Update
Political context
In the last weeks before the elections, cases of violence remained unresolved, domestic and internat...
Reporting by broadcasters with national coverage during the election campaign was marked by a pronounced imbalance in favour of the authorities - both in the presence of political actors and in the way they were portrayed and in their opportunity to address voters directly.
Up to the last week of the election campaign, on broadcasters with national coverage the authorities received almost three quarters of the time devoted to political actors (72 per cent), and the opposition slightly more than a quarter (28 per cent). More than half of the time devoted to the authorities was positive in tone, while negative coverage was almost absent. The opposition, by contrast, was portrayed negatively in nearly two fifths of the time devoted to it. The most negative coverage concerned the Student List: more than four fifths of the time devoted to it was negative in tone. Representatives of the authorities also had a considerably greater opportunity than the opposition to address the public directly.
In regular programming, which accounted for 55 per cent of the total time devoted to political actors, the authorities received 70 and the opposition 30 per cent of the time. In specially designated election programme slots the ratio was almost identical (69 to 31 per cent), which shows that even the parts of programming intended for presenting electoral contestants did not ensure equal presence for the authorities and the opposition.
The same ratio between the authorities and the opposition was recorded on the public service broadcaster: 72 to 28 per cent, and the share of the opposition was smaller than in the 2023 election campaign. Unlike the other broadcasters with national coverage, Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) portrayed political actors predominantly neutrally. Balance was, however, achieved only in the election programme slots (52 to 48 per cent), while regular programming (which accounted for 43% of the total time devoted to political actors) was almost entirely devoted to representatives of the authorities (94 per cent). Taking into account the marked dominance of the authorities in regular programming, as well as the recorded cases of favouring the authorities' candidates, RTS did not fulfil its legal obligation to provide citizens with impartial, balanced and pluralistic information during the election campaign.
Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of the United Serbia list, retained a dominant position in television coverage of the election campaign, despite a decrease in his presence after he resigned as President of the Republic on 27 September. On broadcasters with national coverage he received almost a third of the time devoted to political actors (32 per cent), more than all opposition actors combined (27 per cent). His intensive media presence continued after the resignation as well, with an almost threefold increase in the number of live link-ups in the programming of broadcasters with national coverage and cable channels - from 27 between the start of the campaign and his resignation, to 78 after the resignation.
Cable channels showed pronounced polarisation. On Informer TV and Kurir TV the authorities dominated in both time and tone: they had over three quarters of the time, predominantly positive portrayal and a strong focus on Aleksandar Vučić, while the opposition was portrayed almost exclusively negatively and was rarely given the chance to speak for itself. N1 and Nova S gave more space to the opposition and were more critical of the authorities, but the imbalance on these channels was less pronounced, and the opposition was portrayed predominantly neutrally.
On the local television stations observed, representatives of the authorities had seven times more opportunities to address the audience directly than the opposition, which on half of the stations observed was not given a single opportunity to address it directly. While the authorities and Aleksandar Vučić were portrayed almost exclusively in a positive or neutral light, negative coverage was directed at the opposition, particularly the Student List.
During the election campaign, cases indicating possible violations of media regulations were recorded on all broadcasters with national coverage, through coverage of the opening of facilities with the participation of officials standing as candidates in the 30-day period before the elections, when this is prohibited by law, as well as through covert political advertising, that is, failure to separate election promotion from regular programming. Similar irregularities were observed on eight of the ten local television stations observed, where examples of misuse of public office and resources for electoral purposes and a one-sided negative campaign against the opposition were also recorded. Of particular concern are cases of possible use of children for political purposes, violations of privacy and broadcasting without a licence.
Informer TV stood out, as its programming throughout the campaign served the stigmatisation of the authorities' political opponents and the promotion of Aleksandar Vučić as the candidate of the ruling majority, with content inciting hatred and intolerance. Further concern is raised by the broadcasting of at least 16 recordings of wiretapped conversations of opposition or independent actors, whose origin and the circumstances in which they were made have not been clarified.
Coverage by the most influential online outlets during the election campaign was marked by pronounced polarisation: while pro-government portals portrayed the authorities almost exclusively positively and discredited their political opponents, criticism of the authorities prevailed in critically oriented outlets, but with a more balanced tone and a larger share of neutral coverage.
Over the 38 days of the campaign, pro-government portals published at least 2,700 articles in which the authorities' political opponents were portrayed as a source of violence and instability, including claims that chaos and incidents were being prepared for election day and its aftermath.
At the same time, in almost 300 articles the narrative of a “colour revolution” was used to stigmatise the Student List, the opposition, civil society and independent media, by portraying them as part of an externally organised attempt at an illegitimate seizure of power.
