Media coverage in the first half of the campaign was marked by a pronounced imbalance in favour of the authorities - both in the presence of electoral contestants and in the way they were portrayed and in their opportunity to address the public directly.
On broadcasters with national coverage, in extended prime time (18.00h-24.00h) representatives of the authorities received 69 per cent of the time devoted to political actors, and the opposition 31 per cent. The difference was not only one of presence: 38 per cent of the time devoted to the authorities was positive and less than one per cent negative, while 42 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition was negative. The Student List was the opposition contestant with the largest presence, but 88 per cent of the time devoted to it was negative. Its representatives spoke directly during only ten per cent of that time.
Coverage by Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) in the first half of the campaign was characterised by a pronounced imbalance in the presence of the authorities and the opposition: the authorities received 85 per cent and the opposition only 15 per cent of the time, which is the lowest figure among broadcasters with national coverage. This is almost half as much time as RTS allocated to opposition electoral actors in the first part of the 2023 campaign (28 per cent), and almost three times less than in 2022 (40 per cent), according to the monitoring by CRTA's observation missions at those elections. Within this airtime, the opposition was portrayed mostly neutrally, with the opportunity to address the public directly through election programme slots. This, however, did not significantly change the overall picture. Although the specially designated election programme slots offered a greater degree of pluralism than regular programming, the ratio of 64 to 36 per cent shows that genuine equality among electoral contestants was not achieved in them either. Given the complete dominance of officials and representatives of the authorities in non-election content, it is clear that the public service broadcaster did not fulfil its basic duty to provide citizens with information based on a diversity of viewpoints and on a greater number of different sources.
The most influential cable channels and online outlets displayed strong political polarisation - it was not, however, symmetrical. On Informer TV and Kurir TV, which Telekom enabled to broadcast terrestrially without seeking the media regulator's approval, the time devoted to the opposition was almost exclusively negative - around 90 per cent - while the authorities were portrayed predominantly positively and almost never negatively. On N1 and Nova S the direction was the opposite, but of considerably lower intensity.
A similar asymmetry was recorded in online outlets: portals favourable to the authorities portrayed the authorities in markedly positive terms, and the opposition negatively. Critically oriented portals showed the opposite, but less pronounced, pattern.
On local television stations, coverage was almost one-sided. The authorities had a considerably larger presence and were portrayed almost exclusively positively or neutrally, while 64 per cent of mentions of the opposition were negative.
The polarising media picture was also reflected in the narratives. On portals favourable to the authorities, by far the most prevalent narrative was the discrediting of political opponents - they were portrayed as violent, responsible for destabilising the country, collaborators with foreign interests and ready to take power by undemocratic means. A particularly intense smear campaign was waged against the Student List. On critically oriented portals, the most prevalent narrative was criticism of the authorities, directed above all at the use of public office and public resources for electoral purposes, political influence over institutions, electoral irregularities, pressure on citizens and the state of media freedoms.
Similar patterns were present on the front pages of the daily newspapers. Nearly 100 manipulative headlines were recorded, two thirds of which concerned the discrediting of the authorities' political opponents and 29 per cent the discrediting of actors from the region.
Informer TV, which was left out of the monitoring conducted by the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM), stood out in particular for the intensity and continuity of its discrediting of the authorities' political opponents. Informer's programming also carried at least ten recordings of wiretapped conversations relating to the “Student List”.
On broadcasters with national coverage, in extended prime time (18.00h-24.00h) representatives of the authorities received 69 per cent of the time devoted to political actors, and the opposition 31 per cent. The difference was not only one of presence: 38 per cent of the time devoted to the authorities was positive and less than one per cent negative, while 42 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition was negative. The Student List was the opposition contestant with the largest presence, but 88 per cent of the time devoted to it was negative. Its representatives spoke directly during only ten per cent of that time.
Coverage by Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) in the first half of the campaign was characterised by a pronounced imbalance in the presence of the authorities and the opposition: the authorities received 85 per cent and the opposition only 15 per cent of the time, which is the lowest figure among broadcasters with national coverage. This is almost half as much time as RTS allocated to opposition electoral actors in the first part of the 2023 campaign (28 per cent), and almost three times less than in 2022 (40 per cent), according to the monitoring by CRTA's observation missions at those elections. Within this airtime, the opposition was portrayed mostly neutrally, with the opportunity to address the public directly through election programme slots. This, however, did not significantly change the overall picture. Although the specially designated election programme slots offered a greater degree of pluralism than regular programming, the ratio of 64 to 36 per cent shows that genuine equality among electoral contestants was not achieved in them either. Given the complete dominance of officials and representatives of the authorities in non-election content, it is clear that the public service broadcaster did not fulfil its basic duty to provide citizens with information based on a diversity of viewpoints and on a greater number of different sources.
The most influential cable channels and online outlets displayed strong political polarisation - it was not, however, symmetrical. On Informer TV and Kurir TV, which Telekom enabled to broadcast terrestrially without seeking the media regulator's approval, the time devoted to the opposition was almost exclusively negative - around 90 per cent - while the authorities were portrayed predominantly positively and almost never negatively. On N1 and Nova S the direction was the opposite, but of considerably lower intensity.
A similar asymmetry was recorded in online outlets: portals favourable to the authorities portrayed the authorities in markedly positive terms, and the opposition negatively. Critically oriented portals showed the opposite, but less pronounced, pattern.
On local television stations, coverage was almost one-sided. The authorities had a considerably larger presence and were portrayed almost exclusively positively or neutrally, while 64 per cent of mentions of the opposition were negative.
The polarising media picture was also reflected in the narratives. On portals favourable to the authorities, by far the most prevalent narrative was the discrediting of political opponents - they were portrayed as violent, responsible for destabilising the country, collaborators with foreign interests and ready to take power by undemocratic means. A particularly intense smear campaign was waged against the Student List. On critically oriented portals, the most prevalent narrative was criticism of the authorities, directed above all at the use of public office and public resources for electoral purposes, political influence over institutions, electoral irregularities, pressure on citizens and the state of media freedoms.
Similar patterns were present on the front pages of the daily newspapers. Nearly 100 manipulative headlines were recorded, two thirds of which concerned the discrediting of the authorities' political opponents and 29 per cent the discrediting of actors from the region.
Informer TV, which was left out of the monitoring conducted by the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM), stood out in particular for the intensity and continuity of its discrediting of the authorities' political opponents. Informer's programming also carried at least ten recordings of wiretapped conversations relating to the “Student List”.
Media market and distribution
During the first part of the election campaign, changes in media ownership structure and the expansion of the media portfolios of individual companies continued. Particularly visible was the further expansion of the portfolio of Telekom Srbija, a majority state-owned company that at the same time plays a significant role in the market for the distribution of media content. In September, Telekom became the sole owner of Mondo Inc
“Telekom becomes sole owner of Kurir, former co-owner of Srpski telegraf appointed director”, UNS, 14 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10o
, the publisher of Kurir, taking over the remaining 20 per cent stake from WMG Media. Saša Milovanović, a former co-owner and director of Srpski telegraf and a former editor of Kurir, was appointed general director of Mondo Inc. At the same time, Telekom initiated proceedings to take over River Media, the publisher of the television channel UNA
“WE REVEAL Telekom Srbija has confirmed that it is taking over another television channel: UNA joins a big media family”, Forbes, 27 August 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10p
. The proceedings had not been completed by the time this report was finalised.
