ODIHR recommends its largest recent observation mission for Serbia’s early elections

From 6 to 10 July 2026, ODIHR sent a Needs Assessment Mission to Serbia to decide whether, and how, to observe the early elections, expected later in the year after a round of electoral legislative reform, meeting the authorities, parties, media, civil society, academia and international actors, CRTA among them. Such a report is not ODIHR's verdict on the elections: it sets out the facts and the competing positions of the authorities and other stakeholders, identifying problems and sensitive points rather than reaching conclusions.

On 30 July it published its recommendation - a full Election Observation Mission, with a core team of analysts, 32 long-term observers and 300 short-term observers for election day, plus media monitoring and an assessment of disinformation and interference. That is the largest mission ODIHR has proposed for Serbia in over a decade, with about 20% more election-day observers than in 2023 - an increase that tracks the depth of the concerns raised.

Those concerns start with the climate itself. The elections are expected in a deeply polarised environment, reshaped by the student-led protests that followed the November 2024 collapse of the Novi Sad railway-station canopy, in which 16 people died, with interlocutors pointing to declining trust in institutions and a real risk of post-election disputes and violence.

On the rules, the report records legislative movement since 2023 - a voter-register audit, mandatory training for officials, first-ever campaign spending limits, rules for third-party campaigning - but finds many longstanding ODIHR recommendations still unmet, and opposition and civil society described the reforms as selective and insufficiently inclusive. What matters, interlocutors stressed, is not the adoption of these changes but whether they are implemented.

Doubts extend to the institutions meant to apply the rules. Several told the mission they lack the capacity for their new tasks; the media regulator had been paralysed for some 20 months and resumed work only in July, while interlocutors questioned the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agency meant to police campaign finance.

CRTA reads the size of the recommended mission as a measure of the risk, not a solution to it. A strong observation presence can deter manipulation, but it cannot replace reform. The credibility of these elections will depend on whether the changes are implemented in good faith - and whether the systemic problems ODIHR has flagged for years are finally addressed.

ODIHR deployed its Needs Assessment Mission from 6 to 10 July 2026, following a 23 June letter from the Speaker of the National Assembly and repeated public statements by President Aleksandar Vučić and other senior officials indicating that early elections would be held later in the year. The mission's task was to assess the pre-election environment and recommend whether ODIHR should deploy an election-related activity and, if so, of what kind.

It met a broad range of interlocutors, including state institutions, the Republic Electoral Commission, parties across the spectrum, journalists, academia, the international community and civil society organisations, CRTA among them.

It is worth being clear about what this kind of report is - and is not. A needs assessment does not deliver ODIHR's verdict on the elections, the electoral reform or the amended laws. It sets out the undisputed facts of the process - the laws adopted, the institutions in place, the key figures - alongside the positions of the authorities and state institutions on one side and those of other stakeholders, from opposition parties to civil society and the media, on the other, while offering very few conclusions of ODIHR's own. Its purpose is to identify the needs, problems and sensitive points around the elections and to recommend whether, and how, ODIHR should observe. ODIHR's actual assessment of how these elections are run will come later, through the observation mission and its post-election report. The findings below should therefore be read as a map of the concerns raised, not as a judgment already reached.

The report's central recommendation is unambiguous: ODIHR will deploy a full Election Observation Mission. Alongside a core team of analysts, it will request that OSCE participating States second 32 long-term observers to follow the process throughout the country and 300 short-term observers for election-day procedures. In line with its standard methodology, the mission will include media monitoring and will assess institutional preparedness against disinformation and foreign and domestic interference (FIMI/DIMI).

The significance of these figures becomes clear only in comparison with earlier missions. For the December 2023 early parliamentary elections, ODIHR deployed an EOM with a core team of 11 experts, 30 long-term observers and 250 requested short-term observers; for the April 2022 presidential and parliamentary elections, 15 core experts, 27 long-term observers and 250 short-term observers. ODIHR had, in fact, been recommending a full observation mission for Serbia well before it could deploy one: its needs assessments called for a full EOM ahead of both the 2017 presidential election - where the short timeframe left room only for an assessment mission - and the 2020 parliamentary elections, where the 30 long-term and 200 short-term observers it recommended were cut to a limited mission by the pandemic and an opposition boycott. A full EOM was actually fielded only from 2022; earlier still, the 2012, 2014 and 2016 elections drew only limited missions, with around a dozen long-term observers and no systematic election-day observation.

Against that backdrop, the recommended 2026 mission is the largest ODIHR has proposed for Serbia in over a decade, exceeding both the missions it deployed in 2022 and 2023 and those it recommended in 2017 and 2020. Mission size is not a neutral technical parameter but is calibrated to the assessed needs: the step up to 32 long-term and 300 short-term observers is not a formality - it tracks the depth of the concerns interlocutors raised. The rise in short-term observers alone, from 250 to 300, reflects heightened attention to election-day conduct - the area interlocutors flagged over the irregularities and pseudo-observers documented at the 29 March 2026 local elections.

