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On 2 September 2026, "Students in Blockade" presented allegations of wiretapping and spying on the phones of activists in Serbia. At least 14 people were targeted by advanced spyware, including Pegasus and NoviSpy. Amnesty International and Citizen Lab confirmed the findings on the attacks on the phones, and in one case a Pegasus spyware infection was confirmed.
The targets of the attacks are members of the student movement and activists, and an MP and a local councillor from opposition parties were also targeted. The period of targeting coincides with the period of the local elections in 10 cities and municipalities in Serbia, which were held on 29 March 2026.
This is the most extensive documented wave of the use of such software in the country to date. The spyware has access to all data on the device, including all communication, contacts, photos, app content and other files. This spyware can also secretly record the device's screen, as well as activate the microphone or camera.
Lawyer Ana Toskić Cvetinović, who has worked for years on personal data protection and the right to privacy, described the situation as alarming, because this type of surveillance endangers not only the person whose phone is targeted, but also everyone they are in contact with. "This is invasive surveillance that endangers not only those who are the targets of surveillance, but also their families, friends, associates and colleagues. It is impossible to control the scope of that surveillance," said Ana Toskić Cvetinović.
This case has again opened up public debate on other cases of wiretapping and phone spying over the past few years. Some of them have come to public attention, such as the wiretapping and tracking of Free Citizens Movement MP Anna Oreg, or Amnesty International's December 2024 report on the wiretapping and tracking of journalists, activists and representatives of the civil sector. Although several cases have been confirmed, Amnesty International believes there are dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of different devices that have been targeted by spyware.
"At the end of July I gave a statement to the police, I think it was their Department for High-Tech Crime, in Kneza Miloša Street. I wasn't the only one, I think other people also gave statements as injured parties, although some gave up. I don't know what is happening next with that investigation," Slaviša Milanov told Nova.rs.
Lawyer Kruna Savović, who represents Milanov, as well as some other injured citizens who were victims of wiretapping, stresses the slowness of the state authorities.
"Slaviša Milanov gave his statement to the police more than two years after the criminal complaint was filed. Even in that case, the prosecution's handling cannot be assessed as efficient. In the case of the installation or attempted installation of spyware, Milanov is not the only injured party. Ljubomir Stefanović, editor of the YouTube channel Slavija Info, also gave a statement on the same matter. There was no progress there either. The criminal complaint filed by civil society organisations has been supplemented twice, and covers a total of seven injured parties," lawyer Kruna Savović told Nova.rs.
In February 2024, Milanov was taken into the police station under the pretext of a test for driving under the influence of alcohol and narcotics. While he was in detention, plain-clothes police officers questioned him about his journalistic work. His Android phone was switched off when he handed it over to the police on entering the station.
After his release, Milanov noticed that his phone had evidently been tampered with and that mobile data and wifi had been switched off, which he otherwise always keeps on. "That meant someone had been messing with my phone while it was handed over to the police. I later found out that wifi and internet data are switched off automatically when the SIM card is taken out and put back, and that those who had handled my phone simply forgot to turn those functions back on," the journalist explained.
Milanov informed the Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia (NUNS) and several non-governmental organisations about this case, and by checking with the "Stay free" app he established that his mobile phone had indeed been manipulated while he was at the police station. After delays and stalling, he was questioned only more than two years later, and it is a big question what the outcome of this investigation will be.
Ljubomir Stefanović, editor of the YouTube channel Slavija Info, also had NoviSpy electronic surveillance software found on his phone. NUNS called on the prosecution to establish who is responsible for the misuse of digital forensic tools and the tracking of journalists and activists.
In its appeal to the prosecution, NUNS stated that, according to the information available to it, Cellebrite tools, which are used to unlock phones and download data, had also been used in Ljubomir Stefanović's case, which also opens up the possibility that NoviSpy spyware was installed.
According to NUNS, on 11 October 2024 Stefanović was practically abducted by the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) and taken to the premises of the Voždovac police station, where he was held for several hours and questioned over allegedly insulting President Aleksandar Vučić. He told Danas at the time that BIA officers had even threatened to frame him in scandals if he did not stop criticising Vučić on his channel.
According to Stefanović's claims, BIA officers took away his phone, so he did not know where it was during the interview, and he received no "paper" as proof that he had been officially questioned, nor did anyone make a record of his statement.
BIA has never either confirmed or denied Stefanović's allegations, and he, through his lawyer Nikola Lakić, filed a criminal complaint against BIA director Vladimir Orlić and several unidentified persons, because the BIA agents did not identify themselves to Stefanović.
"I had no idea they were capable of that, I had to move out of the studio where I record because threats came that it would be set on fire," the journalist said.
The report documents how mobile forensic products from the Israeli company Cellebrite are used to extract data from the mobile devices of journalists and activists, and reveals that the Serbian police and BIA used a specially developed Android spyware, NoviSpy, to covertly infect individuals' devices during detention or police questioning.
"Our investigation reveals how the Serbian authorities have used surveillance technologies and digital repression tactics as instruments of wider state control and repression directed against civil society," said Dinushika Dissanayake, the organisation's Deputy Regional Director for Europe.
Cellebrite, a company founded and headquartered in Israel but with offices around the world, develops the Cellebrite UFED product suite, intended for law enforcement agencies and state institutions, which enables data extraction from a large number of mobile devices, including some of the latest Android phones and iPhone models, even without knowing the device's passcode.
Amnesty International stresses that, although technically less advanced than highly invasive commercial spyware such as Pegasus, NoviSpy, a previously unknown Android spyware, nevertheless gives the Serbian authorities extensive surveillance capabilities once it is installed on a particular person's device. NoviSpy can collect sensitive personal data from the phone and allows the microphone or camera to be switched on remotely.
In at least two cases, Cellebrite UFED exploits, software that takes advantage of a bug or security vulnerability, were used to bypass Android security mechanisms, which enabled the authorities to covertly install NoviSpy during police questioning, stated Amnesty International, which also established that the Serbian authorities had used Cellebrite to exploit a zero-day vulnerability, a software bug unknown to the original software manufacturer and for which no fix yet exists, on Android devices, thereby gaining privileged access to the phone of an environmental activist.
"Our forensic evidence confirms that NoviSpy was installed while Slaviša Milanov's device was in the possession of the Serbian police and that the infection depended on the use of an advanced tool such as Cellebrite UFED, which can unlock the device. Amnesty International attributes NoviSpy to BIA with a high degree of confidence," said Donncha Ó Cearbhaill, head of Amnesty International's Security Lab.
Amnesty International also carried out a forensic analysis of the phone of Nikola Ristić, a youth activist from the organisation SviĆe, and confirmed a second case of a person whose device, while in the possession of the Serbian authorities, was unlocked using the Cellebrite UFED tool and infected with NoviSpy spyware.
Nikola was one of the key organisers of the protest in Belgrade on 3 November 2024, following the tragic event in Novi Sad and the collapse of the railway station canopy. On the eve of the protest itself, four BIA officers took him to a police station, where he was told that through his activism he was endangering his own safety, the safety of his family and of the community as a whole.
"They said we were all just naive and idealistic kids who don't know what we're doing and that we don't realise that with the protests we are endangering everyone's safety," said Ristić, adding that he was held at the station for a little over two hours, but had the impression that his questioning had no clear meaning or purpose and that the officers were just trying to buy time.
When they finally released him, Ristić asked for a court order, but the officers told him that the prosecutor was still deciding whether his social media post, in which he called for a peaceful protest, should be forwarded to the police for further action, and that they could therefore not give him any documentation. As soon as he left, he suspected that someone had accessed his phone and immediately contacted Amnesty International's Security Lab.
