Conduct of the elections: electoral institutions and actors

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The institutions responsible for conducting the elections and overseeing the electoral process formally carried out their tasks, but did not resolve the key problems that undermine the transparency, lawfulness and equality of the electoral process.

The Republic Electoral Commission (REC) carried out most electoral activities within the statutory deadlines. However, public confidence in the integrity and competences of the REC was undermined by the procedure for adopting the controversial decision that voting abroad be held according to Serbian time, as well as by its relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the process of determining the polling station infrastructure abroad. The REC did not adopt an instruction on voting outside the polling station, thereby opening the way to inconsistent, and also unlawful, practices by local commissions. Cases were recorded in which complaints were taken up for decision only as the deadline was expiring, which limited discussion of them.

The Agency for Prevention of Corruption (ACAS) has not demonstrated that it is exercising effective oversight of the campaign by applying the new statutory mechanisms. In certain cases, the Agency found that there had been no breach of the law, on the grounds that the resource suspected of having been misused was not owned by the institution the official represents. It follows from such an interpretation that a public official can misuse only a resource of the institution or state body in which he or she holds office, and no other. Such an interpretation narrows the concept of misuse of public resources, contrary to the statutory provision.

Although the Council of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) continued to work and attempted to consider the complaints received during the election campaign, divisions among its members and the absence of the required majority prevented decisions from being taken on possible breaches of the law in media reporting.

Police actions during the elections raised questions about the equal treatment of candidates, the timeliness and proportionality of interventions and the justification for certain measures.

The Republic Electoral Commission

During the observation period, the Republic Electoral Commission (REC) carried out most of the activities prescribed by law within the prescribed deadlines, but under the shadow of controversial decisions and of missed opportunities to put a stop to the unlawful and inconsistent practices of local election commissions and polling boards in the process of voting from home.

The criteria for designating polling stations abroad and the voting hours for voters from the diaspora remain contentious. The REC decided on the complaints of “Student List - Students Are Winning” only after the statutory deadline had expired, although there were no objective reasons for the delay. Nor did the REC adopt an instruction that would have harmonised the conduct of election commissions with regard to applications for voting outside the polling station, because the members from the ranks of the parliamentary majority abstained. This left room for unlawful practices - the local election commission in Zaječar allowed political actors to register voters for voting outside the polling station, even though under the regulations such an application may be submitted only by the voter in person.

The REC's extended composition has been formed in full, since all submitters of confirmed candidate lists have nominated representatives. The REC consists of 67 people - members and deputy members in its permanent and extended compositions. The REC's permanent composition consists of the chairperson, the deputy chairperson, 16 members and their deputies, 34 people in total. The permanent composition includes 22 representatives of the parliamentary majority and 12 representatives of the opposition. The extended composition has 33 members and deputy members.

For a decision to be adopted, 18 of the 35 members must vote in favour of it.

Sessions and decisions of the REC

Between the calling of the elections and the cut-off date of this report, 28 sessions of the REC were held, three of them after the consolidated electoral list was established.

The REC adopted acts of an organisational and technical nature relating to the preparation of the voting and the conduct of special electoral procedures in a timely manner.

The consolidated electoral list, containing 18 confirmed candidate lists with candidates for MPs, was adopted at the REC session of 8 October 2026.

New data deepen doubts about the integrity of the certified candidacy signatures

On 17 October, the Republic Electoral Commission made available data on signature certification for the seven lists that submitted their candidacies after 25 September, which were confirmed in the following order: 12. the Liberal Green Party (LZS), 13. the “SNAGA” coalition, 14. the Party of Russian-Serbian Unity, 15. “Dad, This Is for You”, 16. the coalition “Vladimir Gajić - Alternative for Serbia”, 17. the Albanian Coalition and 18. “Mother Serbia - GRUDA”. The data confirm patterns observed earlier: an almost exclusive reliance on city and municipal administrations, a large number of signatures in places with no recorded activities by the lists, and matches in the territorial distribution of certification.

