Legal and institutional framework

The calling of snap elections tests the capacity of institutions to apply the law within unpredictable and short deadlines, particularly where they are simultaneously faced with changes to the legal framework and the introduction of new obligations. The second round of amendments in four years to the electoral laws and to the laws on campaign financing and the prevention of corruption is taking place in 2026. In both cases the amendments came ahead of an (announced) calling of elections. Changes to the legal framework ought to be adopted in good time, so that all contestants, voters and competent institutions have sufficient time to familiarise themselves with the new rules and to prepare to apply them. Frequent amendments, particularly those adopted immediately before elections, cannot be assessed solely through the content of individual provisions, but also through their effect on the stability and predictability of the electoral framework. ODIHR has consistently drawn attention to the importance of a timely and inclusive electoral reform process. ODIHR recommendations nos. 2 (2024), 1 (2023), 1 (2022), and 1 and 2 (2020).

Although the 2026 amendments were presented as a response to the recommendations of ODIHR and the Council of Europe, their scope remains limited, since for the most part they address individual questions within the electoral framework while structural problems have not been fully addressed. The effects of the new provisions will depend to a large extent on how they are applied, and on the capacity and conduct of the competent institutions.

The reform covered five electoral and anti-corruption laws: the Law on the Election of MPs, the Law on Local Elections, the Law on the Election of the President of the Republic, the Law on Financing of Political Activities and the Law on Prevention of Corruption. The Reform Agenda of the Republic of Serbia set the end of 2025 as the deadline for these amendments, but the process was formally launched only at the beginning of February 2026. Amendments to the four electoral laws were adopted in May and to the Law on Financing of Political Activities in July 2026, while amendments to the Law on Prevention of Corruption were adopted on the last day of August 2026. The provisions were aligned on several occasions with opinions submitted by ODIHR. It is evident that through those comments, as in its earlier recommendations, ODIHR recommendations nos. 2 (2024), 1 (2023), 1 (2022), and 1 and 2 (2020). ODIHR consistently points to the need for electoral legislative reform to be carried out in good time, through a transparent and inclusive process that allows all relevant actors to be involved.

Bearing in mind that March 2026 marked the start of an election year with respect to the presidential elections, which in the regular course must be held in the spring of 2027, amending six important laws does not meet the criterion of timeliness - particularly if elections are called early at this or another level, as representatives of the authorities have announced.

The amendment process was not sufficiently open and transparent. There was no substantive public consultation involving all social actors. The proposals were not significantly altered, nor were they further explained, following the numerous objections and suggestions raised during the public consultations held and through amendments tabled in the parliamentary procedure. According to available data, more than 130 amendments were tabled during the adoption of the amendments to the first four laws, of which eight were adopted in committee, mostly of a technical nature, while [...]

The CRTA Election Observation Mission assesses that, as of the newly adopted legislative provisions, a basis has been created for eight of the 54 ODIHR recommendations from the 2023 and 2024 elections to be fulfilled. Twenty recommendations have been partially fulfilled. Of the total number of fulfilled recommendations, only one is a priority recommendation. This assessment is based on CRTA's findings and observation; ODIHR's official assessment will follow after the new elections and the publication of its final report. According to ODIHR's most recent assessment, only four priority recommendations have been fully fulfilled since 2012; available at: https://paragraph25.odihr.pl/home-page-countries/serbia/

In amending these laws, the proposer invoked five ODIHR recommendations from 2023 The 2023 ODIHR recommendations invoked by the proposer of the law are nos. 11, 2, 20, 12 and 24. concerning candidate registration, the professionalisation of the election administration, the status of minority lists, and legal protection in the electoral process. Although certain provisions improve the electoral framework, their effect is limited because some of the amendments may open space for abuse.