Ivan Bjelić, an environmental activist and freelance journalist, has repeatedly been subjected to increased police checks, pressure and detentions because of his involvement in non-violent acts of civil disobedience. On 17 December 2023, he was stopped while travelling by bus to Belgrade and taken to the Ministry of the Interior building in Belgrade, where he was questioned by police and BIA officers. The arrest took place on the same day the parliamentary elections were held, which were followed by anti-government protests.
During the several hours he spent at the police station, the officers showed Bjelić a formal written order obliging him to tell them his PIN and unlock his Android phone, which was in BIA's possession for several hours, and shortly after examining the phone, the officers told Bjelić that they had found no indications or evidence that he had taken part in an attempted "violent overthrow of the constitutional order" or in terrorist acts, and then released him.
After his release, Amnesty International carried out a forensic analysis of the phone and found evidence confirming that a Cellebrite UFED product had been used to obtain extended system privileges on his phone, which enabled the authorities to extract all data from the device. As in the cases of all the other activists and journalists whose devices were accessed using Cellebrite, Bjelić has not been formally charged with any criminal offence either.
The report states that in this case the authorities showed Bjelić a search warrant, and he was also asked to provide access to the phone so that the examination could be carried out. Viewed solely from the perspective of domestic legal procedure, this could be considered a lawful use of Cellebrite's digital forensic technology, but such use nevertheless raises serious questions about its legitimacy.
"Amnesty International considers that the use of advanced forensic software and serious charges of terrorism and endangering the constitutional order against people who are merely exercising their human rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly cannot be considered a legitimate aim and may therefore constitute a violation of international law and human rights," the report stresses.
In August 2024, Ivan Milosavljević Buki, an environmental activist and one of the leading figures of the organisation Rendžeri Istočne Srbije (Rangers of Eastern Serbia) (RIS), which operates in the Homolje area, worked with N1 television to document the unlawful abstraction of drinking water for mining activities in Homolje, and during filming was repeatedly exposed to physical threats; he also published a video of one such incident.
After speaking publicly about these events, he was invited to an informal interview at BIA's premises in Požarevac on 22 August 2024, where officers asked him to play the video, so he handed the device to an officer, who scrolled randomly through the phone, and at one point even left the room to take a call, taking Milosavljević's still unlocked phone with him.
After this interview, Milosavljević suspected that something had been done to his phone, and Amnesty International then carried out a forensic analysis of the device, which showed that the authorities had tried, apparently unsuccessfully, to install Android applications via the Files app while the unlocked phone was outside the room in which the interview was being held.
"Over a period of approximately 20 minutes, the phone was connected to a computer via a USB cable, and authorisation to install untrusted Android applications that had been copied to the phone and opened in the Files app was attempted at least twice. Amnesty International believes that the attempt to install NoviSpy spyware may have been prevented by a relatively new security feature of Google Play Protect," the report states.
It states that since the installation attempts failed, there are no forensic records that would definitively confirm that the applications the authorities tried to install were indeed NoviSpy. "However, given that the interview was conducted by BIA, as well as the forensic traces confirming attempts to install two untrusted Android applications precisely at the time the device was in BIA's possession, Amnesty International believes there are very strong grounds to conclude that the authorities were also trying to install NoviSpy spyware in this case," the report stresses.
It states that in another case, involving an activist from the organisation Krokodil, spyware was installed on an Android phone during an interview with BIA officers in October 2024 about an attack on their premises. After the interview, there was suspicion that the phone had been compromised and, at the activist's request, Amnesty International carried out a forensic investigation and established that NoviSpy had been installed on the device during the interview.
Amnesty International also managed to recover and decrypt the data NoviSpy had collected while the activist was using the phone. These included screenshots of email accounts, Signal and WhatsApp messages, as well as social media activity. Before publishing the report, Amnesty International informed security researchers at Android and Google about the NoviSpy campaign, after which measures were taken to remove the spyware from affected Android devices.
Amnesty International states that Serbian activists who were targeted by this kind of surveillance have been left traumatised, citing the statement of three activists who wished to remain anonymous.
"We are all in a kind of digital prison, a digital gulag. We have the illusion of freedom, but in reality we are not free at all. This has two consequences: either you opt for self-censorship, which deeply affects your ability to work, or you decide to speak anyway, but then you have to be prepared to bear the consequences," said one of the activists who had been targeted by Pegasus.
According to Amnesty International, technical data indicate that in previous years dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of different devices were targeted by NoviSpy spyware. They also state that the phones of dozens of other activists were temporarily confiscated after protests against lithium mining in July and August 2024 and examined with forensic tools which Amnesty believes probably included Cellebrite.
Responding to Amnesty International's allegations, Cellebrite said that it appreciated the organisation drawing attention to the alleged misuse of its technology, that it was investigating the claims made in this report and that, if they were confirmed, it was ready to impose appropriate sanctions, including ending Cellebrite's cooperation with all relevant institutions.
Amnesty International shared the research findings with the Government of Serbia before publication, but received no response. At the same time, it called on them to stop using highly invasive spyware, to provide victims of unlawful targeted surveillance with an effective legal remedy and to hold those responsible for rights violations to account. Analysis of the NoviSpy application revealed an IP address linked to a security services server that was used to transfer stolen data from infected phones.
BIA responded with a statement saying that it "can only note that the trivial sensationalism of its content points to the purpose of Amnesty International - which is reflected in working for the interests of certain agencies and pressure groups". "BIA works exclusively in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Serbia and we are therefore not even able to comment on the absurd allegations from their text, just as we do not otherwise comment on similar content," the statement said.
The Ministry of the Interior (MUP) of Serbia stated that the claims in Amnesty International's report about the use of a forensic tool by the Ministry were "absolutely untrue" and that within the National Centre for Criminal Forensics the forensic tool is used exclusively in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code. It also said that the forensic tool is used in the same way by other police forces around the world.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) rapporteur for Serbia, Axel Schäfer, expressed concern and alarm over the revelations about the surveillance of journalists and activists in Serbia. "I strongly condemn this practice, which violates the right to respect for private life and may jeopardise the exercise of other human rights, such as freedom of expression, assembly and association. It also has a chilling effect on the work of journalists and civil society activists in their watchdog role over institutions, and undermines trust in democratic institutions and the rule of law," Schäfer said.
Ten civil society organisations responded to Amnesty International's report by filing a criminal complaint with the Prosecutor's Office for High-Tech Crime against unidentified authorised officers of BIA and the police for infecting the mobile phones of journalists and activists with spyware.
In addition to the criminal complaint, a request was sent to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection to initiate oversight of the implementation of the Law on Personal Data Protection "regarding the unauthorised processing of personal data by the police and the Security Intelligence Agency", as well as a request to the Protector of Citizens (Ombudsman) to initiate proceedings on its own initiative into the work of the police and BIA.
The criminal complaint was filed by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Civic Initiatives, CRTA, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights, the Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia (NUNS), the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights (YUCOM), the Krokodil association, Partners Serbia and the SHARE Foundation.
This 23-year-old activist and student at Union University, whose real identity is known to BIRN, entered the Sava Centre hall out of sheer curiosity, together with a friend, also a student and activist, sat down and started talking to participants of the rally, and when he got up to get a drink for himself and his friend, he was surrounded by a group of men in plain clothes and taken to the Savski venac police station, his phone was confiscated and he spent the next six hours locked in a room with four inspectors.
After "cracking" the passcode on the phone of Vedran (name changed) using Cellebrite digital forensic equipment and downloading all the data, the operatives tried to erase their traces. This was shown by an analysis of the phone carried out in January 2025 by experts from Amnesty International's cyber lab. "They saw my entire life over the previous five years. They inevitably came across something very private, something I would never want anyone to see, let alone BIA," the student told BIRN.