More than 200 manipulative headlines were recorded on the front pages of the daily press, of which three quarters were aimed at stigmatising political opponents, above all the Student List, while one in four contained negative narratives about neighbouring countries, often used to portray the opposition as linked to allegedly hostile political centres in the region.
Immediately before the elections, the Adria News Network (ANN) media group, which brings together outlets critically oriented towards the authorities, underwent programming and staffing changes during the process of its takeover by Alpac Capital, accompanied by opposition from parts of the newsrooms and the departure of a number of journalists and editors.
Up to the last week of the election campaign, on broadcasters with national coverage the authorities received almost three quarters of the time devoted to political actors (72 per cent), and the opposition slightly more than a quarter (28 per cent). More than half of the time devoted to the authorities was positive in tone, while negative coverage was almost absent. The opposition, by contrast, was portrayed negatively in nearly two fifths of the time devoted to it. The most negative coverage concerned the Student List: more than four fifths of the time devoted to it was negative in tone. Representatives of the authorities also had a considerably greater opportunity than the opposition to address the public directly.
In regular programming, which accounted for 55 per cent of the total time devoted to political actors, the authorities received 70 and the opposition 30 per cent of the time. In specially designated election programme slots the ratio was almost identical (69 to 31 per cent), which shows that even the parts of programming intended for presenting electoral contestants did not ensure equal presence for the authorities and the opposition.
The same ratio between the authorities and the opposition was recorded on the public service broadcaster: 72 to 28 per cent, and the share of the opposition was smaller than in the 2023 election campaign. Unlike the other broadcasters with national coverage, Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) portrayed political actors predominantly neutrally. Balance was, however, achieved only in the election programme slots (52 to 48 per cent), while regular programming (which accounted for 43% of the total time devoted to political actors) was almost entirely devoted to representatives of the authorities (94 per cent). Taking into account the marked dominance of the authorities in regular programming, as well as the recorded cases of favouring the authorities' candidates, RTS did not fulfil its legal obligation to provide citizens with impartial, balanced and pluralistic information during the election campaign.
Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of the United Serbia list, retained a dominant position in television coverage of the election campaign, despite a decrease in his presence after he resigned as President of the Republic on 27 September. On broadcasters with national coverage he received almost a third of the time devoted to political actors (32 per cent), more than all opposition actors combined (27 per cent). His intensive media presence continued after the resignation as well, with an almost threefold increase in the number of live link-ups in the programming of broadcasters with national coverage and cable channels - from 27 between the start of the campaign and his resignation, to 78 after the resignation.
Cable channels showed pronounced polarisation. On Informer TV and Kurir TV the authorities dominated in both time and tone: they had over three quarters of the time, predominantly positive portrayal and a strong focus on Aleksandar Vučić, while the opposition was portrayed almost exclusively negatively and was rarely given the chance to speak for itself. N1 and Nova S gave more space to the opposition and were more critical of the authorities, but the imbalance on these channels was less pronounced, and the opposition was portrayed predominantly neutrally.
On the local television stations observed, representatives of the authorities had seven times more opportunities to address the audience directly than the opposition, which on half of the stations observed was not given a single opportunity to address it directly. While the authorities and Aleksandar Vučić were portrayed almost exclusively in a positive or neutral light, negative coverage was directed at the opposition, particularly the Student List.
During the election campaign, cases indicating possible violations of media regulations were recorded on all broadcasters with national coverage, through coverage of the opening of facilities with the participation of officials standing as candidates in the 30-day period before the elections, when this is prohibited by law, as well as through covert political advertising, that is, failure to separate election promotion from regular programming. Similar irregularities were observed on eight of the ten local television stations observed, where examples of misuse of public office and resources for electoral purposes and a one-sided negative campaign against the opposition were also recorded. Of particular concern are cases of possible use of children for political purposes, violations of privacy and broadcasting without a licence.
Informer TV stood out, as its programming throughout the campaign served the stigmatisation of the authorities' political opponents and the promotion of Aleksandar Vučić as the candidate of the ruling majority, with content inciting hatred and intolerance. Further concern is raised by the broadcasting of at least 16 recordings of wiretapped conversations of opposition or independent actors, whose origin and the circumstances in which they were made have not been clarified.
Coverage by the most influential online outlets during the election campaign was marked by pronounced polarisation: while pro-government portals portrayed the authorities almost exclusively positively and discredited their political opponents, criticism of the authorities prevailed in critically oriented outlets, but with a more balanced tone and a larger share of neutral coverage.
Over the 38 days of the campaign, pro-government portals published at least 2,700 articles in which the authorities' political opponents were portrayed as a source of violence and instability, including claims that chaos and incidents were being prepared for election day and its aftermath.
At the same time, in almost 300 articles the narrative of a “colour revolution” was used to stigmatise the Student List, the opposition, civil society and independent media, by portraying them as part of an externally organised attempt at an illegitimate seizure of power.
