institutions - from ministries to municipalities - took part in engineering the electoral infrastructure and the electoral offer. This was visible in the organisation of the elections and in the handling of participants' safety, while media and anti-corruption oversight remained without effect.
Following the controversial decisions of the election administration to narrow, in a non-transparent and discriminatory manner, the space for voters abroad to vote on 25 October, the Republic Electoral Commission (REC) - which carried out all its other activities within the statutory deadlines - did not act in a timely manner on the complaints of the “Student List - Students Are Winning” concerning these decisions, and then voted to reject them. The model and composition of the election administration showed once again that political outvoting, which favours the majority even in the expanded composition, plays the main role in whether decisions are taken or not. The REC thus did not adopt a proposal by some of its members to specify how applications to vote outside the polling station are to be submitted and recorded. This opened the way for inconsistent, and also unlawful, practice in different parts of Serbia. As a consequence, the first case was recorded (Zaječar) in which a local election commission decided that a political party may register voters for voting from home instead of the voters themselves - which potentially opens the way for undue influence on voters and for undermining their free will.
This electoral process is accompanied by suspicions that, in the conduct of electoral actions, misuse occurred at various levels in institutions and state bodies, some of which may also constitute criminal offences. The misuse concerns candidacy, where the aim was to influence who would appear on the ballot, and voting, where an unknown number of voters in the country and abroad have in practice been hindered in exercising their right to vote.
A number of voters have contacted CRTA Election Observation Mission who claim, with documentation, that without their consent they were transferred from their place of permanent residence in Serbia to vote in Banja Luka, on the basis of forged applications submitted in their name, in some cases using invalid identity documents.
Official data on signature certifications show that almost half of the confirmed candidate lists are under suspicion as to the authenticity of their supporting signatures and the regularity of their collection for the candidacy. 7. Russian Party, 12. Liberal Green Party, 13. I Choose Justice - I Choose the Future - Coalition SNAGA, 14. Party of Russian-Serbian Unity, 15. Dad, This Is for You, 16. Vladimir Gajić - Alternative for Serbia, 18. Mother Serbia - GRUDA. On average 98 per cent of their certifications come from municipal administrations, in places with no recorded activity by the lists, and the distribution of certified signatures resembles predetermined quotas. In 16 of Belgrade's 17 municipalities “round” or almost identical figures appear, while among other places with illogical certification patterns Požarevac, Kragujevac and Kraljevo stand out in particular.
The elections of 25 October are being held on the basis of a voter register that has not been audited, because the competent authorities did not give the Commission for the audit of the voter register full access to data or the conditions for effective work. The system for maintaining the Unified Voter Register still does not distinguish error from misuse, from double entries to fictitious permanent residence. The figure of a 98% match, which the Office for IT and eGovernment published without the Commission's approval, is not accurate and does not measure any of these phenomena. By examining the records, members of the Commission confirmed patterns of organised entry of voters before the 2023 elections, and with them CRTA's earlier assessments of the Belgrade elections; the same signals are present in 2026, so CRTA Election Observation Mission considers that the risk of manipulation of the voter register exists in these elections as well.
A review of a sample of voter register extracts did not show that voters had been added or omitted. However, it was established that more than 30,000 voters do not appear in the extracts in the alphabetical order of surnames in which the polling board looks for them. There is therefore a risk that they will be prevented from voting if the polling board does not find them. CRTA Election Observation Mission calls on the REC to instruct polling boards, when they do not find a voter in the expected place, to check other places in the extract as well. It also calls on voters who are not found to request an additional check of the entire extract.
The prevalence of incidents in the election campaign undermined the conditions for free participation. By the last week of the campaign, 116 incidents on the ground involving physical violence and verbal threats had been recorded - an average of three a day since the elections were called. Gatherings of activists and citizens at campaign events across the country put participants' safety, rather than the lists' programmes, in the foreground.