One of the key amendments concerns the removal of the restriction under which a voter could support only one candidate list. This provision relates to ODIHR recommendation no. 11 (2023). Although this amendment formally contributes to greater pluralism and freedom of association, in the context of the electoral process in Serbia - burdened by a history of contestants of questionable authenticity taking part in elections, who have often also forged their candidacies - the provision as adopted may deepen and facilitate such practices. CRTA considers that the proposed provision does not fully meet ODIHR's recommendation, which practice also confirms: at the 2023 elections in Belgrade there was suspicion of forged signatures in seven [...] The CRTA Election Observation Mission points out that, given the failure to prosecute abuses of voter support signatures at previous elections and the absence of reform of the election administration, there is a risk of legally "encouraging" the registration of candidate lists whose authenticity is in doubt. CRTA, 2023 Elections, Final Report, https://crta.rs/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CRTA_Zavrsni-izborni-izvestaj-2023.pdf

A second key amendment concerns candidate lists of national minorities, and relates to specifying the criteria for acquiring the status of a minority list. The proposer invokes ODIHR recommendation no. 20 (2023). The possibility for citizens' groups to submit minority lists widens access to an attractive space for abuse - lists of national minorities enjoy more favourable conditions for registration and for the allocation of seats, which may encourage bad-faith actors to take part in elections even though they do not authentically represent the interests of national minorities.

The amendments also introduce mandatory training for members of local election commissions and polling boards, together with an obligation on proposers to nominate persons who have completed that training, which is a positive change. However, the requirement that only trained polling board members serve at polling stations will apply only from 2028. This provision relates to ODIHR recommendation no. 2 (2023).

Also positive is the amendment removing the grounds for automatic rejection of candidate lists and allowing submitters 48 hours in which to remedy formal deficiencies. This provision relates to ODIHR recommendation no. 12 (2023). This enables more equal participation by electoral contestants, particularly smaller political entities and citizens' groups, which often lack the capacity for legal support when registering.

Finally, the amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Court introduce urgency in electoral disputes by prescribing deadlines for the submission of documentation and for the Court to decide, and by extending the deadline for repeat elections. This provision relates to ODIHR recommendation no. 24 (2023). Even so, CRTA points out that the real effects of that amendment will depend on the efficiency, independence and timeliness of the Constitutional Court's conduct in electoral disputes.

The adopted amendments to the Law on Financing of Political Activities formally address a significant number of ODIHR recommendations, The amendments address nine ODIHR recommendations from 2020 to 2023. but in themselves do not guarantee any improvement in the integrity and equality of the financing of political activities. Although new rules are introduced that may improve the transparency of financing, the control of campaign expenditure and the supervisory role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption, certain provisions may deepen inequality among electoral contestants, while their real effect will depend above all on consistent and effective application.

The most significant innovations concern the capping of campaign expenditure, the lowering of donation limits and the regulation of affiliated legal entities, the definition of third-party campaigning, clearer rules on borrowing by political entities and on the use of goods and services from public sources, and urgent deadlines for the Agency to act during the election campaign. Even so, several provisions place new and extra-parliamentary electoral contestants at a disadvantage relative to parliamentary parties, which receive budget funding or have other stable sources of financing, even though the electoral guarantee is being abolished. The real effects of the amendments will depend on their application in practice, and particularly on the capacity and readiness of the Agency to ensure effective and timely oversight.

The new provisions limit borrowing by political entities to 25 per cent of annual budget funds, prescribe a repayment deadline for loans taken for regular operations and prohibit their use for the campaign. An electoral contestant will repay a loan taken for the campaign by the time it submits its final report. CRTA points out that the level of borrowing remains high and that the purpose of loans and credit needs to be regulated precisely, so that regular operations and the campaign are clearly separated.

The rules on the use of goods and services from public sources This provision relates to ODIHR recommendation no. 13 (2023). have been improved so as to require that goods and services be provided on equal terms, that decisions on their use be published, and that public institutions providing goods and services adopt internal rules. The application of those internal rules, and the response of the competent authorities to the contentious situations seen in practice so far, will be decisive in assessing how effective the new provisions are.