City and municipal administrations certified between 96 and 100% of the support signatures for each of the seven lists. By comparison, for the lists submitted earlier this share was 97% for the Russian Party, 81% for United Serbia and 22% for the Student List.

The differences are particularly significant in the administrations where CRTA had previously recorded refusals or postponements of certification for opposition lists. In those administrations, 73 signatures were certified for Gajić's list in Alibunar, 918 for “Dad, This Is for You” and GRUDA in Sombor, 204 for GRUDA in Smederevska Palanka and 2,327 for GRUDA and Gajić in Kragujevac. In Požarevac, Novi Sad, Niš, Kraljevo and Kragujevac, the places that accounted for the largest numbers of signatures for these lists, CRTA's observers had not recorded a single field activity by these lists as of 16 October.

Požarevac stands out both for the volume of certification and for earlier allegations that the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) provided support in collecting signatures for other lists. The City Administration certified a total of 2,720 signatures for the Liberal Green Party, “Dad, This Is for You” and Vladimir Gajić, more than Novi Sad certified for the same lists (2,119). According to three independent sources cited in the second report, SNS activists in Požarevac collected signatures for “Dad, This Is for You”. REC data confirm that Požarevac is the largest single place of certification for that list and that all of its signatures there were certified by the City Administration.

In 16 of the 17 Belgrade municipalities, a pattern in the certification of signatures for four lists is visible. Besides cases of an even distribution of certified signatures for these lists, a similarity in the numbers of certified signatures between the lists is also noticeable. The figures for “Dad, This Is for You” and Gajić differ by no more than three signatures in Voždovac (402 and 400), Zvezdara (403 and 400) and Čukarica (400 and 398), with similar matches in Grocka.

It was also established that the ballot papers (lilac in colour - Pantone 2085 U) will be printed in 29 language variants, depending on the languages and scripts in official use in individual cities or municipalities.

The total number of voters in the Republic of Serbia, established at the REC session of 10 October, was published in the “Official Gazette” and stands at 6,450,523. The same number of ballot papers is being prepared for election day.

Voting abroad

Issues relating to voting abroad remained contentious. Amendments to the original decision designating polling stations abroad specified the areas covered by the 93 polling stations (at which a total of 102,147 voters will be able to vote). These amendments did not, however, resolve the fundamental doubts about the criteria for designating polling stations and assigning voters, since the REC was not provided with the requested data and explanations that would have allowed a comprehensive assessment of the proposals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The problems concerning the voting hours abroad, from 07:00 to 20:00 Serbian time, have not been resolved.

The Constitutional Court's decision on voting booths

Ahead of the elections, the Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality and legality of the introduction of voting booths. In doing so, however, it assessed only whether that arrangement is in line with the Constitution and the law, and not what risks its application carries. In a public appearance, the President of the Court also gave his own assessment in favour of the booths, which goes beyond the scope of his office.

The Constitutional Court is competent to assess whether a general act is in line with the Constitution and the law. It is not competent to assess its expediency or the way in which it will be applied in practice. This was also confirmed by the President of the Court, Vladan Petrov, who stated that the Court had not dealt, and could not deal, with the application of the regulations or with possible difficulties and misuse during the voting. Nevertheless, in the same statement, before the decision and its reasoning had even been drafted, he assessed that the booths were not only lawful but also useful, since they ensure a higher level of secrecy of the vote, citing their use in Germany, France and Italy and also mentioning that this implements one of ODIHR's recommendations. Such an assessment does not follow from what the Court decided. It may create the impression among the public that the justification for the new arrangement has been confirmed, and not only its lawfulness.

The decision establishing the lawfulness of this normative arrangement therefore does not remove the potential difficulties in using the voting booths. Nor does it remove the possibility that this change will lead to new irregularities and misuse during the voting. The new booths are aluminium structures around two metres high and one metre wide and deep, and they are set up alongside the existing cardboard screens. At smaller polling stations, this raises questions of space and layout. The arrangement was introduced shortly before the elections and is being applied for the first time. Polling boards will have to protect the secrecy of the vote and, at the same time, prevent the enclosed space of the booth from being used for controlled voting, such as photographing a completed ballot paper.