Amnesty International's experts noticed that the service had tried several times and in different ways to install an unknown Android application on his phone. This method of forcibly unlocking a phone using Cellebrite equipment, followed by the insertion of NoviSpy tracking software, had also been recorded in earlier cases.
"After reviewing the allegations in Amnesty International's December 2024 report, Cellebrite took concrete steps to examine each individual claim in accordance with our ethics and integrity policies. We have concluded that it is appropriate at this time to suspend the use of our products by the relevant customers," the statement said.
Commenting on Cellebrite's statement, the head of Amnesty International's Security Lab said that it further confirms Amnesty International's December 2024 findings that the Serbian police and intelligence services routinely misused Cellebrite's digital forensic equipment outside legally sanctioned procedures to surveil civil society activists and independent journalists who criticise the authorities. He also stressed that revoking the licences of users who misused the equipment for political reasons is a crucial first step. "Now the Serbian authorities must urgently conduct their own thorough and impartial investigation, establish accountability, ensure legal protection and compensation for victims and put in place appropriate mechanisms to prevent future abuses," said Donncha Ó Cearbhaill.
Civil society representatives from Serbia recalled Amnesty International's report "A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the suppression of civil society in Serbia", which clearly pointed to the widespread use of technologies for spying and unlawfully accessing the private data of citizens of Serbia. The report presented concrete evidence in five cases confirming the use of intrusive tools, and published interviews with 13 people who had been targeted by spyware or digital forensic searches; all the findings clearly proving the compromise of mobile phones were documented, including the presence of malicious applications linked to a BIA server used to transfer stolen data from infected phones.
"Amnesty International's report only confirmed earlier indications that the Serbian state is conducting unlawful covert surveillance and misusing spyware against its own citizens - activists, journalists and civil society organisations," pointed out the representatives of civil society organisations from Serbia, who were represented by Dušan Pokuševski, programme director of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, and Milena Berić, executive director of the Krokodil association.
Pokuševski stressed that the use of spyware in Serbia is not only unlawful but also constitutes a criminal offence under the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to unauthorised collection of data, computer viruses and unauthorised access to protected devices and data. "Although the Criminal Procedure Code provides for special surveillance measures and interception of communications, the use of spyware goes beyond those provisions and cannot be justified, because it enables full access to all data on a device, not just to communication channels. The use of spyware for covert surveillance and recording of communications does not meet the principles of necessity and proportionality, which are key to applying such measures. The same applies to the Law on the Security Intelligence Agency, which regulates the application of special measures," Pokuševski pointed out at the Council of Europe.
He also stated that the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly stressed that surveillance measures must be in accordance with the law, subject to independent oversight and applied only when strictly necessary and proportionate. "In addition to the absence of a legal basis for the use of spyware, practice has shown that the safeguards provided for by the Constitution and the laws are not effective. Decisions on applying surveillance measures in criminal proceedings are entrusted to the judiciary, and none of these measures can be carried out without prior court approval. A judge should also assess whether it is necessary to take certain measures at all and, if so, whether the information could be obtained by applying less intrusive measures. However, the cases documented by Amnesty International show that court decisions either do not exist or are issued pro forma, without a real assessment of the necessity of such measures. Moreover, independent mechanisms for oversight and monitoring of covert surveillance in Serbia, including the Protector of Citizens and the Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, have traditionally been extremely reluctant to engage in such investigations," Pokuševski stressed.
Milena Berić is a Krokodil activist who was under BIA surveillance measures and who is mentioned in Amnesty International's report. She described the event that led to her interview at BIA, which took place on 20 September 2024, when a group of hooligans speaking Russian burst into the organisation's premises and cut the ties holding a Ukrainian flag. Police representatives appeared quickly after receiving Krokodil's report, but left without making a record, which is why she personally demanded accountability from BIA, and this was followed by an invitation to come for an informal interview on 1 October.
She said she had left her jacket and phone outside the room where she was being questioned, and after the meeting, when she collected her personal belongings, she noticed a notification on her phone indicating that all her contacts had been exported. "I took a screenshot and sent it to BIA with a simple question: Why? At that moment, I realised I was seeking protection and accountability from those who support the perpetrators. I felt as if I was fighting a losing battle. Instead of providing us with protection, institutions funded by the citizens of Serbia made me even more vulnerable," Milena Berić stressed.
She says she contacted Amnesty International and 10 days later its forensic experts confirmed that illegal tracking software had been installed on her phone during the visit to BIA, and 14 days later they established that the IP address collecting her data was located at a BIA address. "I saw my personal photos and other data that are now in the hands of the state," she said, stressing that for the first time she was truly afraid for her own safety and that of her family, colleagues and friends.
It all looked like a message from a potential source wanting to tip them off about some information, but the unusual link and unknown sender raised suspicions that it was phishing. After it was suspected that the messages were an attempt to install spyware on the journalists' phones, BIRN turned to Amnesty International's Security Lab for help. Their forensic analysis confirmed that these were Pegasus spyware attacks.
"We found that the text messages contain links to a Serbian-language internet domain which we can say with a high degree of certainty is linked to NSO Group's Pegasus spyware," said Donncha Ó Cearbhaill.
Amnesty International concluded that in both cases of the BIRN journalists this was an attempted Pegasus infection using the "one-click" method. Both messages and links were sent just one hour apart, from the same Viber number, to two journalists working in the same newsroom.
One of the journalists, who insisted on anonymity, said she was absolutely furious about the attempt to install Pegasus. "It was a phone registered in my name and I felt as if I had an intruder in my own home. It's a very disturbing feeling... I was extremely worried about my sources, who could have been put at risk because they communicated with me."
The other journalist, Jelena Veljković, said she was not overly frightened by the attempt to target her with Pegasus, but that it was very unpleasant. "It was my private phone, which I also use for work, and a virus like Pegasus, which is not at all selective and can access everything on someone's phone, can have consequences for my family too."
"This was a targeted attack on investigative journalists, a form of pressure and a warning. Whether it was an attack on me personally or on BIRN as a media outlet, I'm not sure," Jelena Veljković stressed.
Amnesty International shared its findings with NSO Group, which replied that it could not comment on specific current or former customers and that, in line with its policy, it could not disclose information about the technical specifications, functionality or operational characteristics of its products.
These findings, as Amnesty International pointed out, are further evidence that the Serbian authorities are misusing highly invasive spyware products and other digital surveillance technologies to target journalists, activists and other members of civil society, at a time when Serbia has been shaken by mass student protests since November 2024. "The Serbian authorities must stop using highly invasive spyware, provide victims of unlawful targeted surveillance with effective legal protection and hold those responsible for rights violations to account," Amnesty International stresses. Its message to NSO Group is that it must stop selling Pegasus and suspend the use of its products in Serbia.
It called on the Government of Serbia to immediately stop using advanced surveillance technologies against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware, and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible.
The European Parliament called on the European Commission, bearing this in mind, to monitor further developments in these cases, raise these issues in talks with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation of all the cases mentioned.
It was recalled that, after the publication of Amnesty International's report at the end of 2024, the ten organisations activated all available legal protection mechanisms. In addition to the criminal complaint against members of the police and BIA filed with the Prosecutor's Office for High-Tech Crime, a request was sent to the Protector of Citizens to open an inquiry into the work of these bodies on its own initiative, as well as a complaint from one of the journalists who had been targeted. A request was also submitted to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection to initiate oversight of the work of these bodies.