More than 200 manipulative headlines were recorded on the front pages of the daily press, of which three quarters were aimed at stigmatising political opponents, above all the Student List, while one in four contained negative narratives about neighbouring countries, often used to portray the opposition as linked to allegedly hostile political centres in the region.
Immediately before the elections, the Adria News Network (ANN) media group, which brings together outlets critically oriented towards the authorities, underwent programming and staffing changes during the process of its takeover by Alpac Capital, accompanied by opposition from parts of the newsrooms and the departure of a number of journalists and editors.
Media market and distribution
The concentration of media ownership and control over the distribution of television content, which intensified during the election year, continued during the campaign as well. Telekom Srbija, which is majority state-owned, became the sole owner of the publisher of Kurir
“Telekom becomes sole owner of Kurir, former co-owner of Srpski telegraf appointed director”, UNS, 14 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10o
and initiated the takeover of UNA television
“WE REVEAL Telekom Srbija has confirmed that it is taking over another television channel: UNA joins a big media family”, Forbes, 27 August 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10p
, while the publishers of Informer and Alo! continued expanding their network of local outlets
“The company behind the tabloids Alo and Informer is launching a local outlet in Prijepolje too”, 29 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10q, accessed 2 October 2026.
. Immediately before the elections, Telekom made Informer TV and Kurir TV available free of charge via the terrestrial signal
ANEM, “Request that Telekom and REM stop the unlawful broadcasting of Informer and Kurir”, 24 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10r, accessed 2 October 2026.
, including in areas for which these channels hold no licence for such broadcasting, which prompted reactions from media associations over the undermining of equal conditions on the media market.
During the process of the media group's takeover by Alpac Capital, programming and staffing changes followed as well. Nova S stopped broadcasting the satirical comedy programme “24 Minutes with Zoran Kesić” (“24 minuta sa Zoranom Kesićem”) N1, “Zoran Kesić: The talk of an expensive programme is a mere excuse, ‘24 minuta’ from now on on YouTube”, 5 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10t, accessed 2 October 2026. , while Marko Stjepanović, until then editor of Blic, was appointed editor-in-chief of the Nova S portal despite opposition from the newsroom Cenzolovka, “Ratko Femić: We have been given an occupation editor, imposed from above”, 9 October 2026, https://link.crta.rs/14o, accessed 17 October . Journalists and editors warned of a possible threat to editorial independence, while ten journalists and editors left N1 television Cenzolovka, “Ten journalists at N1 television have resigned”, 16 October 2026, https://link.crta.rs/14p, accessed 17 October .
During the process of the media group's takeover by Alpac Capital, programming and staffing changes followed as well. Nova S stopped broadcasting the satirical comedy programme “24 Minutes with Zoran Kesić” (“24 minuta sa Zoranom Kesićem”) N1, “Zoran Kesić: The talk of an expensive programme is a mere excuse, ‘24 minuta’ from now on on YouTube”, 5 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10t, accessed 2 October 2026. , while Marko Stjepanović, until then editor of Blic, was appointed editor-in-chief of the Nova S portal despite opposition from the newsroom Cenzolovka, “Ratko Femić: We have been given an occupation editor, imposed from above”, 9 October 2026, https://link.crta.rs/14o, accessed 17 October . Journalists and editors warned of a possible threat to editorial independence, while ten journalists and editors left N1 television Cenzolovka, “Ten journalists at N1 television have resigned”, 16 October 2026, https://link.crta.rs/14p, accessed 17 October .
The state of political pluralism on television
Broadcasters with national coverage
In the period from 14 September to 16 October, the authorities received 72, and the opposition 28 per cent of the time devoted to political actors on broadcasters with national coverage. The imbalance was considerably greater than in the 2022 election campaign (64 to 36 per cent), but slightly smaller than in 2023 (75 to 25 per cent).
CRTA, Second periodic report of long-term observers: Elections 2023, https://link.crta.rs/15o; CRTA, Second report on the campaign, 15 February - 25 March 2022, https://link.crta.rs/15p, accessed 17 October
Chart 8.1. Imbalance on broadcasters with national coverage greater than in 2022, slightly smaller than in 2023
Chart 8.1. Imbalance on broadcasters with national coverage greater than in 2022, slightly smaller than in 2023
Imbalance on broadcasters with national coverage greater than in 2022, slightly smaller than in 2023
The authorities and the opposition, broadcasters with national coverage, comparison of campaigns (%)
The authoritiesThe opposition
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of broadcasters with national coverage; 2022 and 2023 campaigns and 14 September - 16 October 2026.