Protection of electoral rights

Between the start of the electoral process and the cut-off date of this report, decisions were taken on a total of 38 complaints. Since the consolidated electoral list was established on 8 October, not a single complaint has been upheld.

Complaints and appeals concerning voting abroad

Six complaints were submitted against the REC decisions on the designation of polling stations abroad, taken at the proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Four complaints were rejected, while two were dismissed. Of particular significance are the two complaints submitted by “Student List - Students Are Winning”: against the decision designating polling stations abroad and against the decision setting the opening and closing times of voting at those polling stations.

The REC scheduled the session to decide on the Student List's complaints immediately before the expiry of the prescribed deadline for taking a decision (so that by the time the deadline expired, discussion of the first complaint had not even begun), and the session was further delayed.

Such conduct departs from previous practice and indicates that the REC acted in an untimely and inefficient manner in this particular case, especially given that the delay was not caused by the volume of work or by other objective circumstances. Since this is the first such case in this electoral process, and since it arose in deciding on complaints concerning the designation of polling stations abroad and the setting of voting hours, it leaves room for suspicion about the motives behind this decision.

Despite the missed deadline, the complaints were put to a vote at the session - they did not receive the required majority of REC members and were rejected. The Administrative Court rejected the appeals subsequently lodged by the Student List.

Complaints were also lodged by voters from Geneva, challenging the decision not to open a polling station in that city. The REC dismissed the complaints on the grounds that they had been submitted by persons without standing, since under the law a voter cannot lodge a complaint against that type of decision.

Voting outside the polling station: the way opened to unlawful practice and to undermining voters' free will

The City Election Commission (CEC) in Zaječar allowed registration for voting from home in a contentious and unlawful manner: it permitted political parties, coalitions and citizens' groups to register voters for voting outside the polling station by submitting lists of people who had allegedly expressed such a wish during the campaign. The law does not allow this, since the right to vote outside the polling station belongs to the voter who requests it himself or herself. This interpretation is highly contentious and problematic from the standpoint of protecting voters' right to express their electoral will freely. Such situations are possible because there are no uniform rules for all local election commissions. Without clear rules, local commissions interpret the law themselves, and accepting party lists opens the way to pressure on voters and to misuse of voting outside the polling station. The members of the Republic Electoral Commission from the ranks of the majority abstained in the vote on the draft instruction prepared by the Working Group on Normative Affairs, as a result of which the act was not adopted on 10 October.

By law, a voter who is unable to come to the polling station because of serious illness, old age or disability may vote outside it if he or she notifies the election commission or the polling board in good time.

On 8 October, the Zaječar CEC adopted its chairperson's proposal that applications be submitted by political entities instead of voters, with the entities required only to vouch for the accuracy of the lists. Neither such a guarantee nor the fact that a list was submitted on time proves that each voter personally asked to vote in this way. Moreover, the law ties the application to election day and the period immediately before it, not to a wish someone may have expressed weeks earlier.

The Agency for Prevention of Corruption (ACAS): no effective oversight of the election campaign

In the reporting period, as in the first three weeks of the campaign, the Agency for Prevention of Corruption did not show that it applies the new statutory mechanisms in a way that allows effective oversight and public scrutiny of the election campaign. Reporting on the monitoring of public officials remained incomplete, while the publication of the promotional activities of public authorities amounted to formal record-keeping, without publicly available data on the Agency's checks and responses. In the remainder of the campaign the Agency initiated only two new proceedings of its own motion, while, of the 37 complaints CRTA had filed since the start of the campaign, it had decided on only twelve by the time this report was finalised. Of particular concern is the reasoning of certain decisions concerning the misuse of public resources, in which responsibility for using public resources for political purposes is in practice ruled out if those resources do not fall within the remit of the body in which the reported official holds office.