In the area of financing political entities, the amendments introduce lower donation limits, define affiliated companies and restrict circumvention of the prescribed limit. This provision relates to ODIHR recommendation no. 18 (2020). CRTA assesses that these provisions help prevent the concentration of financial support, but may also contribute to an unequal electoral contest. The unequal impact of the new provisions on political actors relates above all to the provisions on loans and credit, the electoral guarantee, own funds, and the limit on donations by natural persons. See in more detail the section "The effect of the adopted provisions on the equality of electoral contestants".

A further innovation is the introduction of an upper limit on the total election campaign expenditure of a single electoral contestant, which did not previously exist: €6,000,000 for presidential and parliamentary elections, €1,500,000 for provincial, €1,000,000 for city and €400,000 for municipal elections, covering funds from public and private sources together. This provision relates to ODIHR recommendation no. 16 (2022). The level of the threshold is, however, contentious. It has been set at a level that roughly corresponds to the ruling party's spending to date (Graphic 3), SNS's final report on the financing of its election campaign for the 2023 parliamentary elections, available at: https://www.acas.rs/cyr and is several times above what all the other contestants combined have spent, so it does not reduce the existing disproportion in the campaign. Rather than limiting expenditure, a limit set in this way confirms it as the permitted maximum.

Preventing the misuse of public office and public resources during the election campaign, and improving the transparency of the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption, are the subject of the Law on Amendments to the Law on Prevention of Corruption, with reference to three ODIHR recommendations from 2022 and 2023. The new legislative provisions invoke ODIHR recommendations nos. 5 and 17 (2023) and 4 (2022). In more detail on the CRTA Plus website: https://crta.plus/sr/updates/draft-law-amending-the-law-on-prevention-of-[...] CRTA assesses that the Law responds to a certain extent to the recommendations of ODIHR and GRECO, but that its effect will only be measurable once it is applied.

The most significant amendments concern the attempt to prevent the so-called officials' campaign. This provision relates to ODIHR recommendations nos. 5 (2023) and 4 (2022). The Law introduces new rules on the conduct of public officials: restrictions on the use of public gatherings and meetings to promote political entities, on participation in promotional activities of public authorities, subject to exceptions, and on issuing statements in connection with the exercise of public office. It also regulates officials' use of social media and the role of the media in announcing their activities. CRTA notes that the concept of "promotional activity" is broadly defined, which leaves room for contradictory interpretations.

A particular problem is posed by the exceptions to the prohibition on public officials organising or taking part in promotional activities of public authorities. Once the candidate registration deadline has passed, a public official may not organise promotional activities of a public authority in that capacity, but the exceptions to that prohibition are broadly framed: where the promotional activity was planned before the elections were called, as regards its timing and manner of implementation; where it concerns public events that by established practice are held at a particular time and with the participation of the holder of a particular public office; and where the official's participation is necessary for the conduct of international relations. Exceptions framed in this way leave room for the great majority of promotional activities to be justified by reference to earlier planning or established practice, which calls into question the real effect of the prohibition.

The Law specifically regulates the obligation of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption to monitor the activities of public officials systematically. These provisions draw on ODIHR recommendations nos. 5 and 17 (2023) and 4 (2022). The Agency is required to monitor certain officials, such as the President of the Republic and members of the Government, and to draw up a plan for monitoring other public officials on the basis of a sample formed by random selection and risk assessment, with a prescribed minimum number of officials depending on the level of the elections. Monitoring covers appearances in the media, at public gatherings and on the official accounts of public authorities, and also personal communication channels on which an official publishes information about activities undertaken in that capacity. The Agency publishes its findings once a week and, where it suspects a breach of the law, is required to initiate proceedings ex officio without delay.

Improving the Agency's conduct and transparency is likewise an important area of amendment. This provision relates to ODIHR recommendation no. 17 (2023). The proposal introduces an obligation to issue formal decisions, a right of appeal and the possibility of initiating administrative proceedings, as well as special transparency rules for officials' campaign cases, including the publication of decisions and appeals.