The authorities' advantage was greatest on TV Prva (81 per cent), followed by TV Pink (79), TV B92 (77) and RTS (72 per cent). The exception was TV Happy, where the opposition received 57 per cent of the time, predominantly neutral. The limitation is that this channel's main evening news programme was not covered by the monitoring, only the programme “Current Affairs” (“Aktuelnosti”), whose main topic is international relations, with a focus on the war in Ukraine, and whose guests were representatives of “We - The Voice of the People”, the Movement “We - The Strength of the People”, the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Serbian Progressive Party, POKS, PUPS and Novi DSS.
Chart 8.2. The authorities' advantage greatest on TV Prva; the opposition ahead only on TV Happy
Chart 8.2. The authorities' advantage greatest on TV Prva; the opposition ahead only on TV Happy
The authorities' advantage greatest on TV Prva; the opposition ahead only on TV Happy
The authorities and the opposition by broadcaster with national coverage (%)
The authoritiesThe opposition
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of broadcasters with national coverage, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
The difference was even more pronounced in tone. Half of the time devoted to the authorities was positive (54 per cent), and there was almost no negative coverage, while 39 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition was negative, and 11 per cent positive.
Chart 8.3. Half of the authorities' airtime positive, nearly two fifths of the opposition's negative
Chart 8.3. Half of the authorities' airtime positive, nearly two fifths of the opposition's negative
Half of the authorities' airtime positive, nearly two fifths of the opposition's negative
Tone of coverage, broadcasters with national coverage (%)
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of broadcasters with national coverage, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
Representatives of the authorities spoke directly during 77 per cent of their time, and representatives of the opposition during 55 per cent. The pattern was most pronounced on TV Pink, TV Prva and TV B92, where between 64 and 74 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition was negative, while opposition actors themselves spoke during only 23 to 29 per cent of their time.
Chart 8.4. On Pink, Prva and B92 the opposition portrayed negatively and rarely in an active role
Chart 8.4. On Pink, Prva and B92 the opposition portrayed negatively and rarely in an active role
On Pink, Prva and B92 the opposition portrayed negatively and rarely in an active role
Tone and active role by broadcaster with national coverage (%)
Active role: share of time in which the actor speaks directly to the audience.
Active role: share of time in which the actor speaks directly to the audience.
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of broadcasters with national coverage, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
The Student List received 43 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition. The list was also the most negatively portrayed, with 81 per cent of its time negative. The other lists were portrayed predominantly neutrally or positively.
Chart 8.5. The Student List received the most opposition airtime, but also the most negative tone
Chart 8.5. The Student List received the most opposition airtime, but also the most negative tone
The Student List received the most opposition airtime, but also the most negative tone
Opposition lists, broadcasters with national coverage
Other opposition lists: 8 per cent of opposition airtime.
Other opposition lists: 8 per cent of opposition airtime.
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of broadcasters with national coverage, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
Aleksandar Vučić before and after his resignation as President of the Republic
Until his resignation on 27 September, Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of the “United Serbia” list, received 54 per cent of the total time devoted to political actors on the five broadcasters with national coverage, almost twice as much as all opposition actors combined (29 per cent). After the resignation, from 28 September to 16 October, his share fell to 32 per cent, but was still larger than the share of the entire opposition (27 per cent). The fall was most drastic on RTS (from 66 to four per cent), where after the resignation Vučić appeared exclusively in the election programme slot. On the other channels he continued to be present in other programming as well, such as the documentary films “The Statesman” (“Državnik”) and “The Supreme Commander” (“Vrhovni komandant”), which were devoted to him, and in paid airtime slots carrying party rallies of the “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list, as a result of which his share on TV Happy rose from zero to 23 per cent.
The number of live link-ups with Vučić carried by broadcasters with national coverage and cable channels rose several-fold after the resignation: from 27 link-ups between the start of the election campaign and the resignation, to 78 in the 19 days after the resignation. Live broadcasts on local television stations rose from 230 to 879.
Aleksandar Vučić received nearly 40 hours of airtime, almost ten times more than Ivica Dačić and 19 times more than the opposition actor with the largest presence, Ilija Srdanović, whose time was 90 per cent negative.
Chart 8.6. Actors of the authorities without negative tone, opposition actors predominantly negative
Chart 8.6. Actors of the authorities without negative tone, opposition actors predominantly negative
Actors of the authorities without negative tone, opposition actors predominantly negative
Most represented individuals, broadcasters with national coverage
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of broadcasters with national coverage, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
Portrayal of actors in election and regular programming
The opposition was at a disadvantage even in the election parts of the programming. In election programme slots, including pre-election debates, the authorities received 69 and the opposition 31 per cent of the time. In regular programming (which accounted for 55 per cent of the total time allocated to political actors) the ratio was similar (70 to 30 per cent), but the opposition's presence in it came for the most part from debates and political talk programmes that did not concern the elections, such as “Current Affairs” on TV Happy, or that were not adequately announced and designated as election programming, such as “Hit Tweet” (“Hit tvit”) on TV Pink. In news programmes, representatives of the authorities received 87 and the opposition 13 per cent of the time.