The expansion of the network of local outlets linked to the publishers of Informer and Alo continued during the election campaign as well. Best Media Team, owned by the publishers of these two tabloids, set up a new company in Prijepolje, Infolim, registered for the production and broadcasting of television programming “The company behind the tabloids Alo and Informer is launching a local outlet in Prijepolje too”, 29 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10q, accessed 2 October 2026. .
The ownership changes took place in parallel with changes in the distribution of television content. Immediately before the start of the campaign, as part of a six-month promotion, Telekom Srbija made around 30 television channels available free of charge via the terrestrial signal, among them Informer TV, Kurir TV, Blic TV, K1 and Euronews Srbija. In this way, Informer TV and Kurir TV also became available to audiences in areas for which they hold no terrestrial broadcasting licence from the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media. During the campaign, 16 media and journalists' associations and civil society organisations called on Telekom to halt such broadcasting and on REM to respond, stating that this practice raises questions of legality and of equal conditions on the media market ANEM, “Request that Telekom and REM stop the unlawful broadcasting of Informer and Kurir”, 24 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10r, accessed 2 October 2026. .
Changes were recorded at the same time in the outlets of Adria News Network (ANN), which comprises N1 Srbija, Nova S, Nova.rs, the daily Danas and the weekly Radar. During 2026, Portugal's Alpac Capital agreed to buy ANN from United Group, and the new leadership took up directorial posts while the takeover proceedings had not yet been completed from a regulatory standpoint. N1, “Alpac Capital has taken over N1, TV Nova, Nova.rs, Radar, Danas: All directors dismissed”, 17 August 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10s, accessed 2 October 2026. Ahead of the start of the election campaign, Nova S decided not to continue broadcasting the programme “24 Minutes with Zoran Kesić” (“24 minuta sa Zoranom Kesićem”), which deals with social and political developments in Serbia through comedy and satire. The new leadership justified the decision on economic and commercial grounds, while the programme's authors linked it to the pre-election period N1, “Zoran Kesić: The talk of an expensive programme is a mere excuse, ‘24 minuta’ from now on on YouTube”, 5 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10t, accessed 2 October 2026. . According to media reports, the new management of N1 and TV Nova asked REM for a licence to broadcast in Serbia. Cenzolovka, “N1 management did not inform the regulator in Luxembourg about the request for a licence to broadcast in Serbia”, 5 October 2026, https://link.crta.rs/12y, accessed 6 October 2026.
A change at the top of the Nova.rs portal also followed during the campaign. On 17 September, Mihailo Jovićević left the post of editor-in-chief Nova.rs http://nova.rs, “Mihailo Jovićević is no longer the editor of the Nova.rs http://nova.rs portal”, 16 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10v, accessed 2 October 2026. of the Nova.rs portal. The employees' union and ANEM Nova.rs http://nova.rs, “The union of Nova.rs and Radar: The removal of editor-in-chief Mihailo Jovićević is disturbing, he was dismissed at the moment when the site is at its most successful”, 17 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10w, accessed 2 October 2026. expressed concern about the possible consequences of the staffing changes for critical journalism in the pre-election period ANEM, “The staffing changes at Nova.rs are pressure on critical journalism ahead of the elections”, 17 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10x, accessed 2 October 2026. , while journalists and staff at Nova.rs warned that, according to their accounts, the new management intends to hire journalists from outlets favourable to the authorities. Cenzolovka, “Journalists and staff of Nova.rs: The new management would bring regime journalists and SNS adverts onto our site through the back door. We are putting up resistance with our names”, 1 October 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10y, accessed 2 October 2026.
Several digital incidents affecting independent and critically oriented outlets were recorded during the first part of the campaign. Cloned websites of N1 and Vreme ANEM, “ANEM ALARM: Cloned websites of N1 and Vreme”, 24 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10z, accessed 2 October 2026. appeared, imitating their names and visual identity, while VranjeNews, Mašina and some local outlets reported cyber and bot attacks ANEM, “ANEM ALARM: Mašina and local outlets targeted by cyber attacks”, 28 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/110, accessed 2 October 2026. that disrupted their work or compromised their social media accounts.
The expansion of the network of local outlets linked to the publishers of Informer and Alo continued during the election campaign as well. Best Media Team, owned by the publishers of these two tabloids, set up a new company in Prijepolje, Infolim, registered for the production and broadcasting of television programming “The company behind the tabloids Alo and Informer is launching a local outlet in Prijepolje too”, 29 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10q, accessed 2 October 2026. .
The ownership changes took place in parallel with changes in the distribution of television content. Immediately before the start of the campaign, as part of a six-month promotion, Telekom Srbija made around 30 television channels available free of charge via the terrestrial signal, among them Informer TV, Kurir TV, Blic TV, K1 and Euronews Srbija. In this way, Informer TV and Kurir TV also became available to audiences in areas for which they hold no terrestrial broadcasting licence from the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media. During the campaign, 16 media and journalists' associations and civil society organisations called on Telekom to halt such broadcasting and on REM to respond, stating that this practice raises questions of legality and of equal conditions on the media market ANEM, “Request that Telekom and REM stop the unlawful broadcasting of Informer and Kurir”, 24 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10r, accessed 2 October 2026. .
Changes were recorded at the same time in the outlets of Adria News Network (ANN), which comprises N1 Srbija, Nova S, Nova.rs, the daily Danas and the weekly Radar. During 2026, Portugal's Alpac Capital agreed to buy ANN from United Group, and the new leadership took up directorial posts while the takeover proceedings had not yet been completed from a regulatory standpoint. N1, “Alpac Capital has taken over N1, TV Nova, Nova.rs, Radar, Danas: All directors dismissed”, 17 August 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10s, accessed 2 October 2026. Ahead of the start of the election campaign, Nova S decided not to continue broadcasting the programme “24 Minutes with Zoran Kesić” (“24 minuta sa Zoranom Kesićem”), which deals with social and political developments in Serbia through comedy and satire. The new leadership justified the decision on economic and commercial grounds, while the programme's authors linked it to the pre-election period N1, “Zoran Kesić: The talk of an expensive programme is a mere excuse, ‘24 minuta’ from now on on YouTube”, 5 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10t, accessed 2 October 2026. . According to media reports, the new management of N1 and TV Nova asked REM for a licence to broadcast in Serbia. Cenzolovka, “N1 management did not inform the regulator in Luxembourg about the request for a licence to broadcast in Serbia”, 5 October 2026, https://link.crta.rs/12y, accessed 6 October 2026.