They state that it has remained unknown what steps these institutions have taken to establish the lawfulness of the conduct of the police and BIA, as well as the responsibility of the persons who carried out these surveillance actions.
"Unlawful surveillance by state structures has continued, as at the end of March an attempted Pegasus spyware attack on two BIRN journalists was also confirmed. There are also clear indications that there are other cases of unlawful digital surveillance; it is also clear that the state bodies responsible for security matters are unlawfully spying on activists and journalists, and in a large number of cases," stress the 10 organisations working on human rights protection.
These organisations appealed to the competent institutions, in line with the Constitution and laws of Serbia, as well as international standards, to react without delay in order to stop unlawful digital surveillance, as well as all other forms of pressure, and to establish the criminal responsibility of the persons who committed these acts.
The next day, in a joint operation by the Belgrade Higher Public Prosecutor's Office, the police and the BIA, eight students, who had been tracked and wiretapped at the School of Electrical Engineering and the Faculty of Civil Engineering, were also detained on charges of having committed the criminal offences of preparing an offence against the constitutional order and security of Serbia and calling for a violent change of the constitutional order. The students had already given the "green light" for a wave of civil disobedience on the evening of 28 June, and the arrests were followed by protests and blockades across Serbia, which lasted throughout the summer.
During July and August, students and citizens who demonstrated in the streets were detained. Students in Blockade, with the help of IT Blokada, published a very detailed guide on how to behave at protests and what to do in case of detention. Journalists, activists and protest organisers were advised to use hardened mobile operating systems, to take anti-forensic measures that would make device analysis more difficult and to use full-disk encryption. It was also recommended that they consider using apps that create hidden, encrypted data containers, as well as security scanners and specialised security apps that offer a "panic button" or a "duress PIN". The list of recommendations also included the use of file-shredding apps.
Journalists, activists and protest organisers who had reason to believe they had been targeted by, for example, Pegasus were advised to immediately stop using the device for any sensitive communication, disconnect it from Wi-Fi and mobile networks and not to try to restore the device to factory settings or remove the malware themselves, because this would alert the attackers and destroy key forensic evidence needed for confirmation. "This is not a do-it-yourself situation. Contact a specialised organisation equipped to deal with such threats," the joint post by the students and IT Blokada states.
Those heading to protests and blockades were advised to leave their primary phone at home, and if they carried their primary phone, to keep it "clean" (with no personal data), turn off biometrics (face/fingerprint), use a long, alphanumeric passcode, use Signal for communication and turn on self-destructing messages.
They are Slobodan Vidojević, a farmer from Bresnica (Čačak) and president of the Association of Milk Producers of Šumadija and Pomoravlje; Zlatko Kokanović, an activist of the association "Ne damo Jadar" and a resident of Gornje Nedeljice (Loznica); Vladimir Višić, a farmer from Stara Pazova and one of the founders of the Initiative for the Survival of Farmers of Serbia; and Jovan Topalović, a farmer from Lunovo Selo (Užice) and president of the citizens' association "Da (Ne) Dišemo Duboko".
On 1 October 2024, when a farmers' protest had been scheduled, Slobodan Vidojević was detained in the centre of the village around noon. Vidojević described the arrest to BIRN as "cinematic", because three officials "bundled" him into a black van, having first given him a "good" beating.
"They held me by the arms, and they took my phone when I got into the van. They drove via the village of Tavnik, made a loop and took me to the police station in Čačak, upstairs, to the BIA office," the farmer said, describing the arrest. The questioning lasted about two hours and he received a record of it.
For months after the detention, Vidojević heard crackling on the phone, the system kept freezing and the signal kept dropping. He also noticed that the battery and internet data were being used up faster than before. It was confirmed that NoviSpy software had been active on his phone for more than a year.
On 18 July 2024 at 8:15, Kokanović was summoned to a short informal interview at BIA, ahead of a trip to Belgrade where he was due to attend a meeting at the Government of Serbia with representatives of the authorities and the Ministry of Agriculture (Ana Brnabić, Miloš Vučević and Aleksandar Martinović) - scheduled for 13:30. He was held for about four hours at BIA's premises within the police station in Loznica. Before the meeting, he left his phone in the hallway, in a locker. "For the first 30 to 45 minutes the phone was with them, and then they gave it back to me so I could answer a call," Kokanović said, and BIRN points out that even this short time was enough for the officers to install NoviSpy on his phone, at exactly 9:38, monitoring his every subsequent activity. Kokanović says that he used the phone "infected" in this way "for a month or so and then articles based on phone conversations started coming out in the tabloids", and that after that month he got a new device and put the "infected" one aside.
Ahead of the protest against Rio Tinto held in Belgrade on 11 August 2024, Višić set off for Belgrade on his tractor, and at the entrance to the city, in Cara Dušana Street in Zemun, he was stopped by traffic police and taken to a police station. A traffic officer confiscated his phone, and three inspectors questioned him for between three and four hours. Months later, BIRN and experts from the SHARE Foundation checked the phone, which had also been infected.
On 10 September, Topalović was summoned for an interview at BIA; a BIA officer came to pick him up in a car, and they drove to Jelova Gora near Užice, where BIA has a facility. "We left our phones in the car, but it was their car. He told me to leave it so I wouldn't bring it inside, so that I wouldn't record them, nor they me. In the office they cross-examined me, there were two of them. So they ask me where do you know this one from, that one from...," said Topalović, noting that protests against Rio Tinto were ongoing at the time, so the questioning came down to his acquaintances with other eco-activists. "The interview lasted maybe an hour. When it was over, the phone was where I had left it, next to the gearstick in the car." It would turn out that Topalović's phone was infected that day.
NoviSpy is spyware developed within BIA, which since 2018 has been communicating with a server registered to an operative of that service. It works by silently taking screenshots of the phone and sending them to a server at BIA, capturing messages as they are typed, app correspondence, photos, contacts, and even the windows of banking and other apps. In the case of former police general Slobodan Malešić, about whom BIRN has previously written, the same type of software took hundreds of screenshots a day for days, recording everything from the music he listens to, to message conversations, to notes and private photos that were never meant for others.
The targets of the attacks are members of the student movement and activists, and an MP and a local councillor from opposition parties were also targeted. The period of targeting coincides with the period of the local elections in 10 cities and municipalities in Serbia, which were held on 29 March 2026.
This is the most extensive documented wave of the use of such software in the country to date. The spyware has access to all data on the device, including all communication, contacts, photos, app content and other files. This spyware can also secretly record the device's screen, as well as activate the microphone or camera.
Lawyer Ana Toskić Cvetinović, who has worked for years on personal data protection and the right to privacy, described the situation as alarming, because this type of surveillance endangers not only the person whose phone is targeted, but also everyone they are in contact with. "This is invasive surveillance that endangers not only those who are the targets of surveillance, but also their families, friends, associates and colleagues. It is impossible to control the scope of that surveillance," said Ana Toskić Cvetinović.
This case has again opened up public debate on other cases of wiretapping and phone spying over the past few years. Some of them have come to public attention, such as the wiretapping and tracking of Free Citizens Movement MP Anna Oreg, or Amnesty International's December 2024 report on the wiretapping and tracking of journalists, activists and representatives of the civil sector. Although several cases have been confirmed, Amnesty International believes there are dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of different devices that have been targeted by spyware.
Who has been wiretapped?