The difference in tone was even more pronounced: in news programmes 90 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition was negative, while in these programmes the authorities were portrayed positively in 34 per cent and negatively in less than one per cent of their time. Negative tone also marked 41 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition in election programme slots.
Chart 8.7. Even in election programming the opposition did not get equal space
The difference in tone was even more pronounced: in news programmes 90 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition was negative, while in these programmes the authorities were portrayed positively in 34 per cent and negatively in less than one per cent of their time. Negative tone also marked 41 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition in election programme slots.
Chart 8.7. Even in election programming the opposition did not get equal space
Even in election programming the opposition did not get equal space
Election and regular programming, broadcasters with national coverage, excluding political advertising and paid airtime (%)
The authoritiesThe oppositionNegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of broadcasters with national coverage, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
Electoral pluralism on Radio Television of Serbia (RTS)
On the public service broadcaster, in the period from 14 September to 16 October, the authorities received 72, and the opposition 28 per cent of the time devoted to political actors. The opposition's share was even smaller than in the 2023 election campaign (35 per cent).
CRTA, Second periodic report of long-term observers: Elections 2023, https://link.crta.rs/15o; CRTA, accessed 17 October
Chart 8.8. Opposition share on RTS smaller than in the 2023 campaign
Chart 8.8. Opposition share on RTS smaller than in the 2023 campaign
Opposition share on RTS smaller than in the 2023 campaign
The authorities and the opposition on RTS 1, comparison of campaigns (%)
The authoritiesThe opposition
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of RTS 1; 2023 campaign and 14 September - 16 October 2026.
The authorities were portrayed predominantly neutrally (67 per cent) and positively (31 per cent), and negatively in only two per cent of the time. For the opposition, 11 per cent of the time was negative and 25 per cent positive. Representatives of the authorities spoke directly during 81 per cent of their time, and representatives of the opposition during 77 per cent.
Chart 8.9. RTS portrayed the authorities and the opposition predominantly neutrally
Chart 8.9. RTS portrayed the authorities and the opposition predominantly neutrally
RTS portrayed the authorities and the opposition predominantly neutrally
Tone and role on RTS 1 (%)
Active role: share of time in which the actor speaks directly to the audience.
Active role: share of time in which the actor speaks directly to the audience.
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of RTS 1, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
The largest part of the time devoted to the opposition went to European Serbia (39 per cent) and the Student List (32 per cent). These two largest lists were also the only ones portrayed with any negative tone. They were followed by Authentic Right (14 per cent) and Movement Strength of Serbia - BK (four per cent).
Chart 8.10. On RTS most opposition airtime went to European Serbia and the Student List
Chart 8.10. On RTS most opposition airtime went to European Serbia and the Student List
On RTS most opposition airtime went to European Serbia and the Student List
Opposition lists on RTS 1
Other opposition lists: 4 per cent of opposition airtime.
Other opposition lists: 4 per cent of opposition airtime.
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of RTS 1, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
Pluralism on RTS was achieved almost exclusively in election programme slots, in which the ratio between the authorities and the opposition was 52 to 48 per cent. In regular programming (which accounted for 43 per cent of the total time devoted to political actors) the authorities received 94 per cent of the time, and the opposition's share in it came from a debate held on 15 September in the programme “Takovska 10”, which was neither announced nor designated as election programming.
Chart 8.11. Balance on RTS only in election blocks
Chart 8.11. Balance on RTS only in election blocks
Balance on RTS only in election blocks
Election blocks and regular programming on RTS 1 (%)
The authoritiesThe opposition
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of RTS 1, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
Debate programmes on RTS
From the start of the campaign until 13 October, RTS 1 broadcast six editions of the debate programme “Takovska 10”, four of which were designated as election programming. It was precisely in those four debates that representatives of candidate lists took part, while the first two, without the election programming designation, featured officials of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the Party of Freedom and Justice (SSP) together with experts (15 September), and only former ambassadors (22 September), respectively. The “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list was represented in all four debates featuring list representatives, and in three of them the ruling coalition had two participants, including a representative of the “Ivica Dačić - A Factor of Stability” list. Of the opposition lists, European Serbia and the Student List took part in three debates each, and Authentic Right in two.
The Student List did not take part in the debate on 29 September. In response to RTS's invitation for Ilija Srdanović, the first candidate on the list, to take part in a debate with Aleksandar Vučić, it stated that the list was not conceived around a single candidate and asked for more precise information about the topic, format and participants, noting that it would then decide who would represent it.153
The six debate programmes lasted around 6.3 hours in total, which corresponds to 31 per cent of the total time RTS 1 devoted to political actors since the start of the campaign (72,362 seconds), or 21 per cent if only the debates designated as election programming are counted.