A change at the top of the Nova.rs portal also followed during the campaign. On 17 September, Mihailo Jovićević left the post of editor-in-chief Nova.rs http://nova.rs, “Mihailo Jovićević is no longer the editor of the Nova.rs http://nova.rs portal”, 16 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10v, accessed 2 October 2026. of the Nova.rs portal. The employees' union and ANEM Nova.rs http://nova.rs, “The union of Nova.rs and Radar: The removal of editor-in-chief Mihailo Jovićević is disturbing, he was dismissed at the moment when the site is at its most successful”, 17 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10w, accessed 2 October 2026. expressed concern about the possible consequences of the staffing changes for critical journalism in the pre-election period ANEM, “The staffing changes at Nova.rs are pressure on critical journalism ahead of the elections”, 17 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10x, accessed 2 October 2026. , while journalists and staff at Nova.rs warned that, according to their accounts, the new management intends to hire journalists from outlets favourable to the authorities. Cenzolovka, “Journalists and staff of Nova.rs: The new management would bring regime journalists and SNS adverts onto our site through the back door. We are putting up resistance with our names”, 1 October 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10y, accessed 2 October 2026.
Several digital incidents affecting independent and critically oriented outlets were recorded during the first part of the campaign. Cloned websites of N1 and Vreme ANEM, “ANEM ALARM: Cloned websites of N1 and Vreme”, 24 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/10z, accessed 2 October 2026. appeared, imitating their names and visual identity, while VranjeNews, Mašina and some local outlets reported cyber and bot attacks ANEM, “ANEM ALARM: Mašina and local outlets targeted by cyber attacks”, 28 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/110, accessed 2 October 2026. that disrupted their work or compromised their social media accounts.
The state of political pluralism on television
Television coverage during the first part of the campaign was characterised by a pronounced imbalance in the presence of the authorities and the opposition. Coverage patterns differed between broadcasters with national coverage and cable channels, as well as between individual channels.
Pluralism on broadcasters with national coverage
Across the five broadcasters with national coverage (Radio Television of Serbia and four commercial broadcasters, TV Pink, TV Prva, TV B92 and TV Happy), the imbalance in the presence and portrayal of electoral actors was pronounced. Representatives of the authorities received 69 per cent of the total time devoted to political actors, while the opposition received 31 per cent.
Chart 8.1. Share of the total time allocated to political actors
Chart 8.1. Share of the total time allocated to political actors
Share of the ruling majority and the opposition in total political airtime on broadcasters with national coverage
The ruling majorityThe opposition
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, media monitoring, 9-30 September 2026.
The imbalance was present on almost all individual broadcasters with national coverage, but with varying intensity. It was most pronounced on RTS, where the authorities received 85 per cent of the time and the opposition 15 per cent. TV Pink follows, with a ratio of 80 to 20 per cent, TV Prva with 76 to 24 per cent and TV B92 with 72 to 28 per cent in favour of the authorities. TV Happy is an exception, because in the observation period all of the time allocated to political actors went to the opposition. TV Happy's main evening news programme is broadcast at 16.30 and is therefore not covered by the monitoring of extended prime time (18.00-24.00). In the observation period, the monitoring of TV Happy covered only the programme “Aktuelnosti”, whose guests were representatives of Mi - Glas naroda, POKS, Pokret Mi snaga naroda and Novi DSS, while there were no representatives of the Student List or of European Serbia.
Chart 8.2. Share of the total time allocated to political actors, by broadcaster with national coverage
Chart 8.2. Share of the total time allocated to political actors, by broadcaster with national coverage
Share of the ruling majority and the opposition by broadcaster with national coverage
The ruling majorityThe opposition
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, media monitoring, 9-30 September 2026.
The difference between the two political blocs was also visible in the way they were portrayed. Of the total time devoted to the authorities, 61 per cent was neutral and 38 per cent positive. For the opposition, 53 per cent of the time was neutral, 42 per cent negative and five per cent positive. The imbalance therefore lay not only in the amount of media space, but also in the way political competitors were portrayed.
Chart 8.3. Distribution of coverage of representatives of the ruling majority and the opposition, by tone and role
Chart 8.3. Distribution of coverage of representatives of the ruling majority and the opposition, by tone and role
Tone and role in the coverage of broadcasters with national coverage
NegativeNeutralPositiveActivePassive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, media monitoring, 9-30 September 2026.
When the data are viewed by individual broadcaster, the differences in tone become even more pronounced. On the commercial broadcasters, the authorities were portrayed with no negative tone or with a negligible share of it, while positive coverage accounted for 35 per cent of the time on Pink, 52 per cent on Prva and 50 per cent on B92. At the same time, coverage of the opposition on these broadcasters was predominantly negative: 83 per cent of the time on Pink, 81 per cent on Prva and 68 per cent on B92. RTS showed a different pattern: coverage of both political blocs was predominantly neutral, but a negative tone was more frequent for the opposition (13 per cent) than for the authorities (three per cent), while a positive tone accounted for 21 per cent of the time in both cases. On TV Happy, within the programme covered by the monitoring, the opposition was portrayed exclusively neutrally.
Chart 8.4. Distribution of coverage of representatives of the ruling majority and the opposition by tone, by broadcaster
Chart 8.4. Distribution of coverage of representatives of the ruling majority and the opposition by tone, by broadcaster
Tone of coverage of the authorities and of the opposition, by broadcaster with national coverage
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, media monitoring, 9-30 September 2026.
Presence in programming did not necessarily mean that political actors were able to address the public directly. Representatives of the authorities spoke directly during 68 per cent of the time devoted to them, while for the opposition that share was 52 per cent. A significant part of the opposition's visibility came from content in which other political actors, journalists or interviewees spoke about it.
Among the opposition electoral contestants, the Student List stood out in particular, receiving 41 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition. However, 88 per cent of the time devoted to the list was negative in tone, nine per cent neutral and three per cent positive, while its representatives spoke directly during ten per cent of the time devoted to them.
Chart 8.5. Share of the time allocated to the opposition, tone of coverage and role in coverage
Among the opposition electoral contestants, the Student List stood out in particular, receiving 41 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition. However, 88 per cent of the time devoted to the list was negative in tone, nine per cent neutral and three per cent positive, while its representatives spoke directly during ten per cent of the time devoted to them.
Chart 8.5. Share of the time allocated to the opposition, tone of coverage and role in coverage
Presence, tone and role of opposition lists on broadcasters with national coverage
NegativeNeutralPositiveActivePassive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, media monitoring, 9-30 September 2026.
Aleksandar Vučić had the largest presence of any individual political actor on broadcasters with national coverage, with 49 per cent of the total time allocated to all political actors. A particularly stark contrast in media treatment is visible between Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of the “United Serbia” list, and Ilija Srdanović, the first candidate on the Student List. While 38 per cent of the time devoted to Vučić on broadcasters with national coverage was positive, with no negative tone, Srdanović received almost exclusively negative treatment (90 per cent). The difference was also visible in the way the two candidates reached the public. Vučić spoke directly during 70 per cent of the time devoted to him, while for Srdanović that share was eight per cent, and most of his visibility consisted of content in which others spoke about him.