Two days after this conference, the portal Nova.rs reminded the public of the case of Slaviša Milanov, a journalist from Dimitrovgrad, who was tracked and wiretapped because of his evidently critical articles about the authorities, which he published on the local portal FAR, which publishes articles in Serbian and Bulgarian. Although more than two years have passed since his case was reported, Milanov said that none of the competent authorities had contacted him about it."At the end of July I gave a statement to the police, I think it was their Department for High-Tech Crime, in Kneza Miloša Street. I wasn't the only one, I think other people also gave statements as injured parties, although some gave up. I don't know what is happening next with that investigation," Slaviša Milanov told Nova.rs.
Lawyer Kruna Savović, who represents Milanov, as well as some other injured citizens who were victims of wiretapping, stresses the slowness of the state authorities.
"Slaviša Milanov gave his statement to the police more than two years after the criminal complaint was filed. Even in that case, the prosecution's handling cannot be assessed as efficient. In the case of the installation or attempted installation of spyware, Milanov is not the only injured party. Ljubomir Stefanović, editor of the YouTube channel Slavija Info, also gave a statement on the same matter. There was no progress there either. The criminal complaint filed by civil society organisations has been supplemented twice, and covers a total of seven injured parties," lawyer Kruna Savović told Nova.rs.
In February 2024, Milanov was taken into the police station under the pretext of a test for driving under the influence of alcohol and narcotics. While he was in detention, plain-clothes police officers questioned him about his journalistic work. His Android phone was switched off when he handed it over to the police on entering the station.
After his release, Milanov noticed that his phone had evidently been tampered with and that mobile data and wifi had been switched off, which he otherwise always keeps on. "That meant someone had been messing with my phone while it was handed over to the police. I later found out that wifi and internet data are switched off automatically when the SIM card is taken out and put back, and that those who had handled my phone simply forgot to turn those functions back on," the journalist explained.
Milanov informed the Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia (NUNS) and several non-governmental organisations about this case, and by checking with the "Stay free" app he established that his mobile phone had indeed been manipulated while he was at the police station. After delays and stalling, he was questioned only more than two years later, and it is a big question what the outcome of this investigation will be.
Ljubomir Stefanović, editor of the YouTube channel Slavija Info, also had NoviSpy electronic surveillance software found on his phone. NUNS called on the prosecution to establish who is responsible for the misuse of digital forensic tools and the tracking of journalists and activists.
In its appeal to the prosecution, NUNS stated that, according to the information available to it, Cellebrite tools, which are used to unlock phones and download data, had also been used in Ljubomir Stefanović's case, which also opens up the possibility that NoviSpy spyware was installed.
According to NUNS, on 11 October 2024 Stefanović was practically abducted by the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) and taken to the premises of the Voždovac police station, where he was held for several hours and questioned over allegedly insulting President Aleksandar Vučić. He told Danas at the time that BIA officers had even threatened to frame him in scandals if he did not stop criticising Vučić on his channel.
According to Stefanović's claims, BIA officers took away his phone, so he did not know where it was during the interview, and he received no "paper" as proof that he had been officially questioned, nor did anyone make a record of his statement.
BIA has never either confirmed or denied Stefanović's allegations, and he, through his lawyer Nikola Lakić, filed a criminal complaint against BIA director Vladimir Orlić and several unidentified persons, because the BIA agents did not identify themselves to Stefanović.
"I had no idea they were capable of that, I had to move out of the studio where I record because threats came that it would be set on fire," the journalist said.
Activists in Serbia in a digital prison
On 16 December 2024, Amnesty International published the report "A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the suppression of civil society in Serbia", which states that the Serbian police and intelligence services use advanced phone spyware, together with mobile forensic tools, to unlawfully target journalists, environmental activists and other individuals as part of a covert surveillance campaign.The report documents how mobile forensic products from the Israeli company Cellebrite are used to extract data from the mobile devices of journalists and activists, and reveals that the Serbian police and BIA used a specially developed Android spyware, NoviSpy, to covertly infect individuals' devices during detention or police questioning.
"Our investigation reveals how the Serbian authorities have used surveillance technologies and digital repression tactics as instruments of wider state control and repression directed against civil society," said Dinushika Dissanayake, the organisation's Deputy Regional Director for Europe.
Cellebrite, a company founded and headquartered in Israel but with offices around the world, develops the Cellebrite UFED product suite, intended for law enforcement agencies and state institutions, which enables data extraction from a large number of mobile devices, including some of the latest Android phones and iPhone models, even without knowing the device's passcode.
Amnesty International stresses that, although technically less advanced than highly invasive commercial spyware such as Pegasus, NoviSpy, a previously unknown Android spyware, nevertheless gives the Serbian authorities extensive surveillance capabilities once it is installed on a particular person's device. NoviSpy can collect sensitive personal data from the phone and allows the microphone or camera to be switched on remotely.
In at least two cases, Cellebrite UFED exploits, software that takes advantage of a bug or security vulnerability, were used to bypass Android security mechanisms, which enabled the authorities to covertly install NoviSpy during police questioning, stated Amnesty International, which also established that the Serbian authorities had used Cellebrite to exploit a zero-day vulnerability, a software bug unknown to the original software manufacturer and for which no fix yet exists, on Android devices, thereby gaining privileged access to the phone of an environmental activist.
"Our forensic evidence confirms that NoviSpy was installed while Slaviša Milanov's device was in the possession of the Serbian police and that the infection depended on the use of an advanced tool such as Cellebrite UFED, which can unlock the device. Amnesty International attributes NoviSpy to BIA with a high degree of confidence," said Donncha Ó Cearbhaill, head of Amnesty International's Security Lab.
Amnesty International also carried out a forensic analysis of the phone of Nikola Ristić, a youth activist from the organisation SviĆe, and confirmed a second case of a person whose device, while in the possession of the Serbian authorities, was unlocked using the Cellebrite UFED tool and infected with NoviSpy spyware.
Nikola was one of the key organisers of the protest in Belgrade on 3 November 2024, following the tragic event in Novi Sad and the collapse of the railway station canopy. On the eve of the protest itself, four BIA officers took him to a police station, where he was told that through his activism he was endangering his own safety, the safety of his family and of the community as a whole.
"They said we were all just naive and idealistic kids who don't know what we're doing and that we don't realise that with the protests we are endangering everyone's safety," said Ristić, adding that he was held at the station for a little over two hours, but had the impression that his questioning had no clear meaning or purpose and that the officers were just trying to buy time.
When they finally released him, Ristić asked for a court order, but the officers told him that the prosecutor was still deciding whether his social media post, in which he called for a peaceful protest, should be forwarded to the police for further action, and that they could therefore not give him any documentation. As soon as he left, he suspected that someone had accessed his phone and immediately contacted Amnesty International's Security Lab.
Ivan Bjelić, an environmental activist and freelance journalist, has repeatedly been subjected to increased police checks, pressure and detentions because of his involvement in non-violent acts of civil disobedience. On 17 December 2023, he was stopped while travelling by bus to Belgrade and taken to the Ministry of the Interior building in Belgrade, where he was questioned by police and BIA officers. The arrest took place on the same day the parliamentary elections were held, which were followed by anti-government protests.
During the several hours he spent at the police station, the officers showed Bjelić a formal written order obliging him to tell them his PIN and unlock his Android phone, which was in BIA's possession for several hours, and shortly after examining the phone, the officers told Bjelić that they had found no indications or evidence that he had taken part in an attempted "violent overthrow of the constitutional order" or in terrorist acts, and then released him.
After his release, Amnesty International carried out a forensic analysis of the phone and found evidence confirming that a Cellebrite UFED product had been used to obtain extended system privileges on his phone, which enabled the authorities to extract all data from the device. As in the cases of all the other activists and journalists whose devices were accessed using Cellebrite, Bjelić has not been formally charged with any criminal offence either.
