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The European Commission has published its 2026 Rule of Law report on Serbia. The picture it paints is of a country where the formal reform agenda keeps moving - new laws, new strategies, new opinions requested from the Venice Commission - while the substance of the rule of law continues to erode in practice. Political pressure on institutions has increased, the space for civil society has narrowed, and the safety of journalists has deteriorated. CRTA was among the organisations the Commission consulted during its March 2026 country visit, and several of the concerns the report raises - the voter register, the integrity of institutions, the checks that should hold power accountable - are ones we have documented throughout the year.
Below we go through the report's four pillars and what each means for citizens of Serbia.
Below we go through the report's four pillars and what each means for citizens of Serbia.
Justice: reforms that took a step back
The report's central finding on the judiciary is that Serbia legislated away some of the very safeguards it had built in. In January 2026, Parliament amended five laws on the proposal of a single member of Parliament, in an urgent procedure and without meaningful consultation. The Venice Commission's April 2026 urgent opinion found that these amendments removed protections for prosecutorial autonomy and judicial independence that the 2023 constitutional reform had introduced. After Serbia prepared new measures in May and June, the Venice Commission's follow-up opinion of 16 June concluded that the majority of its recommendations had been addressed, and on 18 June the High Prosecutorial Council reinstated the last two prosecutors whose secondments had been cut. The damage was partly repaired - but only after international scrutiny. As the report puts it, "concerns regarding prosecutorial autonomy remain and the effectiveness and confidentiality of criminal investigations are hampered by shortcomings in law and practice."
The report is blunt that political pressure on the judiciary and prosecution increased significantly, with little follow-up from the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, the Government or Parliament. Perceived judicial independence remains low: only 36% of the general public rate it as fairly or very good (up from 30% in 2025), while among companies it is now average at 57%. Ten new judges were appointed to the Constitutional Court in December 2025 with three seats still vacant, and the new Court president drew criticism for public comments about dismissing judges who oppose the government. On efficiency, civil and commercial cases held steady, but there is a negative trend in criminal cases and unaddressed problems with administrative cases and constitutional complaints.
The report is blunt that political pressure on the judiciary and prosecution increased significantly, with little follow-up from the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils, the Government or Parliament. Perceived judicial independence remains low: only 36% of the general public rate it as fairly or very good (up from 30% in 2025), while among companies it is now average at 57%. Ten new judges were appointed to the Constitutional Court in December 2025 with three seats still vacant, and the new Court president drew criticism for public comments about dismissing judges who oppose the government. On efficiency, civil and commercial cases held steady, but there is a negative trend in criminal cases and unaddressed problems with administrative cases and constitutional complaints.
Anti-corruption: announcements without a track record
On corruption, perception is worsening. Serbia scored 33 out of 100 on Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking 116th globally - a score that has deteriorated over five years (it was 38 in 2021). In the Eurobarometer, 84% of respondents consider corruption widespread.
The report confirms what the numbers on paper already suggested: a majority of the previous Anti-Corruption Action Plan was never delivered. Of 143 planned activities, only 43% were fully implemented, and around 80% were simply carried over into the new 2026-2028 Action Plan adopted on 4 June 2026. More telling is the gap between announcement and result. The high-profile anti-corruption operation of February to April 2025 saw over 153 people arrested, but many were released and it produced no systemic investigations, indictments or final convictions. Serbia still has no robust track record of final convictions in high-level corruption.
Two cases stand out. The report notes concerns about obstacles and undue influence on the Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime, whose capacity was directly weakened when the January judicial amendments ended the secondments of 11 of its prosecutors. And the investigation into the deadly collapse of part of the renovated Novi Sad railway station remains ongoing. The report is unusually specific about how the domestic case has been obstructed: the POOC task force set up for the investigation ceased its activities in September 2025 after the Ministry of the Interior removed 17 of its experienced members, which impeded indictments and led the Belgrade Higher Court to lift the detention measures for the accused. Running in parallel is an investigation by the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), launched in March 2025 into the reconstruction of the station, which the report says is ongoing. The source the report relies on is a public statement by EPPO chief prosecutor Laura Kövesi that the office is investigating the possible misuse of EU funds in the renovation - a dimension that has drawn little attention in Serbia's public debate. Weaknesses persist on asset declarations and conflicts of interest, the Lobbying Law remains too narrow, amendments to the Law on financing of political activities were adopted but not yet assessed against OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, and exemptions to the public procurement rules continue to be used widely to bypass anti-corruption safeguards.
