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On 4 November 2026, the news outlet Radar reported that the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) had placed its editor-in-chief Vesna Mališić and journalists Sandra Petrušić and Milan Radonjić under covert surveillance. According to the document Radar cites, BIA Director Vladimir Orlić requested the special measures on suspicion of espionage under Article 315 of the Criminal Code, and the Higher Court in Belgrade approved them on 12 June 2026, extending them on 15 July and 9 September 2026.
As described by Radar, the measures covered the recording of communications in the outlet's newsroom at Terazije 5 in Belgrade, as well as ten days of physical surveillance of members of the newsroom, ordered at the BIA director's discretion. The document also lists four Belgrade restaurants, without stating why. On 22 October 2026, Orlić proposed to the President of the Higher Court, Dragan Milošević, that the measures be discontinued, stating that the data collected did not indicate any involvement in espionage. By BIA's own account, the espionage suspicion used to justify more than four months of surveillance of a newsroom was not substantiated.
The report follows two related disclosures. On 1 November 2026, Radar reported, citing an anonymous source and without publishing documents, that BIA had wiretapped prosecutors of the Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime (TOK) working on the case concerning the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy, which killed 16 people. According to the source, the surveillance also covered the head of the office, Mladen Nenadić, and extended to the prosecutors' email communication. These measures, too, were reportedly justified by suspected espionage, ordered at several points between April and October 2026, and Orlić requested their full discontinuation on 29 October, four days after the early parliamentary elections. If confirmed, this would mean that the security service monitored the prosecutors in charge of the corruption investigation linked to the canopy collapse, which triggered the mass protests of the past two years.
On 30 October 2026, equipment presumed to be used for audio and video recording was found in Amphitheatre V of the University of Belgrade Faculty of Law, where students had held their plenary assemblies. The equipment was hidden inside an emergency exit light above the entrance and was discovered after the dean ordered an inspection following warnings from students; the police carried out an on-site investigation. The Faculty confirmed the find. Rector of the University of Belgrade Vladan Đokić stated that it was "further proof that the outgoing government was prepared to settle scores with those who think differently, in breach of the law", describing it as "a gross violation of the autonomy of the University" that "raises a serious question of the existence of elements of a criminal offence". It has not been established who installed the equipment, and no link to BIA has been confirmed.
As of 4 November 2026, neither BIA, the Higher Court in Belgrade nor the TOK had publicly responded to the reports. Under the Constitution, interference with the privacy of communication is permitted only on the basis of a court decision. The case of Radar raises the question of how effective that judicial control is, given that the court approved and twice extended measures against journalists on grounds that the agency itself later found unsupported. Furthermore, the protection of journalists' sources and democratic oversight of the security services are among the standards against which Serbia is assessed in the rule of law chapters of EU accession negotiations. CRTA.Plus follows these developments on its surveillance page and its page on the safety of journalists; earlier cases of spyware use against activists and journalists are documented in the CRTA.Plus chronology of Pegasus and NoviSpy surveillance.
As described by Radar, the measures covered the recording of communications in the outlet's newsroom at Terazije 5 in Belgrade, as well as ten days of physical surveillance of members of the newsroom, ordered at the BIA director's discretion. The document also lists four Belgrade restaurants, without stating why. On 22 October 2026, Orlić proposed to the President of the Higher Court, Dragan Milošević, that the measures be discontinued, stating that the data collected did not indicate any involvement in espionage. By BIA's own account, the espionage suspicion used to justify more than four months of surveillance of a newsroom was not substantiated.
By BIA's own account, the espionage suspicion used to justify more than four months of surveillance of a newsroom was not substantiated.
In an interview with the daily Danas, Mališić stated that the surveillance lasted until 3 November and that journalists' apartments and cars had also been bugged; this claim is not reflected in the excerpts Radar has published. Radar has not published the document in full, and a reference to "3 November 2026" in its heading remains unexplained.The report follows two related disclosures. On 1 November 2026, Radar reported, citing an anonymous source and without publishing documents, that BIA had wiretapped prosecutors of the Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime (TOK) working on the case concerning the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy, which killed 16 people. According to the source, the surveillance also covered the head of the office, Mladen Nenadić, and extended to the prosecutors' email communication. These measures, too, were reportedly justified by suspected espionage, ordered at several points between April and October 2026, and Orlić requested their full discontinuation on 29 October, four days after the early parliamentary elections. If confirmed, this would mean that the security service monitored the prosecutors in charge of the corruption investigation linked to the canopy collapse, which triggered the mass protests of the past two years.
On 30 October 2026, equipment presumed to be used for audio and video recording was found in Amphitheatre V of the University of Belgrade Faculty of Law, where students had held their plenary assemblies. The equipment was hidden inside an emergency exit light above the entrance and was discovered after the dean ordered an inspection following warnings from students; the police carried out an on-site investigation. The Faculty confirmed the find. Rector of the University of Belgrade Vladan Đokić stated that it was "further proof that the outgoing government was prepared to settle scores with those who think differently, in breach of the law", describing it as "a gross violation of the autonomy of the University" that "raises a serious question of the existence of elements of a criminal offence". It has not been established who installed the equipment, and no link to BIA has been confirmed.
As of 4 November 2026, neither BIA, the Higher Court in Belgrade nor the TOK had publicly responded to the reports. Under the Constitution, interference with the privacy of communication is permitted only on the basis of a court decision. The case of Radar raises the question of how effective that judicial control is, given that the court approved and twice extended measures against journalists on grounds that the agency itself later found unsupported. Furthermore, the protection of journalists' sources and democratic oversight of the security services are among the standards against which Serbia is assessed in the rule of law chapters of EU accession negotiations. CRTA.Plus follows these developments on its surveillance page and its page on the safety of journalists; earlier cases of spyware use against activists and journalists are documented in the CRTA.Plus chronology of Pegasus and NoviSpy surveillance.