The report states that in this case the authorities showed Bjelić a search warrant, and he was also asked to provide access to the phone so that the examination could be carried out. Viewed solely from the perspective of domestic legal procedure, this could be considered a lawful use of Cellebrite's digital forensic technology, but such use nevertheless raises serious questions about its legitimacy.
"Amnesty International considers that the use of advanced forensic software and serious charges of terrorism and endangering the constitutional order against people who are merely exercising their human rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly cannot be considered a legitimate aim and may therefore constitute a violation of international law and human rights," the report stresses.
In August 2024, Ivan Milosavljević Buki, an environmental activist and one of the leading figures of the organisation Rendžeri Istočne Srbije (Rangers of Eastern Serbia) (RIS), which operates in the Homolje area, worked with N1 television to document the unlawful abstraction of drinking water for mining activities in Homolje, and during filming was repeatedly exposed to physical threats; he also published a video of one such incident.
After speaking publicly about these events, he was invited to an informal interview at BIA's premises in Požarevac on 22 August 2024, where officers asked him to play the video, so he handed the device to an officer, who scrolled randomly through the phone, and at one point even left the room to take a call, taking Milosavljević's still unlocked phone with him.
After this interview, Milosavljević suspected that something had been done to his phone, and Amnesty International then carried out a forensic analysis of the device, which showed that the authorities had tried, apparently unsuccessfully, to install Android applications via the Files app while the unlocked phone was outside the room in which the interview was being held.
"Over a period of approximately 20 minutes, the phone was connected to a computer via a USB cable, and authorisation to install untrusted Android applications that had been copied to the phone and opened in the Files app was attempted at least twice. Amnesty International believes that the attempt to install NoviSpy spyware may have been prevented by a relatively new security feature of Google Play Protect," the report states.
It states that since the installation attempts failed, there are no forensic records that would definitively confirm that the applications the authorities tried to install were indeed NoviSpy. "However, given that the interview was conducted by BIA, as well as the forensic traces confirming attempts to install two untrusted Android applications precisely at the time the device was in BIA's possession, Amnesty International believes there are very strong grounds to conclude that the authorities were also trying to install NoviSpy spyware in this case," the report stresses.
It states that in another case, involving an activist from the organisation Krokodil, spyware was installed on an Android phone during an interview with BIA officers in October 2024 about an attack on their premises. After the interview, there was suspicion that the phone had been compromised and, at the activist's request, Amnesty International carried out a forensic investigation and established that NoviSpy had been installed on the device during the interview.
Amnesty International also managed to recover and decrypt the data NoviSpy had collected while the activist was using the phone. These included screenshots of email accounts, Signal and WhatsApp messages, as well as social media activity. Before publishing the report, Amnesty International informed security researchers at Android and Google about the NoviSpy campaign, after which measures were taken to remove the spyware from affected Android devices.
Amnesty International states that Serbian activists who were targeted by this kind of surveillance have been left traumatised, citing the statement of three activists who wished to remain anonymous.
"We are all in a kind of digital prison, a digital gulag. We have the illusion of freedom, but in reality we are not free at all. This has two consequences: either you opt for self-censorship, which deeply affects your ability to work, or you decide to speak anyway, but then you have to be prepared to bear the consequences," said one of the activists who had been targeted by Pegasus.
According to Amnesty International, technical data indicate that in previous years dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of different devices were targeted by NoviSpy spyware. They also state that the phones of dozens of other activists were temporarily confiscated after protests against lithium mining in July and August 2024 and examined with forensic tools which Amnesty believes probably included Cellebrite.
Responses and reactions
In response to these findings, NSO Group, the company that developed Pegasus, could not confirm whether Serbia is its client, but stated that the company "takes seriously its responsibility to respect human rights and is strongly committed to avoiding causing, contributing to or being directly linked to negative human rights impacts, as well as to thoroughly investigating all credible allegations of misuse of NSO Group products".Responding to Amnesty International's allegations, Cellebrite said that it appreciated the organisation drawing attention to the alleged misuse of its technology, that it was investigating the claims made in this report and that, if they were confirmed, it was ready to impose appropriate sanctions, including ending Cellebrite's cooperation with all relevant institutions.
Amnesty International shared the research findings with the Government of Serbia before publication, but received no response. At the same time, it called on them to stop using highly invasive spyware, to provide victims of unlawful targeted surveillance with an effective legal remedy and to hold those responsible for rights violations to account. Analysis of the NoviSpy application revealed an IP address linked to a security services server that was used to transfer stolen data from infected phones.
BIA responded with a statement saying that it "can only note that the trivial sensationalism of its content points to the purpose of Amnesty International - which is reflected in working for the interests of certain agencies and pressure groups". "BIA works exclusively in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Serbia and we are therefore not even able to comment on the absurd allegations from their text, just as we do not otherwise comment on similar content," the statement said.
The Ministry of the Interior (MUP) of Serbia stated that the claims in Amnesty International's report about the use of a forensic tool by the Ministry were "absolutely untrue" and that within the National Centre for Criminal Forensics the forensic tool is used exclusively in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code. It also said that the forensic tool is used in the same way by other police forces around the world.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) rapporteur for Serbia, Axel Schäfer, expressed concern and alarm over the revelations about the surveillance of journalists and activists in Serbia. "I strongly condemn this practice, which violates the right to respect for private life and may jeopardise the exercise of other human rights, such as freedom of expression, assembly and association. It also has a chilling effect on the work of journalists and civil society activists in their watchdog role over institutions, and undermines trust in democratic institutions and the rule of law," Schäfer said.
Ten civil society organisations responded to Amnesty International's report by filing a criminal complaint with the Prosecutor's Office for High-Tech Crime against unidentified authorised officers of BIA and the police for infecting the mobile phones of journalists and activists with spyware.
In addition to the criminal complaint, a request was sent to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection to initiate oversight of the implementation of the Law on Personal Data Protection "regarding the unauthorised processing of personal data by the police and the Security Intelligence Agency", as well as a request to the Protector of Citizens (Ombudsman) to initiate proceedings on its own initiative into the work of the police and BIA.
The criminal complaint was filed by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Civic Initiatives, CRTA, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights, the Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia (NUNS), the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights (YUCOM), the Krokodil association, Partners Serbia and the SHARE Foundation.
A new case of spyware surveillance
Nine days after Amnesty International's report on the misuse of spyware against activists and journalists, a student became the next target. He was detained on 25 December at the Sava Centre, where a Serbian Progressive Party rally was being held, and disappeared from public view for six hours.This 23-year-old activist and student at Union University, whose real identity is known to BIRN, entered the Sava Centre hall out of sheer curiosity, together with a friend, also a student and activist, sat down and started talking to participants of the rally, and when he got up to get a drink for himself and his friend, he was surrounded by a group of men in plain clothes and taken to the Savski venac police station, his phone was confiscated and he spent the next six hours locked in a room with four inspectors.
After "cracking" the passcode on the phone of Vedran (name changed) using Cellebrite digital forensic equipment and downloading all the data, the operatives tried to erase their traces. This was shown by an analysis of the phone carried out in January 2025 by experts from Amnesty International's cyber lab. "They saw my entire life over the previous five years. They inevitably came across something very private, something I would never want anyone to see, let alone BIA," the student told BIRN.
Amnesty International's experts noticed that the service had tried several times and in different ways to install an unknown Android application on his phone. This method of forcibly unlocking a phone using Cellebrite equipment, followed by the insertion of NoviSpy tracking software, had also been recorded in earlier cases.