Election and regular programming in extended prime time
The distribution of time allocated to political actors of the authorities and the opposition differed by type of programme. In specially designated election content on broadcasters with national coverage, the authorities received 63 per cent and the opposition 37 per cent of the time, while in regular news and other regular programming the ratio was 71 to 29 per cent.
The difference was even more pronounced in tone: the share of positive portrayal of the opposition was considerably higher in the election programme slots than in regular programming.
In the election programme slots, 16 per cent of the time devoted to the opposition was positive and 41 per cent negative, while outside them positive coverage accounted for only two per cent and negative coverage for 42 per cent. The election programme slots thus create a picture of greater political pluralism than regular programming, in which the pattern of portrayal of the opposition was considerably less favourable150.
150 An election programme slot is the part of the programming intended for the presentation of candidate lists, within which newsrooms may prepare reports themselves or broadcast material that the candidate lists submit to them for the purposes of their own presentation.
Pluralism on Radio Television of Serbia (RTS)
The election campaign began after several months of pronounced imbalance in the main evening news programme of the public service broadcaster, RTS's Dnevnik 2.
“The ruling majority received 96 per cent of the airtime devoted to domestic political actors in the observed period (April-August 2026), with a predominantly positive (40 per cent) or neutral (60 per cent) tone of coverage.”, CRTA Election Observation Mission, Campaigning without the paperwork, https://crta.rs/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/EOM1-SR-Kampanja-pre-raspisivanja_4-updated.pdf
Although it narrowed with the start of the campaign, the imbalance remained pronounced in the first half of the campaign in extended prime time.
Representatives of the authorities received 85 per cent and the opposition 15 per cent of the time devoted to electoral actors.
Of the time devoted to the authorities, 76 per cent was neutral, 21 per cent positive and three per cent negative in tone, while for the opposition the ratio was 66 per cent neutral, 21 per cent positive and 13 per cent negative.
There was a difference in the opportunity to address the public directly as well. Representatives of the authorities spoke directly during 77 per cent of the time devoted to them, compared with 69 per cent for the opposition.
Chart 8.6. Distribution of coverage of the ruling majority and the opposition by tone and role on RTS 1
Representatives of the authorities received 85 per cent and the opposition 15 per cent of the time devoted to electoral actors.
Of the time devoted to the authorities, 76 per cent was neutral, 21 per cent positive and three per cent negative in tone, while for the opposition the ratio was 66 per cent neutral, 21 per cent positive and 13 per cent negative.
There was a difference in the opportunity to address the public directly as well. Representatives of the authorities spoke directly during 77 per cent of the time devoted to them, compared with 69 per cent for the opposition.
Chart 8.6. Distribution of coverage of the ruling majority and the opposition by tone and role on RTS 1
Tone and role in the coverage of Radio Television of Serbia
NegativeNeutralPositiveActivePassive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, media monitoring, 9-30 September 2026.
On RTS, the largest part of the time devoted to the opposition went to the “European Serbia” list (65 per cent). The “Student List” received 14 per cent, “Authentic Right” nine per cent, while “Pokret snaga Srbije” received four per cent. The remaining eight per cent of the time went to minority parties that are not in power and to other opposition representatives not contesting the elections.
The introduction of the election part of the programming brought changes in the tone of coverage of the opposition and increased the active role of addressing the public directly. All opposition lists had a share of positive tone, while only the Student List and European Serbia had a share of negative tone. (Chart 8.7)
Chart 8.7. Share of the time allocated to the opposition, tone of coverage and role in coverage on RTS 1
The introduction of the election part of the programming brought changes in the tone of coverage of the opposition and increased the active role of addressing the public directly. All opposition lists had a share of positive tone, while only the Student List and European Serbia had a share of negative tone. (Chart 8.7)
Chart 8.7. Share of the time allocated to the opposition, tone of coverage and role in coverage on RTS 1
Presence, tone and role of opposition lists on RTS
NegativeNeutralPositiveActivePassive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, media monitoring, 9-30 September 2026.
In the first part of the campaign, Aleksandar Vučić was by far the individual political actor with the largest presence on RTS, with 52 per cent of the total time allocated to all political actors. Most of the time devoted to Vučić was neutral in tone (79 per cent), while 21 per cent was positive. At the same time, Vučić was in an active role during 79 per cent of the time, that is, he had the opportunity to address the public directly, in the first person. Since the start of the campaign, 16 live link-ups with him in RTS programming have been recorded, among them two interviews. One was carried as a live link-up of a conversation from the Jutarnji program of Radio Beograd into RTS's Jutarnji dnevnik, while the other was broadcast in the programme “Za stolom sa Apostolom”, on the day Vučić resigned as President of Serbia.
Use of Aleksandar Vučić's resignation to increase the candidate list's visibility
On 27 September, Aleksandar Vučić resigned from the office of President of the Republic. That day RTS devoted around 130 minutes of programming to him, that is, more than two hours. The interview in the programme “Za stolom sa Apostolom”, devoted to the forthcoming resignation, lasted 74 minutes, while Dnevnik 2, extended from the usual 30 to 88 minutes, devoted approximately 56 minutes to him, or 64 per cent of its duration, including two live addresses. In his last address in the capacity of President of the Republic, Vučić called on citizens to vote for the United Serbia list, stating that “only a vote for United Serbia” was a vote against his political opponents.
The balance of portrayal in election and regular programming in RTS's extended prime time
At the public service broadcaster, the imbalance in the distribution of time was considerably more pronounced in the regular than in the election part of the programming. In regular news and other content, representatives of the authorities received 94 per cent of the time allocated to political actors, and the opposition only six per cent.
Moreover, the time recorded for the opposition in regular programming comes from the debate programme Takovska 10, broadcast on 15 September, in which, alongside Siniša Mali as a representative of the authorities, the opposition representative Dušan Nikezić, vice-president of the Party of Freedom and Justice, took part, as did Miloš Nenezić, president of the Serbian Association of Employers, and Veljko Mijušković, a professor at the Faculty of Economics. Without this single piece of programming, the opposition's presence in regular programming would have been negligible. In addition to this one, RTS organised one further debate in the first part of the campaign in which representatives of the authorities and of the opposition took part: Marina Raguš, from the “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list, Zdravko Ponoš, from the “European Serbia - Marinika Tepić - Zdravko Ponoš” list, and Snežana Paunović, from the “Ivica Dačić - A Factor of Stability” list. The Student List did not respond to the invitation to this debate. The programme “Takovska 10” was also broadcast on 22 September, but that edition was not devoted to the elections; it dealt with international politics, and its guests were the diplomats Dragana Filipović, Dušan Spasojević and Zoran Milivojević. RTS also invited Aleksandar Vučić, Ilija Srdanović and CRTA's director, Vukosava Crnjanski, to a pre-election debate. Ilija Srdanović responded by criticising RTS over the absence of Student List candidates from its programming to date, while CRTA declined to take part, stating that it is an election observer and not a contestant in the electoral race.