A case of favouring the authorities' candidate on RTS
Besides the uneven presence of political actors, the monitoring also pointed to instances of coverage that call into question the impartiality of the public service broadcaster. In the election programme slot of Dnevnik 2, RTS's main evening news, on 12 October, a privileged portrayal of the Acting President of the Republic, Ana Brnabić, was recorded, with claims by state institutions and security services used to refute accusations, to the benefit of the candidate Aleksandar Vučić. The manner of coverage indicated favouring of the authorities' list, the absence of any opportunity to hear the other side and a departure from the principles of balanced and impartial information, by which the public service broadcaster is particularly bound. CRTA submitted a complaint to the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) over this case.
153 Nova.rs, “‘Students in Blockade’ turn to RTS over the invitation to a debate”, 27 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/17o, accessed 19 October
Electoral pluralism on cable channels
On the four cable channels the authorities received 66 and the opposition 34 per cent of the time. On Informer TV and Kurir TV the authorities had more than three quarters of the time (77 and 79 per cent), and on N1 and Nova S the opposition had around 60 per cent.
Chart 8.12. The authorities dominate on Kurir and Informer, the opposition on N1 and Nova S
Chart 8.12. The authorities dominate on Kurir and Informer, the opposition on N1 and Nova S
The authorities dominate on Kurir and Informer, the opposition on N1 and Nova S
The authorities and the opposition by cable channel (%)
The authoritiesThe opposition
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of cable channels, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
On Informer and Kurir the authorities were portrayed predominantly positively (65 per cent), and the opposition almost exclusively negatively (94 and 90 per cent). On N1 and Nova S the direction was the opposite, but of lower intensity: the authorities were portrayed negatively in almost a third of the time (30 and 28 per cent), and the opposition predominantly neutrally.
Chart 8.13. Informer and Kurir portray the opposition almost exclusively negatively
Chart 8.13. Informer and Kurir portray the opposition almost exclusively negatively
Informer and Kurir portray the opposition almost exclusively negatively
Tone by cable channel (%)
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of cable channels, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
On Informer the opposition spoke directly during only 11 per cent of its time, and on Kurir during four per cent, while on N1 and Nova S it was given the chance to address the public directly more often than the authorities. Vučić received 46 per cent of the time on Informer TV and 34 per cent on Kurir TV, with 80 per cent positive tone.
Chart 8.14. The opposition almost never in an active role on Informer and Kurir
Chart 8.14. The opposition almost never in an active role on Informer and Kurir
The opposition almost never in an active role on Informer and Kurir
Active and passive role by cable channel (%)
Active role (speaking directly)Passive role (others speak about the actor)
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of cable channels, 14 September - 16 October 2026.
Coverage by local television stations
Monitoring of ten local television stations shows an imbalance in the presence and portrayal of the authorities and the opposition. Representatives of the authorities were mentioned around one and a half times as often as the opposition, with almost all positive mentions going to the authorities and almost all negative ones to the opposition.
Chart 8.15. On local television stations the authorities mentioned one and a half times as often as the opposition
Chart 8.15. On local television stations the authorities mentioned one and a half times as often as the opposition
On local television stations the authorities mentioned one and a half times as often as the opposition
Mentions of the authorities and the opposition, local television stations
The authorities (60%)The opposition (40%)
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of ten local television stations, 18 September - 16 October 2026.
Chart 8.16. Local television stations: no negative mentions of the authorities, no positive mentions of the opposition
Local television stations: no negative mentions of the authorities, no positive mentions of the opposition
Tone of mentions, local television stations (%)
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of ten local television stations, 18 September - 16 October 2026.
The difference was even greater in the opportunity to address the audience directly: representatives of the authorities appeared as speakers seven times more often than the opposition, while on half of the stations observed the opposition did not once have the chance to speak directly.
Chart 8.17. The authorities seven times more often in an active role; on half of the stations the opposition not once
Chart 8.17. The authorities seven times more often in an active role; on half of the stations the opposition not once
The authorities seven times more often in an active role; on half of the stations the opposition not once
Speakers (active role) by local television station (number)
Number of appearances in an active role (speakers). The opposition did not speak once on five of the ten stations.
Number of appearances in an active role (speakers). The opposition did not speak once on five of the ten stations.
The authorities (691)The opposition (96)
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of ten local television stations, 18 September - 16 October 2026.
Aleksandar Vučić was the political actor with the largest presence, with predominantly positive treatment and an almost complete absence of negative mentions. By contrast, the Student List, the second most frequently mentioned actor, was portrayed in markedly negative terms, without a single positive mention.