Monitoring of the activities of public officials

The third and fourth reports of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption on the monitoring of the activities of public officials did not remedy the reporting shortcomings CRTA pointed out in its previous review. The public is still denied complete data on the scope and structure of the activities monitored, including separate findings on the monitoring of the President of the Republic and members of the Government. Such a practice of meeting the formal requirement by publishing limited information does not allow substantive insight into the results of the oversight and does not achieve the purpose of the new statutory provision, which is meant to ensure more transparent and more substantive reporting on the monitoring of the activities of public officials.

These reports on the monitoring of officials, which cover only those in the random sample,⁴⁹ stated that the Agency had initiated only two further proceedings in two weeks of the election campaign, with incomplete information on their content and grounds.

49 “The amendments to the Law on Prevention of Corruption introduced two mechanisms for monitoring public officials during the election campaign - the monitoring of a random sample of at least 60 officials in parliamentary and presidential elections and the mandatory monitoring of the President of the Republic and members of the Government, independently of the random sample.” CRTA, First interim report on long-term observation (Belgrade: CRTA, 2026). https://link.crta.rs/14m

As in the previous reporting period, the Agency dealt exclusively with breaches of the provision of the Law on Prevention of Corruption concerning the labelling of the account a public official uses in that capacity, avoiding addressing more significant breaches of the law.

Promotional activities of public authorities

The publication of the planned promotional activities of public authorities did not allow effective oversight, because in practice publication amounted to the formal recording of activities notified in advance, without publicly available information that would indicate any substantive action by the Agency. The Agency published on its website a total of around 100 activities notified to it in advance by public authorities, but it was not possible to establish whether it checked their content, monitored their implementation and responded where there were indications that they were being used for political promotion. The mere publication of the lists was thus not turned into an effective instrument of public scrutiny.

According to data from Transparency Serbia⁵⁰, promotional activities of public authorities were observed that were held without having been notified to the Agency in advance. By the cut-off date for this report there was no publicly available information that the Agency had responded to this.

50 Transparency Serbia, “Promotional activity plans have rendered the ban on the officials' campaign meaningless”, website of Transparency Serbia, https://link.crta.rs/14n

Third-party campaigning

The Agency's handling of third-party campaigning remains insufficiently transparent, particularly as regards examining the responsibility of the third parties themselves and the outcome of proceedings initiated over their activities. In this period, the only publicly available information is that the Agency issued a decision on a complaint over breaches of the Law on Financing of Political Activities. The complaint was filed against the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) over the social media account “Naprednjaci”, which, according to the complainant, carried out promotional activities in favour of the SNS.

The complaint was filed against the SNS rather than against the third party. In its decision the Agency found that the political entity had no connection with the “third party” in question and that it had therefore not breached the Law on Financing of Political Activities. The decision also states that the Agency will examine the possibility of initiating proceedings against the administrator of the “Naprednjaci” account, but there is no information whatsoever on this.

In addition, the register of complaints shows that one complaint was filed over third-party campaigning - against a third party - but without any further details.

Apart from this, the Agency took no other action, which is why the effect of the new statutory provision cannot be assessed.

Election campaign financing

The deadline for submitting preliminary reports on election campaign expenses expired on 20 October 2026.

In this reporting period the first tranche of funds from public sources was paid out, amounting to 40% of the total funds allocated, which according to the available data would come to around 34.7 million dinars per candidate list that met the statutory conditions.

The remaining 60% of the funds is distributed after the elections to the lists that won seats, in proportion to the number of seats won, provided that they have submitted a preliminary report on campaign expenses to the Agency.

Publicly available decisions of the Agency

A total of 35 complaints are available on the Agency's website, of which 22 concern breaches of the Law on Prevention of Corruption, while 13 concern the Law on Financing of Political Activities.