In the specially designated election programme slots the ratio was more balanced, but the advantage of the authorities remained pronounced: representatives of the ruling parties received 64 per cent and opposition parties 36 per cent of the time. The difference between election and regular programming thus shows that a greater degree of pluralism was achieved primarily through specially separated election content, while in RTS's regular programming almost all of the space allocated to political actors went to the authorities.
Pluralism on cable channels
The four cable channels were markedly polarised. In aggregate, representatives of the authorities received 60 per cent, and the opposition 40 per cent of the time devoted to political actors, but this ratio conceals different patterns of coverage. On Informer TV and Kurir TV the authorities received around three quarters of the time (69 and 74 per cent), while on N1 and Nova S two thirds of the time went to the opposition (64 and 66 per cent).
The differences were particularly pronounced in the tone of coverage.
On Informer TV and Kurir TV the authorities were portrayed predominantly positively (61 and 56 per cent of the time), and almost never negatively. The time devoted to the opposition was almost exclusively negative (92 and 88 per cent).
On N1 and Nova S the direction of coverage was the opposite, but of considerably lower intensity. The authorities were portrayed negatively in 37 and 41 per cent of the time respectively, and positively in 14 and eight per cent. On N1 and Nova S the opposition was portrayed predominantly neutrally (73 per cent, 63 per cent) and positively (23 and 34 per cent respectively).
Chart 8.8. Tone of coverage on cable channels
The differences were particularly pronounced in the tone of coverage.
On Informer TV and Kurir TV the authorities were portrayed predominantly positively (61 and 56 per cent of the time), and almost never negatively. The time devoted to the opposition was almost exclusively negative (92 and 88 per cent).
On N1 and Nova S the direction of coverage was the opposite, but of considerably lower intensity. The authorities were portrayed negatively in 37 and 41 per cent of the time respectively, and positively in 14 and eight per cent. On N1 and Nova S the opposition was portrayed predominantly neutrally (73 per cent, 63 per cent) and positively (23 and 34 per cent respectively).
Chart 8.8. Tone of coverage on cable channels
Tone of coverage of the authorities and of the opposition, by cable broadcaster
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, media monitoring, 9-30 September 2026.
Similar differences existed in the opportunity to address the public directly. On Informer, representatives of the authorities spoke directly during 70 per cent of the time devoted to them, and the opposition during only 11 per cent, while on Kurir that ratio was 58 to four per cent, so that on these channels the opposition was almost entirely presented in a passive role. On N1 and Nova S the opposition was given the chance to speak directly more often than the authorities (60 and 43 per cent of its own time, compared with 40 and 17 per cent for the authorities).
Pre-election debates are also organised by N1, which broadcast two such programmes during the first period of the campaign. A change from the previous period is the participation of representatives of the authorities, particularly of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), in N1's programming, after a period of several years during which representatives of the largest ruling party did not appear on this channel. The first programme was devoted to education and featured Ana Brnabić, the outgoing Speaker of the National Assembly and third on the “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list, and Mirjana Nikolić, Rector of the University of Arts in Belgrade and ninetieth on the “Student List - Students Are Winning” list. The second pre-election debate featured Siniša Mali, for the “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list, Dušan Nikezić, for the “European Serbia” list, and Dušan Bajatović, for the “Ivica Dačić - A Factor of Stability” list. The debate was devoted to state borrowing, that is, to the question of whether the borrowed funds are used for investment or to finance current spending.
Pre-election debates are also organised by N1, which broadcast two such programmes during the first period of the campaign. A change from the previous period is the participation of representatives of the authorities, particularly of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), in N1's programming, after a period of several years during which representatives of the largest ruling party did not appear on this channel. The first programme was devoted to education and featured Ana Brnabić, the outgoing Speaker of the National Assembly and third on the “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list, and Mirjana Nikolić, Rector of the University of Arts in Belgrade and ninetieth on the “Student List - Students Are Winning” list. The second pre-election debate featured Siniša Mali, for the “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list, Dušan Nikezić, for the “European Serbia” list, and Dušan Bajatović, for the “Ivica Dačić - A Factor of Stability” list. The debate was devoted to state borrowing, that is, to the question of whether the borrowed funds are used for investment or to finance current spending.
Live broadcasts of addresses as a campaign advantage: Aleksandar Vučić compared with other state officials
Aleksandar Vučić was the individual political actor with the largest presence in television programming during the first part of the parliamentary election campaign. As the leader and first candidate on the candidate list “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia”, until 27 September he took part in the campaign while simultaneously holding the office of President of the Republic.
Aleksandar Vučić's pronounced presence in the television space was reflected not only in the total time devoted to him, but also in his direct access to the audience: up to the moment he resigned as President, that is, during the first 19 days of the campaign, national channels and channels broadcast by cable carried his addresses live 27 times. Over the same period, addresses by the Speaker of the National Assembly Ana Brnabić and the Minister of Finance Siniša Mali were carried live five and four times respectively, while the Minister of the Interior Ivica Dačić had no address in the first 19 days of the campaign.
Aleksandar Vučić's pronounced presence in the television space was reflected not only in the total time devoted to him, but also in his direct access to the audience: up to the moment he resigned as President, that is, during the first 19 days of the campaign, national channels and channels broadcast by cable carried his addresses live 27 times. Over the same period, addresses by the Speaker of the National Assembly Ana Brnabić and the Minister of Finance Siniša Mali were carried live five and four times respectively, while the Minister of the Interior Ivica Dačić had no address in the first 19 days of the campaign.
Informer: a pattern of discrediting political opponents and promoting the leader of the ruling list
Informer TV, which is not included in the media monitoring conducted by the media regulator REM
Media article: Vreme, “Four members of the REM Council: Without monitoring of Informer television the integrity of the elections is at risk, 1 October 2026. https://link.crta.rs/13i, accessed 6 October 2026. Applying the 2023 methodology above all entails supervision exclusively of the programming of those media service providers that were supervised ahead of the election campaign in December 2023, and that sample comprises the public service broadcasters, four televisions holding a national coverage licence and three cable channels: N1, Nova S and K1.
, stood out in particular for its continuous discrediting, disparaging and often insulting portrayal of the authorities' political opponents. These were not isolated incidents or statements by guests: the same approach was repeated on different days, in different programmes and towards different political actors, and in this markedly negative portrayal both the presenters and the editors of the channel took an active part, through derogatory descriptions, labelling, ridicule and personalised attacks.
Particularly intense targeting was directed at Ilija Srdanović, the first candidate on the Student List. For example, his declared ethnicity was used as grounds for discrediting him, and on 17 and 18 September he was called, in various programmes, “a proven thug”, “a moral monstrosity” and “human filth”, as well as “a tried-and-tested operative of the notorious Kavač-Milogor regime from Montenegro”. Over several days Informer TV also broadcast the series “Spisak sumnjivih lica” about the Student List's candidates, in which details from their professional and private lives, their political ties and their public positions were linked to accusations and negative characterisations, without any clear distinction between facts, unverified claims and value judgements, and without any space for the candidates to respond. The same approach continued on 30 September, when two programmes carried a report claiming that the list's representatives “target and stigmatise anyone who thinks differently, following the Goebbels recipe”.