From the officials' campaign to the misuse of children
During the election campaign, CRTA documented cases on Pink, Prva, B92, Happy and Kurir indicating possible breaches of broadcasters' legal obligations. The cases observed include broadcasting the officials' campaign in the period when this is prohibited, covert political advertising, failure to separate election promotion from regular programming, broadcasting party rallies within news programmes and exceeding the permitted duration of advertising. Of particular concern is content indicating possible exploitation of children for political purposes, violations of privacy and unauthorised processing of personal data. Departures from the standards of truthful, objective and impartial reporting were also recorded.
At local level, on TV Lav Plus, Studio B, TV Novi Pazar, TV Santos, Novosadska TV and RTV Kragujevac, cases were recorded indicating misuse of public office and resources through the promotion of infrastructure projects for electoral purposes, privileged portrayal of public officials and direct calls to vote for particular candidate lists. Also observed were covert political advertising, broadcasting of party rallies outside pre-election programming and the use of children for political purposes, including their appearance in election spots and in reports on officials' activities. Some stations waged a one-sided negative campaign against opposition electoral contestants, with insults and unfounded accusations, while in some cases personal data and data on health conditions were published, thereby endangering individuals' privacy. Cases of possible broadcasting without a licence were also recorded on Niš TV and TV Mačva.
Over the breaches of regulations listed above, CRTA submitted 18 complaints, as well as two notifications of pirate broadcasting without a licence, to the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM).
At local level, on TV Lav Plus, Studio B, TV Novi Pazar, TV Santos, Novosadska TV and RTV Kragujevac, cases were recorded indicating misuse of public office and resources through the promotion of infrastructure projects for electoral purposes, privileged portrayal of public officials and direct calls to vote for particular candidate lists. Also observed were covert political advertising, broadcasting of party rallies outside pre-election programming and the use of children for political purposes, including their appearance in election spots and in reports on officials' activities. Some stations waged a one-sided negative campaign against opposition electoral contestants, with insults and unfounded accusations, while in some cases personal data and data on health conditions were published, thereby endangering individuals' privacy. Cases of possible broadcasting without a licence were also recorded on Niš TV and TV Mačva.
Over the breaches of regulations listed above, CRTA submitted 18 complaints, as well as two notifications of pirate broadcasting without a licence, to the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM).
Informer TV: an intensive negative campaign with multiple breaches of regulations
In terms of the number and seriousness of the possible breaches of media regulations observed during the election campaign, Informer TV stood out in particular. The channel, which is not included in the media monitoring conducted by the media regulator REM154, waged an intensive, aggressive and one-sided negative campaign against opposition electoral contestants, above all the Student List and its candidates. Its coverage continuously contained elements of speech inciting hatred, intolerance and discrimination155.
At the same time, Aleksandar Vučić was given almost unlimited, privileged space in regular news programming, with uncritical presentation of the activities and successes of the authorities and an almost complete absence of differing views, which undermined the principles of impartial reporting and media pluralism. Informer TV did not consistently designate its pre-election programming, and it published the results of public opinion polls without the legally required information on who commissioned them, the sample size and the methodology.
Particularly notable was the practice of broadcasting recordings of wiretapped conversations of the “Student List” and of opposition actors, which Informer presents as material from its “Viewers' Intelligence Service” (“Gledalačka obaveštajna služba”, GOSI). Since the elections were called, at least 16 such items have been broadcast, among them recordings of conversations involving students, opposition politicians and other electoral actors, accompanied by commentary that cast their actions, intentions or credibility in a negative light. The origin of the recordings has not been clarified: although the name suggests that viewers supply them, the reports did not state who made them, when or how, nor whether those recorded were aware that they were being recorded. Without that information, the audience has no way of assessing the authenticity of the recordings or the context in which they were made.156
Over the breaches of regulations observed in Informer TV's programming, CRTA submitted a total of nine complaints to the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM).
154 Vreme, “Four members of the REM Council: Without monitoring of Informer television the integrity of the elections is at risk”, 1 October 2026, https://link.crta.rs/13i, accessed 6 October 2026. Applying the 2023 methodology above all entails supervision exclusively of the programming of those media service providers that were supervised ahead of the election campaign in December 2023, and that sample comprises the public service broadcasters, four television stations holding a national coverage licence and three cable channels: N1, Nova S and K1.
155 On Informer TV the authorities' political opponents were called “autochauvinist vermin”, “traitors”, “mercenaries” and “anti-Serbs”, while Student List candidates were groundlessly accused of embracing “Ustaša ideology” and of preparing “bloodshed” and “street terror”. Opposition actors were systematically portrayed as a threat to the state and society, through factually unfounded accusations that go beyond the bounds of legitimate political criticism.