Table 3.1. Statistics on complaints made public

Provision breached	Decisions published	Breach established	No breach established
Article 50 of the Law on Prevention of Corruption, concerning misuse of public office	22	22	0
Article 23 of the Law on Financing of Political Activities, concerning misuse of public resources by a political entity	13	4	9

As regards breaches of Article 50 of the Law on Prevention of Corruption, the published decisions show that breaches were established on two grounds: breach of the provisions on labelling the account a public official uses in that capacity and on publishing party content on those profiles, and political activity during working hours. As regards Article 23 of the Law on Financing of Political Activities, three of the breaches established concern the SNS and promotional posts on the accounts of party branches in Barajevo, Lučani and Aranđelovac.

CRTA's complaints to the Agency

Since the start of the election campaign CRTA has filed 37 complaints with the Agency for Prevention of Corruption. By the time this report was finalised the Agency had decided on a total of 12 complaints, finding a breach in five cases and no breach in seven. The most problematic are the decisions concerning the misuse of public resources by public officials, in which the Agency found no breach.

Table 3.2. Overview of CRTA's complaints to the Agency

Provision breached	Complaints filed	Breach established	No breach established	Not decided
Article 50 of the Law on Prevention of Corruption, concerning misuse of public office	11	2	4	5
Article 23 of the Law on Financing of Political Activities, concerning misuse of public resources by a political entity	26	3	3	20

The complaints filed on suspicion of breaches of the Law on Financing of Political Activities mostly concern the promotion of public works and of the activities of public authorities on party profiles. Posts were recorded about the renovation of a school, preventive health check-ups, the asphalting of roads and other infrastructure projects financed from public funds. CRTA's complaints concerning breaches of the Law on Prevention of Corruption were filed against ten different public officials, over the officials' campaign, that is, the misuse of public resources.

The Agency established breaches of the Law on Financing of Political Activities in three cases, concerning SNS posts in Barajevo, Lučani and Smederevo in which the renovation of a school, the asphalting of a local road and the use of a health centre clinic were presented on party profiles. In a further two cases, against Žarko Mićin and Dušan Kozarev, a breach of the Law on Prevention of Corruption was established over the publication of party activities on the accounts they use in their capacity as public officials.

Particularly contentious are the Agency's decisions not to establish a breach of the Law on Prevention of Corruption in the cases of Siniša Mali and Miloš Vučević. Both complaints concerned suspected use of public resources to promote the SNS candidate list, contrary to Article 50(4) of the Law on Prevention of Corruption.

The Monitoring and Analysis Service pointed to a reasonable suspicion that minors had been used for political purposes in the programming of several television stations, contrary to Article 66(5) of the Law on Electronic Media⁵⁶.

56 The Law on Electronic Media (“Official Gazette of the RS”, No. 92/2023, Article 66(5)) provides: “The participation of minors in programme content may not be used for political purposes or abused.”

In both cases the Agency took the fact that the resource did not fall within the remit of the body in which the official holds office as a reason not to establish a breach, thereby in practice allowing public resources to be used to promote a political party without consequences, provided those resources belong to another public authority.

The Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM): institutional deadlock, no outcome on complaints

REM failed to ensure effective oversight of media coverage during the election campaign, despite the election of the Council's president, regular sessions and the consideration of complaints in a considerable number of cases. Although the expert service pointed to suspected breaches of the law, deep divisions among the members of the Council and the lack of the required majority prevented final decisions on imposing measures, leaving the reported irregularities without an institutional outcome.

Following the election of the Council's president, a further six sessions were held - three regular and three extraordinary. REM also launched its own YouTube channel, enabling the public to follow broadcasts of the sessions. However, at its first extraordinary session the Council did not support improving the monitoring methodology or extending the sample of television stations it monitors. At subsequent sessions it considered reports of the Monitoring and Analysis Service and citizens' complaints, but deep divisions among the members of the Council prevented final decisions.