A new reaction from Cellebrite
Cellebrite issued a statement on 25 February 2025 saying that its digital investigation software solutions support forensically sound and legally sanctioned investigations and are not spyware, surveillance systems or any other kind of offensive cyber activity, and that it takes seriously all allegations of possible misuse of its technology by customers in a manner that would be contrary to both the express and implied terms set out in its end-user agreement."After reviewing the allegations in Amnesty International's December 2024 report, Cellebrite took concrete steps to examine each individual claim in accordance with our ethics and integrity policies. We have concluded that it is appropriate at this time to suspend the use of our products by the relevant customers," the statement said.
Commenting on Cellebrite's statement, the head of Amnesty International's Security Lab said that it further confirms Amnesty International's December 2024 findings that the Serbian police and intelligence services routinely misused Cellebrite's digital forensic equipment outside legally sanctioned procedures to surveil civil society activists and independent journalists who criticise the authorities. He also stressed that revoking the licences of users who misused the equipment for political reasons is a crucial first step. "Now the Serbian authorities must urgently conduct their own thorough and impartial investigation, establish accountability, ensure legal protection and compensation for victims and put in place appropriate mechanisms to prevent future abuses," said Donncha Ó Cearbhaill.
Debate in the Council of Europe
On 3 March 2025, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe held a hearing on the use of Pegasus and similar software for spying and covert state surveillance, which was also attended by representatives of civil society organisations from Serbia.Civil society representatives from Serbia recalled Amnesty International's report "A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the suppression of civil society in Serbia", which clearly pointed to the widespread use of technologies for spying and unlawfully accessing the private data of citizens of Serbia. The report presented concrete evidence in five cases confirming the use of intrusive tools, and published interviews with 13 people who had been targeted by spyware or digital forensic searches; all the findings clearly proving the compromise of mobile phones were documented, including the presence of malicious applications linked to a BIA server used to transfer stolen data from infected phones.
"Amnesty International's report only confirmed earlier indications that the Serbian state is conducting unlawful covert surveillance and misusing spyware against its own citizens - activists, journalists and civil society organisations," pointed out the representatives of civil society organisations from Serbia, who were represented by Dušan Pokuševski, programme director of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, and Milena Berić, executive director of the Krokodil association.
Pokuševski stressed that the use of spyware in Serbia is not only unlawful but also constitutes a criminal offence under the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to unauthorised collection of data, computer viruses and unauthorised access to protected devices and data. "Although the Criminal Procedure Code provides for special surveillance measures and interception of communications, the use of spyware goes beyond those provisions and cannot be justified, because it enables full access to all data on a device, not just to communication channels. The use of spyware for covert surveillance and recording of communications does not meet the principles of necessity and proportionality, which are key to applying such measures. The same applies to the Law on the Security Intelligence Agency, which regulates the application of special measures," Pokuševski pointed out at the Council of Europe.
He also stated that the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly stressed that surveillance measures must be in accordance with the law, subject to independent oversight and applied only when strictly necessary and proportionate. "In addition to the absence of a legal basis for the use of spyware, practice has shown that the safeguards provided for by the Constitution and the laws are not effective. Decisions on applying surveillance measures in criminal proceedings are entrusted to the judiciary, and none of these measures can be carried out without prior court approval. A judge should also assess whether it is necessary to take certain measures at all and, if so, whether the information could be obtained by applying less intrusive measures. However, the cases documented by Amnesty International show that court decisions either do not exist or are issued pro forma, without a real assessment of the necessity of such measures. Moreover, independent mechanisms for oversight and monitoring of covert surveillance in Serbia, including the Protector of Citizens and the Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, have traditionally been extremely reluctant to engage in such investigations," Pokuševski stressed.
Milena Berić is a Krokodil activist who was under BIA surveillance measures and who is mentioned in Amnesty International's report. She described the event that led to her interview at BIA, which took place on 20 September 2024, when a group of hooligans speaking Russian burst into the organisation's premises and cut the ties holding a Ukrainian flag. Police representatives appeared quickly after receiving Krokodil's report, but left without making a record, which is why she personally demanded accountability from BIA, and this was followed by an invitation to come for an informal interview on 1 October.
She said she had left her jacket and phone outside the room where she was being questioned, and after the meeting, when she collected her personal belongings, she noticed a notification on her phone indicating that all her contacts had been exported. "I took a screenshot and sent it to BIA with a simple question: Why? At that moment, I realised I was seeking protection and accountability from those who support the perpetrators. I felt as if I was fighting a losing battle. Instead of providing us with protection, institutions funded by the citizens of Serbia made me even more vulnerable," Milena Berić stressed.
She says she contacted Amnesty International and 10 days later its forensic experts confirmed that illegal tracking software had been installed on her phone during the visit to BIA, and 14 days later they established that the IP address collecting her data was located at a BIA address. "I saw my personal photos and other data that are now in the hands of the state," she said, stressing that for the first time she was truly afraid for her own safety and that of her family, colleagues and friends.
BIRN journalists targeted by Pegasus
A forensic analysis by Amnesty International confirmed that two BIRN journalists had been the targets of a failed attempt to install Pegasus on their phones. A message in Serbian, containing an infected link, was sent via Viber from a number registered with Telekom Srbija. Both journalists received the message on 14 February 2025 from the same number, which from that date until the publication of the article on this case (27 March 2025) was unreachable.It all looked like a message from a potential source wanting to tip them off about some information, but the unusual link and unknown sender raised suspicions that it was phishing. After it was suspected that the messages were an attempt to install spyware on the journalists' phones, BIRN turned to Amnesty International's Security Lab for help. Their forensic analysis confirmed that these were Pegasus spyware attacks.
"We found that the text messages contain links to a Serbian-language internet domain which we can say with a high degree of certainty is linked to NSO Group's Pegasus spyware," said Donncha Ó Cearbhaill.
Amnesty International concluded that in both cases of the BIRN journalists this was an attempted Pegasus infection using the "one-click" method. Both messages and links were sent just one hour apart, from the same Viber number, to two journalists working in the same newsroom.
One of the journalists, who insisted on anonymity, said she was absolutely furious about the attempt to install Pegasus. "It was a phone registered in my name and I felt as if I had an intruder in my own home. It's a very disturbing feeling... I was extremely worried about my sources, who could have been put at risk because they communicated with me."
The other journalist, Jelena Veljković, said she was not overly frightened by the attempt to target her with Pegasus, but that it was very unpleasant. "It was my private phone, which I also use for work, and a virus like Pegasus, which is not at all selective and can access everything on someone's phone, can have consequences for my family too."
"This was a targeted attack on investigative journalists, a form of pressure and a warning. Whether it was an attack on me personally or on BIRN as a media outlet, I'm not sure," Jelena Veljković stressed.
Amnesty International shared its findings with NSO Group, which replied that it could not comment on specific current or former customers and that, in line with its policy, it could not disclose information about the technical specifications, functionality or operational characteristics of its products.
These findings, as Amnesty International pointed out, are further evidence that the Serbian authorities are misusing highly invasive spyware products and other digital surveillance technologies to target journalists, activists and other members of civil society, at a time when Serbia has been shaken by mass student protests since November 2024. "The Serbian authorities must stop using highly invasive spyware, provide victims of unlawful targeted surveillance with effective legal protection and hold those responsible for rights violations to account," Amnesty International stresses. Its message to NSO Group is that it must stop selling Pegasus and suspend the use of its products in Serbia.
EU reaction
On 7 May 2025, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Serbia in which it expressed deep concern that the Serbian authorities, according to recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation, had carried out widespread practices of unlawful surveillance using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society.It called on the Government of Serbia to immediately stop using advanced surveillance technologies against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware, and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible.
The European Parliament called on the European Commission, bearing this in mind, to monitor further developments in these cases, raise these issues in talks with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation of all the cases mentioned.