The practice of broadcasting recordings of wiretapped conversations of the “Student List” and of opposition actors, which Informer presents as material from its own “Viewers' Intelligence Service” (“Gledalačka obaveštajna služba”, GOSI), stood out in particular. Since the elections were called, at least ten such items have been broadcast, among them recordings of conversations of students, opposition politicians and other electoral actors, accompanied by commentary that cast their actions, intentions or credibility in a negative light. The origin of the recordings has not been clarified: although the name suggests that viewers supply them, the reports did not state who made them, when or how, nor whether those recorded were aware that they were being recorded. Without that information, the audience has no way of assessing the authenticity of the recordings or the context in which they were made.
The question of the origin of similar recordings has arisen before. Informer TV, together with four other television channels, broadcast an audio recording of a meeting of activists from Novi Sad in March 2025, likewise without any information about how it had been made. The activists were then arrested on suspicion of an attempt to overthrow the constitutional order, and it became known only from the indictment that the recording had been made through surveillance by the Security Information Agency (BIA) under measures that did not concern them. Although the origin of the GOSI recordings is not known, this case shows why that question matters, Insajder, “BIA wiretapped PSG's premises for three and a half months, and then accidentally recorded the activists from Novi Sad”, 28 October 2025, https://link.crta.rs/13j, accessed 6 October 2026.
At the same time, Aleksandar Vučić was given intense direct access to the audience on Informer TV and a markedly affirmative portrayal. Immediately before his address to the UN General Assembly, an interview with his parents was broadcast in which they spoke of their pride in their son, of his achievements and of his “fight for Serbia”, and the speech was trailed as “historic”. The intensity of the promotion was particularly visible after the resignation: between 28 and 30 September, 28 live link-ups from his activities were recorded, including campaign events and tours of infrastructure works. None was marked as part of the election programming, so his messages, including campaign messages, were carried extensively in regular programming and without journalistic mediation.
The pattern of discrediting was not confined to the television format but was also widely present on the Informer portal: in 22 days of the campaign, nearly 900 articles discrediting the authorities' political opponents were published on this portal. They were portrayed as violent and as a threat to the country's stability, and linked to “bringing down the state”, foreign interests and the activities of foreign intelligence services, while a series of articles announced or suggested that they were preparing riots and violence during election night and after the elections, including “bloodshed” and “civil war”. Such content was often accompanied by markedly derogatory and stigmatising characterisations, including “Ustaše”, “fascists”, “traitors”, “monsters” and “sick people”.
Particularly pronounced was the frame in which the elections were presented as a choice between the stability guaranteed by Vučić and the violence and chaos brought by his opponents. The discrediting also included openly stigmatising formulations: some actors were labelled “Ustaše”, “fascists” and “traitors”, while for others formulations such as “monsters”, “sick people” and “this one is already for the psychiatric ward” were used.
CRTA submitted three complaints to REM over content broadcast on Informer TV during the election campaign, pointing, among other things, to one-sided and negative coverage, hate speech, violations of dignity and privacy, and covert election promotion.
Particularly intense targeting was directed at Ilija Srdanović, the first candidate on the Student List. For example, his declared ethnicity was used as grounds for discrediting him, and on 17 and 18 September he was called, in various programmes, “a proven thug”, “a moral monstrosity” and “human filth”, as well as “a tried-and-tested operative of the notorious Kavač-Milogor regime from Montenegro”. Over several days Informer TV also broadcast the series “Spisak sumnjivih lica” about the Student List's candidates, in which details from their professional and private lives, their political ties and their public positions were linked to accusations and negative characterisations, without any clear distinction between facts, unverified claims and value judgements, and without any space for the candidates to respond. The same approach continued on 30 September, when two programmes carried a report claiming that the list's representatives “target and stigmatise anyone who thinks differently, following the Goebbels recipe”.
The practice of broadcasting recordings of wiretapped conversations of the “Student List” and of opposition actors, which Informer presents as material from its own “Viewers' Intelligence Service” (“Gledalačka obaveštajna služba”, GOSI), stood out in particular. Since the elections were called, at least ten such items have been broadcast, among them recordings of conversations of students, opposition politicians and other electoral actors, accompanied by commentary that cast their actions, intentions or credibility in a negative light. The origin of the recordings has not been clarified: although the name suggests that viewers supply them, the reports did not state who made them, when or how, nor whether those recorded were aware that they were being recorded. Without that information, the audience has no way of assessing the authenticity of the recordings or the context in which they were made.
The question of the origin of similar recordings has arisen before. Informer TV, together with four other television channels, broadcast an audio recording of a meeting of activists from Novi Sad in March 2025, likewise without any information about how it had been made. The activists were then arrested on suspicion of an attempt to overthrow the constitutional order, and it became known only from the indictment that the recording had been made through surveillance by the Security Information Agency (BIA) under measures that did not concern them. Although the origin of the GOSI recordings is not known, this case shows why that question matters, Insajder, “BIA wiretapped PSG's premises for three and a half months, and then accidentally recorded the activists from Novi Sad”, 28 October 2025, https://link.crta.rs/13j, accessed 6 October 2026.
At the same time, Aleksandar Vučić was given intense direct access to the audience on Informer TV and a markedly affirmative portrayal. Immediately before his address to the UN General Assembly, an interview with his parents was broadcast in which they spoke of their pride in their son, of his achievements and of his “fight for Serbia”, and the speech was trailed as “historic”. The intensity of the promotion was particularly visible after the resignation: between 28 and 30 September, 28 live link-ups from his activities were recorded, including campaign events and tours of infrastructure works. None was marked as part of the election programming, so his messages, including campaign messages, were carried extensively in regular programming and without journalistic mediation.
The pattern of discrediting was not confined to the television format but was also widely present on the Informer portal: in 22 days of the campaign, nearly 900 articles discrediting the authorities' political opponents were published on this portal. They were portrayed as violent and as a threat to the country's stability, and linked to “bringing down the state”, foreign interests and the activities of foreign intelligence services, while a series of articles announced or suggested that they were preparing riots and violence during election night and after the elections, including “bloodshed” and “civil war”. Such content was often accompanied by markedly derogatory and stigmatising characterisations, including “Ustaše”, “fascists”, “traitors”, “monsters” and “sick people”.
Particularly pronounced was the frame in which the elections were presented as a choice between the stability guaranteed by Vučić and the violence and chaos brought by his opponents. The discrediting also included openly stigmatising formulations: some actors were labelled “Ustaše”, “fascists” and “traitors”, while for others formulations such as “monsters”, “sick people” and “this one is already for the psychiatric ward” were used.
CRTA submitted three complaints to REM over content broadcast on Informer TV during the election campaign, pointing, among other things, to one-sided and negative coverage, hate speech, violations of dignity and privacy, and covert election promotion.