The concept of public official has been broadened to include senior civil servants in appointed positions, certain advisers to holders of executive power, heads of public enterprises and representatives of the state in legal entities with majority public capital. Broadening the concept is a positive innovation, but it needs to be defined more precisely so as to capture primarily those persons who in fact exercise public authority and take decisions of public significance.

The institutional independence of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption has been called into question, since its director is now able to remain in office for up to one year after the expiry of their term. If no new director is elected before that year expires, the director's assistant is appointed acting director, with no time limit on that mandate.

The new legislative provisions do not automatically place future electoral contestants in a more or less favourable position, but certain provisions may have different effects depending on a contestant's position, while for others the outcome will depend on interpretation, application and the conduct of the competent institutions. The differing impact that follows from the adopted provisions, above all those of the Law on Financing of Political Activities, is reflected particularly in the following:

Tying the permitted amount of borrowing to funds from public sources deepens inequality, in that entities with greater public financing also have greater scope to use that mechanism. In addition, a campaign loan is taken out by the political entity's responsible person as a natural person, and only if a commercial bank approves it, which in practice makes it available only to a limited extent. The prohibition on using loans for a contestant's regular operations is difficult to verify, since loans are not taken out earmarked for a specific campaign activity.

There is no limit on the amount of regular-operations funds that a political entity may transfer to its campaign financing account. Parties that have accumulated public funds for regular operations over many years enter the campaign with an advantage over newly formed citizens' groups and extra-parliamentary parties, which do not receive such funds.

Reducing the limit on donations by natural persons to 2.5 average monthly salaries (RSD 273,655) most affects extra-parliamentary and new contestants, which - receiving no public funds for regular operations and having no own funds - rely predominantly on citizens' donations during the election campaign. By way of example, parliamentary parties may, in addition to their own funds, receive up to five average salaries per person for regular operations and a further 2.5 for the campaign.

Abolishing the obligation to lodge a guarantee has made access to public funds easier for extra-parliamentary contestants and citizens' groups. At the same time, given that the legislative amendments have made it easier for all political actors to collect the required number of signatures when registering (a single person may sign several candidate lists), candidate lists of questionable authenticity can more easily take part in elections and can therefore more easily acquire the right to use public funds. Absent clear conditions and safeguards, such lists can acquire the right to the first tranche of public funds (40 per cent), which proportionately reduces the amount available to entities legitimately contesting the elections.

The application of the new legislative provisions will depend to a significant extent on institutional capacity. What follows examines the readiness of the institutions that have been given additional powers and obligations under the new provisions, and of other bodies relevant to the electoral process, including their record of conduct to date in cases where the law has been breached. Particular attention is given to the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and to the Republic Electoral Commission (REC), as the institutions on which significant new obligations have been placed. While no deadline has been prescribed for the Agency to prepare for its new competences, The only deadline directly connected with other bodies' preparations to apply the new obligations under the Law on Financing of Political Activities concerns the obligation of public authorities and other entities which [...] the REC was required to adopt an instruction on the conduct of training by the end of August and to begin the training process. However, as of the closing of this report, the Agency has published only a vacancy notice for new posts, while the REC has not adopted that instruction - although it did adopt a decision to introduce voting booths to safeguard the secrecy of the ballot alongside screens, which is not expressly provided for in the Law on the Election of MPs.

The 2026 electoral legislative reform expanded the REC's obligations, above all in the training and professionalisation of members of local election commissions and polling boards. The introduction of mandatory training, certification and a register of certified persons is a step towards professionalising the election administration. What remains unresolved, however, is the question of the REC's capacity to run that system, particularly given that the REC has no secretariat, that is, no professional service of its own, but borrows one from the National Assembly. This challenge will not be directly relevant to potential snap elections before the end of 2026, or to the regular presidential and parliamentary elections in 2027, since the requirement to hold a certificate begins to apply on 1 January 2028. It could represent a significant constraint for elections held after that date.

The REC is required to adopt the Instruction on the conduct of training in good time, that is, within three months of the entry into force of the amendments to the Law on the Election of MPs, and is accordingly required to begin the training process immediately after adopting that instruction.