Relations within the Council deteriorated further amid mutual accusations and challenges to the work of the expert service. While one group of members turned to international organisations, pointing to irregularities, the other, citing the conduct of members from the opposing camp, argued that there were grounds for their dismissal.

REM's handling of complaints

According to publicly available data on the Regulator's website, by the time this report was finalised REM had received a total of 66 complaints, against: TV B92, TV Superstar, TV Superstar 2, TV Superstar 3, TV Euronews, TV Panon, TV Informer, TV Prva, TV Kurir, TV N1, TV 5, TV K1, TV RTS 1, TV Pink, Nacionalna TV Happy, Tanjug, TV Narodna, TV Santos, TV V5. By the time this report was finalised CRTA had filed a total of 28 complaints, as well as notifications against two media service providers for broadcasting programming without a licence.

On the basis of reports by the Monitoring and Analysis Service, the Council considered initiating inquiry proceedings in more than 20 cases. Although in some cases it acted within a relatively short time, there were no final decisions imposing measures or discontinuing proceedings. At the same time, most of the complaints received were still awaiting processing or a decision.

At its second extraordinary session, held on 7 October 2026, the Council considered reports on pre-election content in which the leader of the “Aleksandar Vučić - United Serbia” list appeared with children.

The Council unanimously initiated inquiry proceedings against RTS 1, RTV, TV B92, TV Pink, Prva and K1 Studio. However, after the media representatives presented their defence at the session of 14 October, the majority required to impose measures was not reached.

At its regular session held on 9 October, the Council considered inquiry proceedings initiated on complaints by citizens and by some Council members against Informer TV, TV Prva, TV B92 and K1 Studio over possible breaches of the election rules, covert political marketing and the use of minors for political purposes. The session was marked by sharp verbal clashes and procedural obstruction. Dragan Vučićević, representing Informer TV, disputed the legitimacy of the complainants and accused the expert service of political bias. At the same time, some Council members disputed the expert service's findings, while others insisted on consistent application of the law.

In the end the Council failed to adopt a single final decision: neither the proposals to impose measures, including a warning and a temporary ban on publishing programme content, nor the proposals to discontinue the proceedings obtained the required majority.

The TV Informer case: no decision despite the expert service's findings

Given that the REM Council did not secure the majority required for TV Informer to be included in regular monitoring during the election campaign, the handling of the complaint concerning this station's programming took on particular significance. The complaint by Zoran Gavrilović of the NGO BIRODI, covering content broadcast from 28 to 30 September 2026, was examined in detail by the Monitoring and Analysis Service, which pointed to several suspected breaches of laws and by-laws.

The expert service's findings concerned the use of minors for political purposes⁵⁷; covert pre-election programming and the undermining of the objectivity of information, through the presentation of political propaganda content as regular news without appropriate labelling⁵⁸; discriminatory and disparaging coverage and breaches of the rules on presenting the other side, including the use of the pejorative term “blokaderi” (blockaders) and the editing of footage of opposition candidates⁵⁹; and violations of personal dignity⁶⁰. The expert service also pointed to propagandistic and unethical reporting on violence, in which basic facts were missing and the content took on the character of political slogans.

57 Rulebook on the protection of the rights of minors in the provision of media services, “Official Gazette of the RS”, No. 43/2024, Article 24.

58 Law on Electronic Media, “Official Gazette of the RS”, No. 92/2023, Articles 61 and 62.

59 Law on Electronic Media, Article 62; Rulebook on the protection of human rights in the provision of media services, “Official Gazette of the RS”, No. 43/2024, Articles 7 and 8.

60 Law on Electronic Media, Article 70.

On the basis of this report, at its extraordinary session of 7 October 2026 the Council initiated inquiry proceedings against TV Informer. The regular session of 9 October, at which a decision on imposing measures was to be taken, was also attended by Dragan Vučićević, owner of the publisher and editor-in-chief of Informer TV. In the Regulator's corridor he had a verbal clash with the official who had prepared the report, and then with REM's director. Shortly afterwards the public was informed that the director had resigned and would remain in office until 23 October 2026.