Coverage by local television stations
On local television stations too
The sample of local television stations comprises: TV Mačva, TV Lav plus, TV 5 Užice, TV V5 Valjevo, TV Santos, Niš TV, Studio B, Novosadska TV, RTV Kragujevac and TV Novi Pazar.
a trend of imbalance in the presence of the authorities and the opposition was noticeable. Of the total number of recorded mentions of political actors, representatives of the ruling majority received 63 per cent and representatives of the opposition 37 per cent of mentions. The authorities were portrayed almost exclusively positively or neutrally - 58 per cent of mentions were positive and 42 per cent neutral, with only one negative mention. By contrast, 64 per cent of mentions of the opposition were negative, 36 per cent neutral and only one positive.
Aleksandar Vučić and the Student List were spoken about most. Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of the United Serbia list, was in almost two thirds of mentions portrayed positively, and the student movement negatively in 82 per cent. Ilija Srdanović, the first candidate on the Student List, was portrayed negatively in 62 per cent of mentions and not once positively. Rasim Ljajić's list, third by number of mentions, appeared almost exclusively on TV Novi Pazar, with a predominantly positive tone.
The difference was even more pronounced in the opportunity for actors to address the public directly. Representatives of the authorities appeared as speakers 311 times, and those of the opposition only 28 times. On half of the television stations observed, the opposition did not address the public directly on a single occasion, and 23 of its 28 appearances in that role were recorded on just two stations, TV Novi Pazar and TV V5 Valjevo.
Aleksandar Vučić and the Student List were spoken about most. Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of the United Serbia list, was in almost two thirds of mentions portrayed positively, and the student movement negatively in 82 per cent. Ilija Srdanović, the first candidate on the Student List, was portrayed negatively in 62 per cent of mentions and not once positively. Rasim Ljajić's list, third by number of mentions, appeared almost exclusively on TV Novi Pazar, with a predominantly positive tone.
The difference was even more pronounced in the opportunity for actors to address the public directly. Representatives of the authorities appeared as speakers 311 times, and those of the opposition only 28 times. On half of the television stations observed, the opposition did not address the public directly on a single occasion, and 23 of its 28 appearances in that role were recorded on just two stations, TV Novi Pazar and TV V5 Valjevo.
Coverage by online outlets
Polarised portrayal of political actors
Unlike local television stations, where a pronounced imbalance in favour of the authorities was recorded, online outlets showed a pattern of polarisation similar to that on the cable channels.
In aggregate, more than half of the mentions of representatives of the authorities were positive (57%), while 25% were neutral and 18% negative. By contrast, slightly more than half of the mentions of opposition actors were negative (52%), with 29% neutral and 19% positive mentions.
Behind the aggregate data, however, differences between the portals are visible. On Informer, Alo, Večernje novosti, Kurir and B92, between 77 and 89 per cent of mentions of the authorities were positive, while a negative tone was almost absent. At the same time, between 79 and 92 per cent of mentions of the opposition on these portals were negative, with only one to two per cent positive. Blic showed the same direction, but considerably less pronounced and with a larger share of neutral mentions.
On N1, Nova.rs and Danas the opposite, but less pronounced, pattern was recorded: slightly more than half of the mentions of the authorities were negative, while between 42 and 48 per cent of mentions of the opposition were positive. At the same time, a significant part of the coverage remained neutral.
Chart 8.9. Tone of coverage on the portals
In aggregate, more than half of the mentions of representatives of the authorities were positive (57%), while 25% were neutral and 18% negative. By contrast, slightly more than half of the mentions of opposition actors were negative (52%), with 29% neutral and 19% positive mentions.
Behind the aggregate data, however, differences between the portals are visible. On Informer, Alo, Večernje novosti, Kurir and B92, between 77 and 89 per cent of mentions of the authorities were positive, while a negative tone was almost absent. At the same time, between 79 and 92 per cent of mentions of the opposition on these portals were negative, with only one to two per cent positive. Blic showed the same direction, but considerably less pronounced and with a larger share of neutral mentions.
On N1, Nova.rs and Danas the opposite, but less pronounced, pattern was recorded: slightly more than half of the mentions of the authorities were negative, while between 42 and 48 per cent of mentions of the opposition were positive. At the same time, a significant part of the coverage remained neutral.
Chart 8.9. Tone of coverage on the portals
Tone of coverage of the authorities and of the opposition, by news portal
NegativeNeutralPositive
Source: CRTA Election Observation Mission, media monitoring, 9-30 September 2026.
Narratives follow the polarisation of the online media space
The polarisation of online outlets was also visible through the narratives that dominated their coverage, but the patterns were not entirely symmetrical. On portals favourable to the authorities, the discrediting of political opponents
Narrative explanation: Discrediting is a narrative through which a political actor, whether an individual or a group, is disparaged or disqualified by means of personalised or group-directed attacks, derogatory labels, ridicule, insinuation or other negative characterisations aimed at the actor itself.
was by far the most prevalent narrative, present in 67 to 84 per cent of the articles on each of these portals. The glorification of Aleksandar Vučić was also one of the most prevalent narratives on these portals. On critically oriented portals (N1, Danas and Nova.rs), the most prevalent was criticism of the authorities
Narrative explanation: Criticism is a narrative through which a political actor is portrayed negatively by pointing to its actions, decisions, positions, conduct, results, omissions or responsibility. The emphasis is on a negative assessment of what the actor does, advocates or is held responsible for, and not on disparaging or challenging the actor itself.
, present in every second article. In the structure of its narratives, Blic was closer to the outlets favourable to the authorities: the glorification of Vučić was present to almost the same extent, while the discrediting of political opponents was considerably less present.
The discrediting of the authorities' political opponents was built along several interconnected lines, through which they were portrayed as violent and responsible for destabilising the country, linked to foreign interests, politically incapable and ready to take power by undemocratic means. Various critical actors were placed within the same frame, from electoral competitors and students to non-governmental organisations and media outlets.
The line about violence was particularly pronounced. During the first part of the campaign, five portals favourable to the authorities published nearly 1,500 articles portraying the authorities' political opponents as actors who provoke chaos, violence and destabilisation and who want a violent and undemocratic seizure of power. Various actors, including political rivals in the elections but also representatives of the civil sector and independent media, were portrayed as “generators of violence”, alongside messages about a choice between “peace and bloody streets” and claims that they intend to achieve their political goals by violent means. During the first part of the campaign, claims about “a violent change of government in the street” and about plans not to recognise electoral defeat were repeated. In several dozen articles, political opponents were attributed explicit preparations for violence, riots or other incidents immediately before the elections, on election day or after the vote, including claims about “a bloody scenario” after the elections and about the preparation of “false flag” operations, that is, staged incidents for which responsibility would be attributed to the authorities.
The second line of discrediting consisted of linking political opponents to foreign and regional actors. Claims were published about “anti-Serb centres in the region”, “sponsors from the West” and the influence of Western intelligence services, as well as about billions of euros invested in “bringing down Serbia”. The term “colour revolution” was used in at least 140 articles, as a common frame through which not only the authorities' political opponents but also non-governmental organisations, independent observers of the electoral process and independent media were linked to foreign influence, destabilisation and attempts to change the government.