Under the new provisions the REC is responsible for organising training and issuing certificates of completed training, valid for three years, and for maintaining a register of persons holding a valid certificate. From 1 January 2028, authorised proposers will be able to nominate as members and deputy members of local election commissions and polling boards only persons holding a valid certificate of completed training.

Local election commissions also acquire a role in operating the training system, by supporting the REC in organising training, while the composition of electoral bodies will in future be conditional on holding the appropriate certificate. The effect of those provisions will depend on the REC's ability to provide training and certification in good time for a sufficient number of people to staff all electoral bodies.

As regards the protection of electoral rights, the REC's record to date points to a risk of uneven and insufficiently independent application of electoral legislation. Given the existing model for the composition of electoral bodies and their decision-making, it remains an open question to what extent professionalisation through training and certification will contribute to the quality of decision-making and to consistent protection of electoral rights. Experience so far provides insufficient grounds to expect that professionalising the members of electoral bodies will by itself change the way the REC decides - a body which, in previous electoral processes, in a considerable number of cases reflected the political interests of the majority rather than consistently applying the law and protecting the public interest.

In that context, the REC's conduct concerning the introduction of voting booths at polling stations is also significant. At its 12th session, held on 19 August 2026 and continued on 24 August, the Republic Electoral Commission adopted a decision to introduce voting booths to safeguard the secrecy of the ballot, on the reasoning that this implemented ODIHR's recommendations. The original proposal was amended so that voting booths are introduced alongside the existing screens. CRTA Election Observation Mission points out that introducing booths by means of a secondary act raises the question of legal basis, given that their use is not expressly provided for in the Law on the Election of MPs, and that their use may create practical problems at polling stations, including the possibility of queues. During the discussion at the session, some REC members also raised questions of voter equality and possible abuse. At its next, 13th session, the REC adopted a decision to conduct a public procurement for 30,000 voting booths, invoking exceptional urgency even though snap elections had not been called by the time the decision was taken.

At the same time, the REC adopted a Decision amending the Instruction on nominating persons to polling boards for the conduct of voting, providing that after elections are held, data on the gender composition of the polling boards that conducted the voting are to be published.

The limited capacity of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption represents a serious challenge to the effective application of its new and expanded competences, given that the new provisions significantly increase the volume and complexity of its work. Its record to date shows that the Agency has not had sufficient human or technological capacity to monitor the election campaign actively. The need to strengthen that capacity is also indicated by the vacancy notice published for nine new posts.

The question remains whether the Agency's existing and planned capacity will be sufficient to discharge its new obligations, given that applying them requires specific knowledge and practical experience, as well as enough time to train new staff and bring them to the point of working independently before the elections are called.

Among the Agency's particularly complex and sensitive new obligations is maintaining records on third parties, including receiving and publishing notifications of the opening of a dedicated account and reports on funds collected and spent. Also in the area of campaign financing, the Agency is to notify the competent authorities of political entities that have not submitted preliminary reports, so that the second tranche of public campaign funding is not paid out to them, and to provide the Tax Administration with data on all donors.

The Agency's obligation to monitor officials' activities during the election campaign is being expanded, including coverage of a larger number of officials through methods combining random selection with an assessment of corruption risk and with complaints previously submitted. The Agency will also be required to monitor the activities of the President of the Republic and members of the Government, to publish its monitoring findings weekly, and to initiate proceedings without delay where it identifies a suspected breach of obligations.

Within seven days of the elections being called, the Agency receives notifications and supporting documentation on planned promotional activities of public authorities and publishes a list of duly notified activities. Activities not on the list should not be held, with the exception of international cooperation activities, which may also be notified subsequently.

Finally, the Agency is required to act on complaints within shorter, statutory deadlines, both during the campaign and in regular proceedings (including shorter deadlines for notifying political entities, for deciding and for publishing decisions). The particularly short deadlines during the campaign are intended to ensure a timely response, while the deadlines for regular proceedings seek to put an end to the existing practice of untimely action. The Agency has failed to respond to certain complaints submitted by CRTA before the official election campaign even after several years, including complaints from 2022 and 2023, and no response has been forthcoming to seven complaints submitted between May and August 2026 either.