Instead of providing equal and unquestionable protection to all participants in the electoral process, the police acted inconsistently and often late in situations posing a risk to opposition candidates, while at the same time being efficiently and preventively engaged in securing the activities of the ruling list. There is no record of police officers pursuing cases or establishing responsibility for attacks on opposition activists and citizens. This is compounded by the fact that opposition activists, above all those of the Student List, were subjected to surveillance, interception, searches and being brought in for informative interviews. These findings do not make it possible to conclude in each individual case that the police acted unlawfully, but they point to the need for the Ministry of the Interior (MUP) to provide clear information on the basis for its actions and to ensure equal protection for all citizens, in line with Articles 5 and 67 of the Law on Police.
In the final stage of the campaign, with the closing rallies of the two main rivals in these elections announced, CRTA Election Observation Mission recorded that the “Student List - Students Are Winning” publicly called on the citizens of Novi Sad not to react to the rally of the “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list, which was held in the city on 16 October in a largely calm atmosphere with isolated incidents. Representatives of “United Serbia” occasionally called for tensions to be calmed during the campaign, but at the same time accused the other side of violence.
In addition, because of claims in public, in pro-government media, that incite intolerance towards election observers by presenting them as participants in alleged sabotage and the overthrow of the government, and that announce their withdrawal on election day, CRTA Election Observation Mission wrote to the Ministry of the Interior (MUP) on three occasions requesting a meeting on the security risks to its observers. MUP responded to the third request on 20 October, proposing a meeting on 21 October.
There was no boundary between the state and the ruling list, and Aleksandar Vučić's resignation as President of the Republic in the middle of the campaign did not bring a change in conduct or narrative that would have separated the two in the eyes of the public. The campaign was marked by more than 1,500 activities of public officials and more than 650 cases with elements of misuse of public resources and office - involving public officials and institutions, as well as the “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list, a third of whose activities contained potential misuse or manipulation of the law.
The freedom and equality of these elections were also undermined by cases of pressure on voters and attempts to win their support by material means. In more than 250 cases jobs, contracts, assistance and public services were used as leverage to win support, most often in public institutions and enterprises.
The imbalance in the media deepened by the end of the campaign. On broadcasters with national coverage, the share of the authorities rose from around two thirds to almost three quarters of the time. Beyond overall time, the share of positive portrayal of the authorities rose to over 50 per cent, compared with 38 per cent in the first half of the campaign. The “Student List”, which consistently receives the most opposition airtime, is still portrayed negatively in more than 80 per cent of its time.
A change in the representation of the opposition was recorded on Radio Television of Serbia (RTS), but the pronounced imbalance in regular programming remained. The share of time devoted to the opposition rose from 15 to 28 per cent. However, a more even representation of political actors was confined to election blocks. In regular programming, which accounts for 43 per cent of total time in extended prime time, representatives of the authorities received as much as 94 per cent of the time devoted to political actors.
After his resignation as President of the Republic, Aleksandar Vučić's overall presence on all broadcasters with national coverage fell from over half to a third of the time - primarily owing to a change in the reporting of Radio Television of Serbia, where he appears only in election programming. A decline was also recorded on other broadcasters, but Aleksandar Vučić still accounts for almost every other second of their programming (43 per cent). Aleksandar Vučić remained the actor given the most media space. He took up more time than the entire opposition, while the number of his live link-ups almost tripled after the resignation, from 27 in the first part of the campaign to 78 towards the end of the second. In addition, the glorification of Aleksandar Vučić on pro-government portals intensified markedly in the second half of the campaign, when the number of such articles doubled.
Pro-government media did not merely promote the authorities. In their online editions an image of the opposition and independent actors as a threat was systematically built. The number of articles presenting them as a source of violence and destabilisation rose from 1,500 in the first part of the campaign to at least 2,700. Almost 300 articles used the “colour revolution” narrative. Informer has broadcast at least 16 recordings of wiretapped conversations since the start of the campaign. Critically oriented media reported critically on the authorities, but in a more balanced way. The polarisation of the media space is therefore not symmetrical.