The report confirms what the numbers on paper already suggested: a majority of the previous Anti-Corruption Action Plan was never delivered. Of 143 planned activities, only 43% were fully implemented, and around 80% were simply carried over into the new 2026-2028 Action Plan adopted on 4 June 2026. More telling is the gap between announcement and result. The high-profile anti-corruption operation of February to April 2025 saw over 153 people arrested, but many were released and it produced no systemic investigations, indictments or final convictions. Serbia still has no robust track record of final convictions in high-level corruption.
Serbia still has no robust track record of final convictions in high-level corruption.
Two cases stand out. The report notes concerns about obstacles and undue influence on the Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime, whose capacity was directly weakened when the January judicial amendments ended the secondments of 11 of its prosecutors. And the investigation into the deadly collapse of part of the renovated Novi Sad railway station remains ongoing. The report is unusually specific about how the domestic case has been obstructed: the POOC task force set up for the investigation ceased its activities in September 2025 after the Ministry of the Interior removed 17 of its experienced members, which impeded indictments and led the Belgrade Higher Court to lift the detention measures for the accused. Running in parallel is an investigation by the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), launched in March 2025 into the reconstruction of the station, which the report says is ongoing. The source the report relies on is a public statement by EPPO chief prosecutor Laura Kövesi that the office is investigating the possible misuse of EU funds in the renovation - a dimension that has drawn little attention in Serbia's public debate. Weaknesses persist on asset declarations and conflicts of interest, the Lobbying Law remains too narrow, amendments to the Law on financing of political activities were adopted but not yet assessed against OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, and exemptions to the public procurement rules continue to be used widely to bypass anti-corruption safeguards.
Media: a regulator finally moving, a climate still deteriorating
For most of the reporting period, Serbia's audiovisual market operated without a functioning REM Council - the regulator's decision-making body had been empty since November 2024. In early July 2026, the National Assembly relaunched the process by adopting an authentic interpretation of the Law on electronic media, addressing the concerns of the four Council members who had resigned and paving the way for their return. It is a step forward, but it arrived after more than a year and a half of regulatory vacuum during which some channels broadcast without a licence and RT Balkans continued to air via state-owned Telekom Srbija.
Around this, the report describes a climate that is getting worse. Political and economic influence over the media is called a serious concern, against a backdrop of further market concentration. Public co-funding continues to reach outlets that violate the Journalists' code of ethics; the Press Council received 185 complaints in 2025, more than double the 88 of the previous year. The independence of public service media deteriorated into a very high-risk area (85% on the Media Pluralism Monitor), and concerns over limited pluralism and pro-government bias persisted. The report offers a stark illustration: aggregated data for April 2026 showed that the ruling majority received 95% of airtime in RTS's central news broadcast, against just 5% for opposition parties. Both public broadcasters were strongly criticised by civil society and media associations for failing to report on the student protests, or for reporting on them in a politically slanted way, and some journalist redundancies at RTS were reportedly in retaliation for staff's personal social and political views. Most seriously, the safety of journalists has further deteriorated, with more physical attacks and threats, alongside continued use of SLAPP lawsuits and spyware against reporters.
Around this, the report describes a climate that is getting worse. Political and economic influence over the media is called a serious concern, against a backdrop of further market concentration. Public co-funding continues to reach outlets that violate the Journalists' code of ethics; the Press Council received 185 complaints in 2025, more than double the 88 of the previous year. The independence of public service media deteriorated into a very high-risk area (85% on the Media Pluralism Monitor), and concerns over limited pluralism and pro-government bias persisted. The report offers a stark illustration: aggregated data for April 2026 showed that the ruling majority received 95% of airtime in RTS's central news broadcast, against just 5% for opposition parties. Both public broadcasters were strongly criticised by civil society and media associations for failing to report on the student protests, or for reporting on them in a politically slanted way, and some journalist redundancies at RTS were reportedly in retaliation for staff's personal social and political views. Most seriously, the safety of journalists has further deteriorated, with more physical attacks and threats, alongside continued use of SLAPP lawsuits and spyware against reporters.