The limited functionality of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) represents a serious challenge to effective oversight of the media during the election campaign, owing to an institutional deadlock in the REM Council that has lasted almost 22 months. Effective and impartial oversight of media service providers is an important precondition for ensuring a level playing field for political actors and for voters' right to comprehensive and objective information. REM has important obligations during the election campaign, including adopting a binding oversight Plan and a Methodology for monitoring media service providers, adopting secondary legislation on media obligations during the campaign, continuously monitoring programming ex officio, acting on complaints from citizens and electoral contestants, and imposing measures for breaches of obligations relating to the election campaign.

The Council's inability to function significantly impedes the application of these mechanisms and compromises REM's capacity to respond to and sanction irregularities in real time. This diminishes the preventive effect of regulatory oversight and opens space for media service providers to operate with a reduced degree of legal and professional accountability, which may further deepen inequality in access to the media and make it harder for voters to exercise their right to equal and objective information.

Since 5 November 2024 REM has had no functioning decision-making body, after the previous Council's term expired by operation of law. The procedure for electing a new Council has been marked by significant delays and procedural irregularities. The competent Committee on Culture and Information of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia issued the public call for nominations only at the end of November 2024, instead of in May of that year. Because the procedures conducted were not in line with the law, the original election procedure was discontinued in April 2025. A new process, launched in May 2025, was marked by the parliamentary Committee's selective interpretation of statutory provisions when drawing up the list of candidates. In more detail on CRTA Plus, "Kako je Srbija ostala bez funkcionalnog medijskog regulatora?", https://crta.plus/sr/updates/how-serbia-was-left-without-a-functioning-media-regulator/

In November 2025 the Assembly elected eight of the nine Council members. The election in incomplete composition came about after the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, Elvira Kovač of the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, a party in the ruling coalition, called on coalition partners immediately before the vote not to vote for any candidate in the category of national councils of national minorities, thereby preventing independent members from forming a majority on the Council. Four of the newly elected members then resigned in December 2025, explaining that the competent committee of the National Assembly and MPs of the ruling majority were continuously breaching the law in order to ensure that candidates close to the authorities held a majority on the Council. In July 2026 the National Assembly adopted an authentic interpretation resolving the question of the legal effect of those resignations: on that interpretation, a Council member's term begins to run on the day they take office, so resignations submitted before taking office produce no legal effect within the meaning of Article 18(1)(4). Invoking the new legal situation thus created, the four members joined the work of the Council in July 2026. The competent committee also decided that the election of the ninth member, from the category of national councils of national minorities, would be repeated after the elections for the national councils of national minorities planned for the autumn of 2026; that election had therefore not been completed by the time this report was published.

Although the REM Council can function in an incomplete composition of eight members, a further problem that arises in practice is the absence of the majority required to adopt decisions. In the current eight-member composition, two equal blocs of four members have formed, and for that reason two attempts to hold a constitutive session to elect the Council's president were unsuccessful.

Ordinary decisions require a majority of five votes, while the adoption of key secondary legislation and the imposition of the most severe measures, such as the withdrawal of a licence, require a two-thirds majority.

Because of this stalemate, the REM Council has not adopted a single decision from the expiry of the previous Council's term in 2024 to the present day.

Changes to judicial legislation during 2026 raise questions that are important for institutional independence Of particular importance is the question of preserving the institutional independence and autonomy of judicial bodies, given the assessments by international institutions of certain provisions adopted during 2026 [...] and for the judiciary's ability to act effectively in cases involving breaches of electoral rights. The unplanned systemic changes in the judiciary did not concern improving the judiciary's capacity to handle electoral disputes and criminal offences against electoral rights. The manner in which the laws were amended, and individual provisions within them, nonetheless affect the broader institutional framework within which the courts and public prosecution offices will operate at elections.