Political advertising was dominated by the “United Serbia” list, which accounted for as much as 93 per cent of the total airtime of advertisements broadcast on broadcasters with national coverage. The “Ivica Dačić - A Factor of Stability” coalition had four per cent, the “Student List” two, and Authentic Right just one per cent of advertising time.
The authorities and pro-government media systematically discredit credible domestic and international observers and actively work to deepen distrust of their findings, in order to dispute in advance any credible interpretation of election day and the election outcome. This creates a serious risk that independent findings on election day will be relativised, or even disqualified, before they are even published. This campaign is led by the highest representatives of the authorities, the Acting President of the Republic and the former President, who is also the leader of the ruling coalition. Together with pro-government media, they are announcing “chaos” on election day, including violence, and spreading unfounded claims about CRTA Election Observation Mission, including that it plans to withdraw its observers. At the same time they call into question the credibility of the international observation missions of ODIHR, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.
The common denominator of the findings on oversight institutions is formal functioning without real effect. The Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) received several dozen complaints but did not take a single decision because of the political blockade of its Council. The Agency for Prevention of Corruption (ACAS) adopted the interpretation that an official who uses resources from another portfolio does not misuse public resources.
By the cut-off date of this report CRTA had filed 65 complaints concerning irregularities and violations of the law in the elections: 28 with the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media and 37 with the Agency for Prevention of Corruption. REM has not taken a single decision. The Agency has decided on 12 complaints and in more than half of them found no violation of the law.
A record number of citizens - 1,600 - contacted CRTA Election Observation Mission during this campaign. Citizens most often asked CRTA for information and support concerning voting abroad, the voter register and other issues related to exercising the right to vote. They also contacted it over suspected electoral manipulation, above all vote buying.
Most indicators deteriorated compared with the first part of the campaign, which had already been assessed as unprecedented. Instead of applying the law equally and ensuring equal conditions for all electoral contestants, some institutions - from ministries to municipalities - took part in engineering the electoral infrastructure and the electoral offer. This was visible in the organisation of the elections and in the handling of participants' safety, while media and anti-corruption oversight remained without effect.
Following the controversial decisions of the election administration to narrow, in a non-transparent and discriminatory manner, the space for voters abroad to vote on 25 October, the Republic Electoral Commission (REC) - which carried out all its other activities within the statutory deadlines - did not act in a timely manner on the complaints of the “Student List - Students Are Winning” concerning these decisions, and then voted to reject them. The model and composition of the election administration showed once again that political outvoting, which favours the majority even in the expanded composition, plays the main role in whether decisions are taken or not. The REC thus did not adopt a proposal by some of its members to specify how applications to vote outside the polling station are to be submitted and recorded. This opened the way for inconsistent, and also unlawful, practice in different parts of Serbia. As a consequence, the first case was recorded (Zaječar) in which a local election commission decided that a political party may register voters for voting from home instead of the voters themselves - which potentially opens the way for undue influence on voters and for undermining their free will.
This electoral process is accompanied by suspicions that, in the conduct of electoral actions, misuse occurred at various levels in institutions and state bodies, some of which may also constitute criminal offences. The misuse concerns candidacy, where the aim was to influence who would appear on the ballot, and voting, where an unknown number of voters in the country and abroad have in practice been hindered in exercising their right to vote.
A number of voters have contacted CRTA Election Observation Mission who claim, with documentation, that without their consent they were transferred from their place of permanent residence in Serbia to vote in Banja Luka, on the basis of forged applications submitted in their name, in some cases using invalid identity documents.