Among political actors, the particularly intense target of discrediting was the Student List. On the Alo, B92, Kurir, Večernje novosti and Informer portals, the discrediting of the list was recorded in 94 per cent of the articles in which it appeared as an actor, and on Blic, where the same pattern was less pronounced, in 62 per cent. Claims were repeated that the list has no programme, no answers and no solutions, and that other political and foreign actors stand behind it. RTS's invitation to a head-to-head debate between Ilija Srdanović and Aleksandar Vučić was used to challenge the list further: Srdanović's response was presented as confirmation that the Student List's candidates “are running away from a debate because they have not a single answer for the people”.
The discrediting was also markedly personalised. On the same four portals, Ilija Srdanović, the first candidate on the Student List, was the subject of discrediting portrayal in 95 per cent of the articles in which he appeared as an actor, and on Blic in 62 per cent. His political independence was challenged by claims that he had been “planted” on the Student List and that Bojan Pajtić, the former president of the Democratic Party, and the Montenegrin intelligence services stood behind his selection, with links drawn to Milo Đukanović. He was at the same time portrayed as violent and was also labelled “a thug”, “a brute”, “Milo's errand boy” and “an agent provocateur”.
Criticism of the authorities on N1, Nova.rs and Danas covered a wide range of topics, but several patterns recurred across all three outlets. In the electoral context, the issues raised most prominently were the use of public office and state resources in the campaign, electoral irregularities, pressure on voters and on public sector employees, and unequal conditions for political contestants. Critical coverage also addressed political influence over institutions and their independence, as well as the state of media freedoms and pressure on journalists.
The discrediting of the authorities' political opponents was built along several interconnected lines, through which they were portrayed as violent and responsible for destabilising the country, linked to foreign interests, politically incapable and ready to take power by undemocratic means. Various critical actors were placed within the same frame, from electoral competitors and students to non-governmental organisations and media outlets.
The line about violence was particularly pronounced. During the first part of the campaign, five portals favourable to the authorities published nearly 1,500 articles portraying the authorities' political opponents as actors who provoke chaos, violence and destabilisation and who want a violent and undemocratic seizure of power. Various actors, including political rivals in the elections but also representatives of the civil sector and independent media, were portrayed as “generators of violence”, alongside messages about a choice between “peace and bloody streets” and claims that they intend to achieve their political goals by violent means. During the first part of the campaign, claims about “a violent change of government in the street” and about plans not to recognise electoral defeat were repeated. In several dozen articles, political opponents were attributed explicit preparations for violence, riots or other incidents immediately before the elections, on election day or after the vote, including claims about “a bloody scenario” after the elections and about the preparation of “false flag” operations, that is, staged incidents for which responsibility would be attributed to the authorities.
The second line of discrediting consisted of linking political opponents to foreign and regional actors. Claims were published about “anti-Serb centres in the region”, “sponsors from the West” and the influence of Western intelligence services, as well as about billions of euros invested in “bringing down Serbia”. The term “colour revolution” was used in at least 140 articles, as a common frame through which not only the authorities' political opponents but also non-governmental organisations, independent observers of the electoral process and independent media were linked to foreign influence, destabilisation and attempts to change the government.
Among political actors, the particularly intense target of discrediting was the Student List. On the Alo, B92, Kurir, Večernje novosti and Informer portals, the discrediting of the list was recorded in 94 per cent of the articles in which it appeared as an actor, and on Blic, where the same pattern was less pronounced, in 62 per cent. Claims were repeated that the list has no programme, no answers and no solutions, and that other political and foreign actors stand behind it. RTS's invitation to a head-to-head debate between Ilija Srdanović and Aleksandar Vučić was used to challenge the list further: Srdanović's response was presented as confirmation that the Student List's candidates “are running away from a debate because they have not a single answer for the people”.
The discrediting was also markedly personalised. On the same four portals, Ilija Srdanović, the first candidate on the Student List, was the subject of discrediting portrayal in 95 per cent of the articles in which he appeared as an actor, and on Blic in 62 per cent. His political independence was challenged by claims that he had been “planted” on the Student List and that Bojan Pajtić, the former president of the Democratic Party, and the Montenegrin intelligence services stood behind his selection, with links drawn to Milo Đukanović. He was at the same time portrayed as violent and was also labelled “a thug”, “a brute”, “Milo's errand boy” and “an agent provocateur”.
Criticism of the authorities on N1, Nova.rs and Danas covered a wide range of topics, but several patterns recurred across all three outlets. In the electoral context, the issues raised most prominently were the use of public office and state resources in the campaign, electoral irregularities, pressure on voters and on public sector employees, and unequal conditions for political contestants. Critical coverage also addressed political influence over institutions and their independence, as well as the state of media freedoms and pressure on journalists.
The press: manipulative narratives on front pages
99 manipulative headlines were recorded on the front pages of the daily newspapers. The most prevalent pattern was the discrediting of the authorities' political opponents, present in 62 per cent of the manipulative headlines, while 29 per cent concerned the discrediting of actors from the region.
In the discrediting of political opponents, the patterns recorded on some television channels (Informer) and in the online outlets recurred: the portrayal of opponents, and of the Student List in particular, as violent and responsible for destabilisation, the challenging of their political capability and credibility, and their linking to other political and foreign actors. On front pages these frames were often condensed into highly suggestive and discrediting formulations, such as “‘Blokaderi’ have finally revealed their plan and programme: Rape!”, “The only programme of the ‘blokaderi’: riding, raping, shearing...”, “We expose the biggest political fraud - the ‘blokaderi’ deception” and “Milo's man wants to run our government”.
The second dominant narrative concerned the discrediting of actors from the region, who were portrayed as hostile towards Serbia. Headlines used characterisations such as “Serb-haters”, claims about “hysteria in the region and in the West” and about “a media war against Serbia”, while the actions and statements of individual political, media and other actors from the region were presented as part of a broader hostile campaign against Serbia.
In the discrediting of political opponents, the patterns recorded on some television channels (Informer) and in the online outlets recurred: the portrayal of opponents, and of the Student List in particular, as violent and responsible for destabilisation, the challenging of their political capability and credibility, and their linking to other political and foreign actors. On front pages these frames were often condensed into highly suggestive and discrediting formulations, such as “‘Blokaderi’ have finally revealed their plan and programme: Rape!”, “The only programme of the ‘blokaderi’: riding, raping, shearing...”, “We expose the biggest political fraud - the ‘blokaderi’ deception” and “Milo's man wants to run our government”.
The second dominant narrative concerned the discrediting of actors from the region, who were portrayed as hostile towards Serbia. Headlines used characterisations such as “Serb-haters”, claims about “hysteria in the region and in the West” and about “a media war against Serbia”, while the actions and statements of individual political, media and other actors from the region were presented as part of a broader hostile campaign against Serbia.