Checks and balances: where the accountability gap is widest
This is the pillar where the report's findings connect most directly to CRTA's work, and where the erosion is clearest.
On elections, the report registers movement but not delivery. Amendments to four election-related laws were adopted in May 2026, further legislation is being prepared following ODIHR opinions, and the commission for the audit of the Voter register has started work - but meaningful data access and full implementation remain to be completed. In other words, the recognition that the Voter register needs an independent audit is now on paper; the audit itself is not yet real.
Parliament's oversight function remains weak. There was no genuine debate on the substance of legislation, plenary sessions were repeatedly convened on short notice, unrelated items were bundled together to frustrate scrutiny, and the monthly question time with the Prime Minister was not held once in 2026. The exercise of presidential powers remains intensely debated: the report notes that the President has pardoned individuals charged with severely harming protesters and signalled possible pardons for senior officials in criminal proceedings, raising direct concerns about interference in the independence of the judiciary. The legal framework for public consultations has deteriorated, with the share of draft laws put to consultation falling from 58% to 51%.
The findings on civil society are among the sharpest in the report. The space for civil society was downgraded to "repressed" by CIVICUS. Organisations that criticise the authorities, monitor electoral irregularities or campaign for the rule of law faced pressure and intimidation, including from high-level officials; the February 2025 police search of four CSOs led to no charges and was widely read as intimidation. Student and civic protests continued, with a large protest on 23 May 2026, while the Security Information Agency's "informative talks" with protesters were perceived as pressure. Cases of excessive use of force by the police, including against journalists and minors, have led to few convictions, and there has been no credible follow-up on the alleged use of a sonic weapon at the March 2025 Belgrade demonstration.
On elections, the report registers movement but not delivery. Amendments to four election-related laws were adopted in May 2026, further legislation is being prepared following ODIHR opinions, and the commission for the audit of the Voter register has started work - but meaningful data access and full implementation remain to be completed. In other words, the recognition that the Voter register needs an independent audit is now on paper; the audit itself is not yet real.
Parliament's oversight function remains weak. There was no genuine debate on the substance of legislation, plenary sessions were repeatedly convened on short notice, unrelated items were bundled together to frustrate scrutiny, and the monthly question time with the Prime Minister was not held once in 2026. The exercise of presidential powers remains intensely debated: the report notes that the President has pardoned individuals charged with severely harming protesters and signalled possible pardons for senior officials in criminal proceedings, raising direct concerns about interference in the independence of the judiciary. The legal framework for public consultations has deteriorated, with the share of draft laws put to consultation falling from 58% to 51%.
Organisations that criticise the authorities, monitor electoral irregularities or campaign for the rule of law faced pressure and intimidation, including from high-level officials
The findings on civil society are among the sharpest in the report. The space for civil society was downgraded to "repressed" by CIVICUS. Organisations that criticise the authorities, monitor electoral irregularities or campaign for the rule of law faced pressure and intimidation, including from high-level officials; the February 2025 police search of four CSOs led to no charges and was widely read as intimidation. Student and civic protests continued, with a large protest on 23 May 2026, while the Security Information Agency's "informative talks" with protesters were perceived as pressure. Cases of excessive use of force by the police, including against journalists and minors, have led to few convictions, and there has been no credible follow-up on the alleged use of a sonic weapon at the March 2025 Belgrade demonstration.
What it adds up to
Taken together, the findings show too little progress to call Serbia a country advancing on reform - and they explain, in concrete terms, why it is stuck on its European path. Under the EU's revised enlargement methodology, opening new negotiating clusters depends on progress in exactly the areas this report covers: the judiciary, the fight against corruption, and democratic institutions including media freedom. That is why Cluster 3, technically ready since 2021, has still not been opened: in July 2026 the required unanimity among member states was not reached, with rule-of-law concerns cited among the reasons. This report is, in effect, the explanation.