Official data on signature certifications show that almost half of the confirmed candidate lists are under suspicion as to the authenticity of their supporting signatures and the regularity of their collection for the candidacy. 7. Russian Party, 12. Liberal Green Party, 13. I Choose Justice - I Choose the Future - Coalition SNAGA, 14. Party of Russian-Serbian Unity, 15. Dad, This Is for You, 16. Vladimir Gajić - Alternative for Serbia, 18. Mother Serbia - GRUDA. On average 98 per cent of their certifications come from municipal administrations, in places with no recorded activity by the lists, and the distribution of certified signatures resembles predetermined quotas. In 16 of Belgrade's 17 municipalities “round” or almost identical figures appear, while among other places with illogical certification patterns Požarevac, Kragujevac and Kraljevo stand out in particular.
The elections of 25 October are being held on the basis of a voter register that has not been audited, because the competent authorities did not give the Commission for the audit of the voter register full access to data or the conditions for effective work. The system for maintaining the Unified Voter Register still does not distinguish error from misuse, from double entries to fictitious permanent residence. The figure of a 98% match, which the Office for IT and eGovernment published without the Commission's approval, is not accurate and does not measure any of these phenomena. By examining the records, members of the Commission confirmed patterns of organised entry of voters before the 2023 elections, and with them CRTA's earlier assessments of the Belgrade elections; the same signals are present in 2026, so CRTA Election Observation Mission considers that the risk of manipulation of the voter register exists in these elections as well.
A review of a sample of voter register extracts did not show that voters had been added or omitted. However, it was established that more than 30,000 voters do not appear in the extracts in the alphabetical order of surnames in which the polling board looks for them. There is therefore a risk that they will be prevented from voting if the polling board does not find them. CRTA Election Observation Mission calls on the REC to instruct polling boards, when they do not find a voter in the expected place, to check other places in the extract as well. It also calls on voters who are not found to request an additional check of the entire extract.
The prevalence of incidents in the election campaign undermined the conditions for free participation. By the last week of the campaign, 116 incidents on the ground involving physical violence and verbal threats had been recorded - an average of three a day since the elections were called. Gatherings of activists and citizens at campaign events across the country put participants' safety, rather than the lists' programmes, in the foreground.
Instead of providing equal and unquestionable protection to all participants in the electoral process, the police acted inconsistently and often late in situations posing a risk to opposition candidates, while at the same time being efficiently and preventively engaged in securing the activities of the ruling list. There is no record of police officers pursuing cases or establishing responsibility for attacks on opposition activists and citizens. This is compounded by the fact that opposition activists, above all those of the Student List, were subjected to surveillance, interception, searches and being brought in for informative interviews. These findings do not make it possible to conclude in each individual case that the police acted unlawfully, but they point to the need for the Ministry of the Interior (MUP) to provide clear information on the basis for its actions and to ensure equal protection for all citizens, in line with Articles 5 and 67 of the Law on Police.
In the final stage of the campaign, with the closing rallies of the two main rivals in these elections announced, CRTA Election Observation Mission recorded that the “Student List - Students Are Winning” publicly called on the citizens of Novi Sad not to react to the rally of the “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list, which was held in the city on 16 October in a largely calm atmosphere with isolated incidents. Representatives of “United Serbia” occasionally called for tensions to be calmed during the campaign, but at the same time accused the other side of violence.
In addition, because of claims in public, in pro-government media, that incite intolerance towards election observers by presenting them as participants in alleged sabotage and the overthrow of the government, and that announce their withdrawal on election day, CRTA Election Observation Mission wrote to the Ministry of the Interior (MUP) on three occasions requesting a meeting on the security risks to its observers. MUP responded to the third request on 20 October, proposing a meeting on 21 October.
There was no boundary between the state and the ruling list, and Aleksandar Vučić's resignation as President of the Republic in the middle of the campaign did not bring a change in conduct or narrative that would have separated the two in the eyes of the public. The campaign was marked by more than 1,500 activities of public officials and more than 650 cases with elements of misuse of public resources and office - involving public officials and institutions, as well as the “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list, a third of whose activities contained potential misuse or manipulation of the law.