156 In March 2025, Informer TV, together with four other television channels, broadcast an audio recording of a meeting of activists from Novi Sad, likewise without any information about how it had been made. The activists were then arrested on suspicion of an attempt to overthrow the constitutional order, and it became known only from the indictment that the recording had been made through surveillance by the Security Information Agency (BIA) under measures that did not concern them. Although the origin of the GOSI recordings is not known, this case shows why that question matters, Insajder, “BIA wiretapped PSG's premises for three and a half months, and then accidentally recorded the activists from Novi Sad”, 28 October 2025, https://link.crta.rs/13j, accessed 6 October 2026.
Coverage by online outlets
Polarised portrayal of political actors
Analysis of coverage by the nine most influential online outlets shows that, in aggregate, the authorities were portrayed predominantly positively (63 per cent), and the opposition predominantly negatively (55 per cent), with very pronounced differences between portals. Informer, Večernje novosti, Alo!, B92 and Kurir reported on the authorities almost exclusively positively and on the opposition negatively, while Blic showed the same pattern in a milder form. On N1, Nova.rs and Danas the pattern was the opposite, but considerably less pronounced and with a large share of neutral coverage.
Chart 8.18. Pro-government portals: the authorities positive, the opposition negative; critical portals the reverse, but milder
Chart 8.18. Pro-government portals: the authorities positive, the opposition negative; critical portals the reverse, but milder
Pro-government portals: the authorities positive, the opposition negative; critical portals the reverse, but milder
Tone by portal (%)
* Percentage shares are calculated relative to the total number of mentions.
* Percentage shares are calculated relative to the total number of mentions.
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, monitoring of online media, 9 September - 16 October 2026.
The polarisation of the media space is also reflected in the dominant narratives. On pro-government portals (Informer, Večernje novosti, Alo!, B92 and Kurir) the prevailing narratives were the stigmatisation of political opponents
Narrative explanation: Stigmatisation is a narrative through which a political actor, whether an individual or a group, is disparaged or disqualified by means of personalised or group-directed attacks, derogatory labels, ridicule, insinuation or other negative characterisations aimed at the actor itself.
(64 to 81 per cent of articles) and the glorification of Aleksandar Vučić
Narrative explanation: The glorification of Aleksandar Vučić covers content that portrays him as an irreplaceable leader and the sole guarantor of Serbia's stability, security and progress. His decisions and actions are presented exclusively in affirmative terms, often with emphasis on his personal courage, sacrifice and international standing.
(31 to 44 per cent), while Blic followed a similar pattern, but with considerably less frequent attacks on the authorities' opponents. The main targets were the Student List and its candidates Ilija Srdanović (first on the list) and Dejan Šoškić (27th on the list). In critically oriented outlets (N1, Nova and Danas) the most prevalent narrative was criticism of the authorities
Narrative explanation: Criticism is a narrative through which a political actor is portrayed negatively by pointing to its actions, decisions, positions, conduct, results, omissions or responsibility. The emphasis is on a negative assessment of what the actor does, advocates or is held responsible for, and not on disparaging or challenging the actor itself.
(49 to 60 per cent of articles), directed above all at Aleksandar Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party.
Portrayal of the authorities' opponents as a source of violence and instability
The narrative portraying the authorities' opponents as violent and destabilising actors was present throughout the campaign. On six portals it was recorded in at least 2,700 articles, including dozens of articles explicitly claiming that the opposition and other independent actors plan to carry out violence and cause chaos during and after election day. The narrative intensified in waves, as a rule after individual incidents or social media content that pro-government media carried intensively and interpreted as proof of the violent nature of the authorities' opponents. The most pronounced wave was recorded after the incidents in Novi Sad and Niš, when over 170 such articles were published in a single day.
At the same time, the same outlets used the narrative of a “colour revolution” in almost 300 articles from the start of the campaign onwards to stigmatise their rivals in the elections, as well as independent actors and individuals. Articles with this narrative were published more frequently as election day approached. In the great majority of articles the term was used to discredit the Student List and opposition parties, but also civil society organisations and independent media. All these actors were thereby portrayed as part of an externally organised attempt at an illegitimate seizure of power, often linked to actors from the region: Croatia, Kosovo and Montenegro.
The press: manipulative narratives on front pages
Similar patterns were present in the daily press. Since the start of the campaign, 201 manipulative headlines have been recorded on the front pages of daily newspapers. The stigmatisation of political opponents, above all of the Student List and of figures associated with it, is present in 76% of the manipulative headlines. The second most prevalent narrative is the discrediting of neighbours, which appears in one in four headlines (25%). These two narratives often intertwine, so that political opponents are linked to Croatia, Kosovo or Montenegrin political actors. The opposition is thus portrayed not only as politically unacceptable, but also as an extension of hostile external centres.