A particular indicator of institutional capacity and efficiency at elections is how criminal complaints alleging breaches of electoral rights are handled. Since the 2023 parliamentary elections CRTA has filed 53 complaints, These criminal complaints concerned a large number of criminal offences, including violation of the right to vote, compilation of inaccurate voter registers, abuse of the right to vote [...] 26 of which relate directly to electoral actions. According to available data, 16 complaints have been dismissed. Seventeen complaints are at the pre-investigation stage, including cases in which the prosecution office is awaiting or has again requested information from the Ministry of the Interior. A similar pattern has been recorded in complaints concerning irregularities on election days, including suspected vote-buying, circular voting and attacks on observers.

In January 2026, a month after the package of draft laws was tabled, the set of so-called Mrdić laws was adopted under urgent procedure - amendments to the Law on the Public Prosecution Office, the Law on the High Prosecutorial Council, the Law on the Organisation and Jurisdiction of State Bodies for Combating High-Technology Crime, the Law on Judges, and the Law on the Seats and Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts and Public Prosecution Offices. These systemic laws, which were not part of the reform plan, suddenly appeared on the parliamentary agenda on the proposal of a single MP of the ruling majority from the parliamentary group "Aleksandar Vučić - Serbia Must Not Stop" - Uglješa Mrdić - departing from the usual practice whereby systemic legislative changes are initiated by the Government of Serbia. Those laws were adopted under urgent procedure, without public consultation and without prior consultation of the relevant judicial institutions or of the Venice Commission. Using an MP's right of legislative initiative also had the consequence of circumventing the usual procedure requiring that opinions be obtained from the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and, in this case, from the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council on the proposed laws. The provisions raised questions as to the autonomy of the public prosecution and the independence of the judiciary, particularly through changes to the position of chief public prosecutors, to the competences of the High Prosecutorial Council and to the organisation of specialised prosecution offices.

The Venice Commission - acting on a request from the Speaker of the National Assembly submitted only after the laws had been adopted and entered into force - identified in an urgent opinion of April 2026 shortcomings that diminish the guarantees of prosecutorial autonomy and judicial independence, and issued nine key recommendations. A new text of the law was subsequently prepared, on which the Commission gave a follow-up opinion in June 2026, assessing that seven of the nine recommendations had been implemented. What remained open were the position of prosecutors in the Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime and the autonomy of the Special Department for High-Technology Crime. A reform process of this kind points to institutional risks that may also matter for how the judiciary handles cases relating to elections.

The atmosphere in which elections are called is also shaped in significant measure by the pronouncements of the most senior state officials. In August 2026, on her account on the X network, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Ana Brnabić, publicly attributed to the students in blockade an intention to draw up lists of people they would "shoot, hang and shear". This was a message presenting one group of citizens, identifiable by their political conviction and civic activism, as a threat to the rest of society, sent from the position of the holder of the highest legislative office and then carried by media with national coverage. CRTA therefore filed a criminal complaint with the Higher Public Prosecution Office in Belgrade on the grounds of reasonable suspicion that the criminal offence of racial and other discrimination under Article 387(4) of the Criminal Code had been committed. When one political option is labelled in this way from the highest institutional position, participants in the electoral process do not enter the campaign as equal contestants.

Practice points to the limited effectiveness of the institutional response to suspected criminal offences connected with the electoral process, with cases held at the pre-investigation stage for prolonged periods indicating either passivity on the part of the prosecution or problems in cooperation with the police in gathering the necessary information. The same pattern is observed in other cases known to the public, which raises the question of the readiness of judicial bodies to respond in a timely and effective manner to breaches of electoral legislation.

At the 2023 elections in Odžaci, CRTA observers set off for the police station to report that several dozen ballots had been taken out of a polling station in Karavukovo. In the yard of the police station, unidentified men destroyed the car the observers were in, using batons. Two and a half years later, in May 2026, the Basic Public Prosecution Office in Sombor dismissed the criminal complaint on the reasoning that there were no grounds to suspect that a criminal offence prosecuted ex officio had been committed. Not all of the attackers were identified, and neither physical traces nor footage from nearby cameras was secured.