At the same session no proposal obtained the required majority - neither the proposals to impose measures nor the proposals to discontinue the proceedings. Those who voted against imposing measures were the Council members who had earlier prevented TV Informer from being included in regular monitoring. Such an outcome, despite the expert service's findings of possible breaches of several provisions of laws and by-laws, further indicates the Council's difficulty in ensuring consistent application of the rules during the election campaign.

Attempt to discredit CRTA: a lawsuit and an application for an interim measure against the Informer portal

The Higher Court in Belgrade granted CRTA's application for an interim measure and prohibited the Informer portal, until the civil proceedings are concluded, from republishing claims that CRTA is a “criminal organisation” and an “intelligence and subversion outpost” preparing bloodshed, under threat of court penalties of 100,000 dinars. The decision is significant given that the disputed content was published 20 days before the elections, at a time when CRTA was accredited to observe the electoral process, and that it linked CRTA to alleged violence and criminal activity. By ordering the interim measure the court recognised, at the level of probability required at this stage of the proceedings, the existence of a specific risk that the disputed claims would be republished and that CRTA's reputation could thereby be further damaged. This decision does not, however, constitute a final assessment of the merits of the lawsuit, nor does it mean that the court has already established that the disputed claims are untrue, which it will decide in its judgment.⁶¹

61 “On 6 October 2026 CRTA filed a lawsuit with the Higher Court in Belgrade against the editor-in-chief of the Informer portal for violation of the right to reputation, together with an application for an interim measure prohibiting the republication of the disputed content. The lawsuit was prompted by three Informer posts of 4 October in which CRTA was linked to a recording in which the lawyer Vladimir Tupanjac allegedly instructs students on how to attack the police. In those posts CRTA was described as a ‘criminal organisation’ and an ‘intelligence and subversion outpost’, with claims that it incites conflict, bloodshed and civil war.” CRTA, First interim report on long-term observation (Belgrade: CRTA, 2026) https://link.crta.rs/14m

Conduct of the Ministry of the Interior during the election campaign

The conduct of the police during the election campaign raises questions about consistency in protecting different political actors, the timeliness of interventions and the justification of certain measures taken against students and activists. In its previous report CRTA Election Observation Mission expressed concern about credible allegations of wiretapping and detention of activists of the “Student List”, as well as about the actions of the Economic Crime Department of the Criminal Police Directorate targeting the campaign logistics of the “Student List”.

Such measures continued in the final stage of the campaign as well: two days before the Student List's closing rally at Slavija, on 20 October, the Student List announced that the police had begun “searching premises in order to arrest students” and were looking for its activist Lazar Mišić, which it described as intimidation. By the time this report was finalised the Ministry of the Interior (MUP) had not publicly explained the reasons for the searches.

Field reports by CRTA's observation mission and media sources record cases in which the police separated opposing groups and quickly arrested suspects, but also allegations of a lack of immediate protection for citizens and journalists who were attacked, of restrictions on political activities and of the use of police powers without a publicly available justification. These findings do not make it possible to conclude in each individual case that the police acted unlawfully, but they indicate the need for the Ministry of the Interior to provide clear information on the basis for its actions and to ensure equal protection for all citizens, in accordance with Articles 5 and 67 of the Law on Police.

The available data on the handling of reports of violence indicate possible differences in the speed and visibility of the police response. Of six selected cases of attacks, or reported attacks, on activists and candidates of the ruling list, arrests of suspects within two days, together with public statements by the police, were recorded in four. By contrast, among 13 publicly recorded cases of violence, threats and obstruction directed at students, opposition actors, journalists and other citizens, the apprehension or detention of a suspect was recorded in three cases, while for the remaining ten no public confirmation of arrests was available as of 18 October. This difference does not in itself prove unequal treatment, since the available data do not necessarily cover all stages of police action, but it raises the question of whether reports by different actors were considered with equal urgency and whether the public was equally informed of the measures taken.