The freedom and equality of these elections were also undermined by cases of pressure on voters and attempts to win their support by material means. In more than 250 cases jobs, contracts, assistance and public services were used as leverage to win support, most often in public institutions and enterprises.
The imbalance in the media deepened by the end of the campaign. On broadcasters with national coverage, the share of the authorities rose from around two thirds to almost three quarters of the time. Beyond overall time, the share of positive portrayal of the authorities rose to over 50 per cent, compared with 38 per cent in the first half of the campaign. The “Student List”, which consistently receives the most opposition airtime, is still portrayed negatively in more than 80 per cent of its time.
A change in the representation of the opposition was recorded on Radio Television of Serbia (RTS), but the pronounced imbalance in regular programming remained. The share of time devoted to the opposition rose from 15 to 28 per cent. However, a more even representation of political actors was confined to election blocks. In regular programming, which accounts for 43 per cent of total time in extended prime time, representatives of the authorities received as much as 94 per cent of the time devoted to political actors.
After his resignation as President of the Republic, Aleksandar Vučić's overall presence on all broadcasters with national coverage fell from over half to a third of the time - primarily owing to a change in the reporting of Radio Television of Serbia, where he appears only in election programming. A decline was also recorded on other broadcasters, but Aleksandar Vučić still accounts for almost every other second of their programming (43 per cent). Aleksandar Vučić remained the actor given the most media space. He took up more time than the entire opposition, while the number of his live link-ups almost tripled after the resignation, from 27 in the first part of the campaign to 78 towards the end of the second. In addition, the glorification of Aleksandar Vučić on pro-government portals intensified markedly in the second half of the campaign, when the number of such articles doubled.
Pro-government media did not merely promote the authorities. In their online editions an image of the opposition and independent actors as a threat was systematically built. The number of articles presenting them as a source of violence and destabilisation rose from 1,500 in the first part of the campaign to at least 2,700. Almost 300 articles used the “colour revolution” narrative. Informer has broadcast at least 16 recordings of wiretapped conversations since the start of the campaign. Critically oriented media reported critically on the authorities, but in a more balanced way. The polarisation of the media space is therefore not symmetrical.
Political advertising was dominated by the “United Serbia” list, which accounted for as much as 93 per cent of the total airtime of advertisements broadcast on broadcasters with national coverage. The “Ivica Dačić - A Factor of Stability” coalition had four per cent, the “Student List” two, and Authentic Right just one per cent of advertising time.
The authorities and pro-government media systematically discredit credible domestic and international observers and actively work to deepen distrust of their findings, in order to dispute in advance any credible interpretation of election day and the election outcome. This creates a serious risk that independent findings on election day will be relativised, or even disqualified, before they are even published. This campaign is led by the highest representatives of the authorities, the Acting President of the Republic and the former President, who is also the leader of the ruling coalition. Together with pro-government media, they are announcing “chaos” on election day, including violence, and spreading unfounded claims about CRTA Election Observation Mission, including that it plans to withdraw its observers. At the same time they call into question the credibility of the international observation missions of ODIHR, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.
The common denominator of the findings on oversight institutions is formal functioning without real effect. The Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) received several dozen complaints but did not take a single decision because of the political blockade of its Council. The Agency for Prevention of Corruption (ACAS) adopted the interpretation that an official who uses resources from another portfolio does not misuse public resources.
By the cut-off date of this report CRTA had filed 65 complaints concerning irregularities and violations of the law in the elections: 28 with the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media and 37 with the Agency for Prevention of Corruption. REM has not taken a single decision. The Agency has decided on 12 complaints and in more than half of them found no violation of the law.
A record number of citizens - 1,600 - contacted CRTA Election Observation Mission during this campaign. Citizens most often asked CRTA for information and support concerning voting abroad, the voter register and other issues related to exercising the right to vote. They also contacted it over suspected electoral manipulation, above all vote buying.