Personnel instability and the shortcomings observed in the conduct of the Ministry of the Interior during previous electoral cycles represent a serious challenge to the Ministry's readiness to protect the integrity of the electoral process effectively. The role of the police in protecting the integrity of the electoral process is particularly significant as regards the safety of electoral contestants, the prevention of violence, and action in cases of election-related criminal offences. Frequent personnel changes in key positions, together with the record of previous electoral cycles and problems in cooperation with the prosecution, raise the question whether the Ministry will be able, during the coming elections, to act in a timely, impartial and effective manner in cases where there are indications or suspicions that criminal offences have been committed, and to ensure the protection of all electoral contestants.

Between November 2025 and August 2026 the leadership of at least six key organisational units of the Ministry of the Interior was replaced: the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, the Gendarmerie, the Border Police Directorate, the Criminal Police Directorate, the Unit for the Protection of Certain Persons and Facilities, and the Service for Combating Organised Crime. According to publicly available information, more than 60 experienced police officers were also retired.

In November 2025 Igor Žmirić was appointed commander of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, Radoslav Repac commander of the Gendarmerie, and Dragiša Simić head of the Border Police Directorate. In December, Marko Kričak Marko Kričak (b. 1984) joined the Security Information Agency in 2018 and transferred to the Ministry of the Interior in 2022, under the statutory possibility of transfer for members [...] - until then commander of the Unit for the Protection of Certain Persons and Facilities - was appointed head of the Criminal Police Directorate, with Ivan Ristić appointed in his place. Marko Zafirović, previously deputy commander of the Unit for the Protection of Certain Persons and Facilities, was subsequently appointed head of the Service for Combating Organised Crime. What all these appointments have in common is that the leadership posts in the Criminal Police Directorate and the Service for Combating Organised Crime were filled with officers from a unit whose remit covers neither criminal investigations nor public order and safety.

The changes were accompanied by changes within individual organisational units, particularly the Criminal Police Directorate.

International bodies have also drawn attention to the risks such practice carries: the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommended that Serbia establish a more open and transparent procedure for appointing the police director and other senior police positions, precisely as a measure to prevent politicisation, together with stronger guarantees for sufficiently independent and transparent oversight of police conduct. GRECO, Fifth Evaluation Round - Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies, Evaluation Report: Serbia, GrecoEval5 [...] Such dynamics raise questions about continuity of work and the professional capacity of the police, particularly in units that play a key role in detecting criminal offences and in acting on requests from the public prosecution. Also of particular concern is the way certain police actions - those of the Criminal Police Directorate in particular - are presented in the media, especially where they are directed at universities, civil society organisations and other actors. On several occasions information about action taken was available to certain media before the competent authorities had officially confirmed it, with reporting that presumed guilt in advance. Such practice raises the question of selective disclosure of information from pre-investigation proceedings, undermines the presumption of innocence and calls into question the purpose of certain operations.

In August 2026 the new head of the Criminal Police Directorate, Marko Kričak, was also appointed deputy national coordinator of the National Coordination Body for the Prevention of and Fight against Terrorism. The body is responsible for coordinating activities on the prevention of and fight against terrorism, radicalism and violent extremism leading to terrorism at the national level.

Experience from the previous local electoral cycles, during 2025 and 2026, further confirms these risks. Cases were recorded of the police failing to respond, or responding inadequately, to pressure on and physical attacks against activists, journalists and observers. In Mionica, police officers were present during an attack on CRTA observers but did not intervene or identify the attackers, while in Bor several attacks on students, activists and journalists were recorded, as well as on a CRTA observer and lawyer, with no adequate police response. In addition, the presence of police at and in the immediate vicinity of polling stations is becoming increasingly frequent, particularly since the 2025 local elections. Cases in which the police refuse to cooperate with the prosecution and do not act on its requests or orders are also a matter of concern.