Renewed reaction from the NGO sector
At the end of May, ten civil society organisations filed a supplement to the criminal complaint over the forced unlocking and spyware infection of the mobile phones of a student activist and a journalist, which took place at the end of 2024.It was recalled that, after the publication of Amnesty International's report at the end of 2024, the ten organisations activated all available legal protection mechanisms. In addition to the criminal complaint against members of the police and BIA filed with the Prosecutor's Office for High-Tech Crime, a request was sent to the Protector of Citizens to open an inquiry into the work of these bodies on its own initiative, as well as a complaint from one of the journalists who had been targeted. A request was also submitted to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection to initiate oversight of the work of these bodies.
They state that it has remained unknown what steps these institutions have taken to establish the lawfulness of the conduct of the police and BIA, as well as the responsibility of the persons who carried out these surveillance actions.
"Unlawful surveillance by state structures has continued, as at the end of March an attempted Pegasus spyware attack on two BIRN journalists was also confirmed. There are also clear indications that there are other cases of unlawful digital surveillance; it is also clear that the state bodies responsible for security matters are unlawfully spying on activists and journalists, and in a large number of cases," stress the 10 organisations working on human rights protection.
These organisations appealed to the competent institutions, in line with the Constitution and laws of Serbia, as well as international standards, to react without delay in order to stop unlawful digital surveillance, as well as all other forms of pressure, and to establish the criminal responsibility of the persons who committed these acts.
Warning to those detained after Vidovdan 2025
On Vidovdan (St Vitus Day), 28 June 2025, a rally was held on Slavija Square in Belgrade at which, at the call of Students in Blockade, around 140,000 people gathered. The rally itself passed peacefully, but immediately after it ended there were clashes between some of the demonstrators and the police at locations near Pionirski Park, which had been fenced off for months and where supporters of the Serbian Progressive Party are based.The next day, in a joint operation by the Belgrade Higher Public Prosecutor's Office, the police and the BIA, eight students, who had been tracked and wiretapped at the School of Electrical Engineering and the Faculty of Civil Engineering, were also detained on charges of having committed the criminal offences of preparing an offence against the constitutional order and security of Serbia and calling for a violent change of the constitutional order. The students had already given the "green light" for a wave of civil disobedience on the evening of 28 June, and the arrests were followed by protests and blockades across Serbia, which lasted throughout the summer.
During July and August, students and citizens who demonstrated in the streets were detained. Students in Blockade, with the help of IT Blokada, published a very detailed guide on how to behave at protests and what to do in case of detention. Journalists, activists and protest organisers were advised to use hardened mobile operating systems, to take anti-forensic measures that would make device analysis more difficult and to use full-disk encryption. It was also recommended that they consider using apps that create hidden, encrypted data containers, as well as security scanners and specialised security apps that offer a "panic button" or a "duress PIN". The list of recommendations also included the use of file-shredding apps.
Journalists, activists and protest organisers who had reason to believe they had been targeted by, for example, Pegasus were advised to immediately stop using the device for any sensitive communication, disconnect it from Wi-Fi and mobile networks and not to try to restore the device to factory settings or remove the malware themselves, because this would alert the attackers and destroy key forensic evidence needed for confirmation. "This is not a do-it-yourself situation. Contact a specialised organisation equipped to deal with such threats," the joint post by the students and IT Blokada states.
Those heading to protests and blockades were advised to leave their primary phone at home, and if they carried their primary phone, to keep it "clean" (with no personal data), turn off biometrics (face/fingerprint), use a long, alphanumeric passcode, use Signal for communication and turn on self-destructing messages.
Farmers spied on
On 4 December 2025, BIRN published an investigation, produced in cooperation with the SHARE Foundation, which revealed that BIA had inserted NoviSpy spyware into the phones of four farmers and environmental activists while they were detained. Because of their activism in agriculture or environmental movements, all of them had been summoned for interviews or detained at the premises of BIA and the police between July and October 2024, when mass protests were held in Serbia against Rio Tinto and for the fulfilment of farmers' demands.They are Slobodan Vidojević, a farmer from Bresnica (Čačak) and president of the Association of Milk Producers of Šumadija and Pomoravlje; Zlatko Kokanović, an activist of the association "Ne damo Jadar" and a resident of Gornje Nedeljice (Loznica); Vladimir Višić, a farmer from Stara Pazova and one of the founders of the Initiative for the Survival of Farmers of Serbia; and Jovan Topalović, a farmer from Lunovo Selo (Užice) and president of the citizens' association "Da (Ne) Dišemo Duboko".
On 1 October 2024, when a farmers' protest had been scheduled, Slobodan Vidojević was detained in the centre of the village around noon. Vidojević described the arrest to BIRN as "cinematic", because three officials "bundled" him into a black van, having first given him a "good" beating.
"They held me by the arms, and they took my phone when I got into the van. They drove via the village of Tavnik, made a loop and took me to the police station in Čačak, upstairs, to the BIA office," the farmer said, describing the arrest. The questioning lasted about two hours and he received a record of it.
For months after the detention, Vidojević heard crackling on the phone, the system kept freezing and the signal kept dropping. He also noticed that the battery and internet data were being used up faster than before. It was confirmed that NoviSpy software had been active on his phone for more than a year.
On 18 July 2024 at 8:15, Kokanović was summoned to a short informal interview at BIA, ahead of a trip to Belgrade where he was due to attend a meeting at the Government of Serbia with representatives of the authorities and the Ministry of Agriculture (Ana Brnabić, Miloš Vučević and Aleksandar Martinović) - scheduled for 13:30. He was held for about four hours at BIA's premises within the police station in Loznica. Before the meeting, he left his phone in the hallway, in a locker. "For the first 30 to 45 minutes the phone was with them, and then they gave it back to me so I could answer a call," Kokanović said, and BIRN points out that even this short time was enough for the officers to install NoviSpy on his phone, at exactly 9:38, monitoring his every subsequent activity. Kokanović says that he used the phone "infected" in this way "for a month or so and then articles based on phone conversations started coming out in the tabloids", and that after that month he got a new device and put the "infected" one aside.
Ahead of the protest against Rio Tinto held in Belgrade on 11 August 2024, Višić set off for Belgrade on his tractor, and at the entrance to the city, in Cara Dušana Street in Zemun, he was stopped by traffic police and taken to a police station. A traffic officer confiscated his phone, and three inspectors questioned him for between three and four hours. Months later, BIRN and experts from the SHARE Foundation checked the phone, which had also been infected.
On 10 September, Topalović was summoned for an interview at BIA; a BIA officer came to pick him up in a car, and they drove to Jelova Gora near Užice, where BIA has a facility. "We left our phones in the car, but it was their car. He told me to leave it so I wouldn't bring it inside, so that I wouldn't record them, nor they me. In the office they cross-examined me, there were two of them. So they ask me where do you know this one from, that one from...," said Topalović, noting that protests against Rio Tinto were ongoing at the time, so the questioning came down to his acquaintances with other eco-activists. "The interview lasted maybe an hour. When it was over, the phone was where I had left it, next to the gearstick in the car." It would turn out that Topalović's phone was infected that day.
NoviSpy is spyware developed within BIA, which since 2018 has been communicating with a server registered to an operative of that service. It works by silently taking screenshots of the phone and sending them to a server at BIA, capturing messages as they are typed, app correspondence, photos, contacts, and even the windows of banking and other apps. In the case of former police general Slobodan Malešić, about whom BIRN has previously written, the same type of software took hundreds of screenshots a day for days, recording everything from the music he listens to, to message conversations, to notes and private photos that were never meant for others.