On the ground the police prevented direct clashes in several cases, but there are also allegations of late or absent protection for those at risk. During parallel gatherings of “United Serbia” and the “Student List”, police cordons separated the groups in several places. At the same time, allegations were recorded of a failure to respond to attacks, or of the police becoming involved only after escalation, including in Niš, Zaječar, Belgrade and Novi Sad. It is particularly important to clarify allegations of an absent or inadequate response when journalists were attacked or prevented from reporting. At least 4 cases were recorded in which journalists were attacked (Valjevo, Niš, Belgrade) and at least 3 in which they were prevented from reporting or obstructed in doing so (Zaječar, Zrenjanin, Bečej). Article 61 of the Law on Police requires the police to take the urgent measures necessary to eliminate an immediate danger to people, while Article 67(2) provides that, in exercising police powers, priority is given to the rights of the person at risk over the person endangering those rights. In the case of attacks on journalists, Article 138(3) of the Criminal Code is also relevant, as it prescribes an aggravated form of the criminal offence of endangering the safety of a person performing tasks of public importance in the field of information. Since this offence is prosecuted ex officio, the obligation of the police under Article 286 of the Criminal Procedure Code to take measures to detect criminal offences and their perpetrators is also relevant.

Police conduct also affected the conditions for holding political gatherings and for the use of public space. In at least seven places, United Serbia rallies were organised at times or locations where activities of the Student List had been announced. The police mostly separated the groups, but some interventions also involved removing participants, checking identification and detaining activists. In Valjevo and Zrenjanin cordons restricted the movement of participants and journalists, while in Zrenjanin two activists were held at the police station until the SNS rally had ended. In some places students relocated their activities because of parallel gatherings of supporters of the authorities. According to a report by a CRTA observer, in Paraćin on 27 September the police asked representatives of the Student List to move an announced rally, explaining that circumstances had changed, after supporters of United Serbia had earlier occupied that space. In the other recorded cases of student activities being relocated, it has not been confirmed that this was requested by the police.

MUP's conduct towards CRTA - no response to a request for a meeting

On 8 October 2026 CRTA sent a letter to the Office of the Minister of the Interior requesting a meeting on the safety of staff and observers during the elections. It was prompted by claims in pro-government media that CRTA planned to withdraw its observers on election day in order to provoke “chaos” and “the overthrow of the government”. CRTA proposed discussing with MUP whether it had any knowledge of threats to observers, what measures it could take for their safety and how the police would act in the event of threats or attacks. The invitation was repeated on 15 October, followed by a third. MUP responded to the third invitation on 20 October, proposing a meeting on 21 October.

Citizen reports to CRTA

In this reporting period more than 670 citizens contacted CRTA, reporting various irregularities and problems connected with the electoral process. The total number of citizens who have contacted CRTA since the start of the election campaign is around 1,600.

The largest number of reports concerned citizens in the diaspora. They most often pointed out that polling stations abroad had not been opened, even though citizens had shown interest in opening them and the requirement of at least 100 voters had been met. A significant number of reports also concerned cases in which citizens had submitted a request to be entered in the voter register abroad in good time and in due form but had nevertheless not been entered, which prevented them from exercising their right to vote abroad.

More than a third of reports concerned suspected irregularities in the voter register. Cases were reported in which, on checking the number of voters registered at a particular address, it was found that more voters were recorded than actually live at that address. In a large number of cases citizens also reported that voting notices were arriving at their home addresses for people they do not know and who, as far as they know, do not live at those addresses. Of particular concern are reports of voting notices being delivered to deceased persons, which raises further questions about the accuracy and currency of the voter register.

The remaining reports concerned suspected vote buying, including vote buying abroad, offers of money for attending the SNS rally at the Arena and allegations of organised vote buying among members of the Roma community, as well as various forms of pressure on voters, above all in public enterprises, the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund and preschool institutions.