All interlocutors, including the authorities, welcomed an observation activity and stressed the importance of a large-scale, long-term and country-wide presence, several noting that a robust international presence could increase public confidence, reduce tensions and deter irregularities and violence.

The report acknowledges legislative movement since the 2023 elections. Amendments have introduced a periodic independent audit of the voter register and an Audit Commission, mandatory training and certification of election officials, the possibility for voters to support more than one candidate list, clearer criteria for national minority electoral lists, and statutory deadlines for electoral disputes before the Constitutional Court. The Law on Financing Political Activities, adopted under urgent procedure on 9 July 2026, introduced campaign expenditure limits for the first time - EUR 6 million for parliamentary or presidential elections, EUR 7 million where a presidential race goes to a second round - along with a framework for third-party campaigning and expanded powers for the Agency for Prevention of Corruption.

Against these steps, the report is equally clear about what has not moved. Many longstanding ODIHR and GRECO recommendations remain unaddressed or only partially addressed: safeguards against the misuse of administrative resources, effective measures against intimidation and pressure on voters, proactive and transparent oversight of campaign finance, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, the independence and effective functioning of the media regulator, and balanced media coverage. Opposition and civil society interlocutors described the reform process as fragmented, selective and insufficiently inclusive - focused on technical amendments while leaving systemic concerns untouched - and questioned whether it would be implemented in good faith.

A single pattern runs through almost every chapter of the report: where the authorities voiced confidence, virtually every other interlocutor voiced doubt. Opposition parties, civil society, independent media and academia met by the mission questioned the impartiality and preparedness of institution after institution - the political neutrality of the election administration "at all levels", the consistency and impartiality of the courts that adjudicate electoral disputes, the effectiveness of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption, the independence of the media regulator, and even the police, amid the declining public trust in state institutions - and in law enforcement in particular - that those same interlocutors reported. ODIHR NAM report, 30 July 2026, Background and Political Context: interlocutors raised concerns about "declining public trust in state institutions, particularly law enforcement authorities". The government side, by contrast, presented each of these bodies as ready and functioning, attributing the difficulties to obstruction or to the opposition's refusal to co-operate.

Beyond the political debate over the reforms, several of the institutions responsible for administering the vote told the mission, in their own words, that the recently amended framework has added tasks they are not yet fully resourced to carry out. The Republic Electoral Commission (REC), while expressing confidence in its overall preparedness, noted that the newly introduced mandatory training and certification system, "combined with the compressed pre-election timeframe, may pose challenges for its effective implementation", and that producing ballot papers and materials in over 20 recognised minority languages "continues to present operational challenges". The Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government, which maintains the voter register, informed the mission "of the need for additional technical staff to ensure the timely and efficient implementation of its responsibilities". The Administrative Court, for its part, reported that election-related cases "continue to place a significant additional burden on the Court during electoral periods without a corresponding increase in human resources" - a strain it expects to be greater still if presidential and parliamentary elections are held simultaneously. ODIHR NAM report, 30 July 2026, sections on Election Administration, Voter Registration and Electoral Dispute Resolution.

Two of the bodies most central to a level playing field draw particular concern - not over workload, but over whether they function at all. The Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) was left without a functioning Council for some 20 months and resumed work only on 10-11 July 2026, after the National Assembly adopted an authentic interpretation to break the deadlock. Interlocutors described how the vacuum had "significantly affected REM's responsiveness" in overseeing broadcasters, licensing and complaints, leaving a backlog the report puts at over 100 pending cases; its ability to clear that backlog fairly and on time is seen as a key test of its independence during the campaign. The Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC), which supervises campaign finance and the use of public resources, expressed confidence in its readiness - yet many interlocutors continued to question "the effectiveness of the APC's oversight and enforcement", and in particular "its ability to proactively detect and address violations". Those doubts are sharpened by the new spending limits and third-party rules the Agency is now expected to police, and by longstanding ODIHR and GRECO recommendations on proactive oversight that remain unaddressed. ODIHR NAM report, 30 July 2026, sections on Media and Party and Campaign Finance.

The mission situates the elections in a highly polarised political and social environment, reshaped by the student-led protests and broader civic mobilisation that followed the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad in November 2024, which killed 16 people. Interlocutors raised concerns about the exercise of fundamental freedoms, declining public trust in institutions, and the risk of post-election disputes and violence.

Recurring themes cut across the report's chapters: the disparity in resources between contestants, the potential misuse of administrative resources and pressure on public-sector employees and voters, a deteriorating environment for journalists and independent media, and unresolved questions about the neutrality of the election administration. The functioning of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) - which resumed work only on 10-11 July 2026 after a prolonged deadlock - remains, in ODIHR's words, a matter of particular importance and a benchmark in Serbia's EU accession process.

ODIHR's decision to recommend its most robust recent mission is itself a signal about the state of Serbia's electoral process. CRTA welcomes a large-scale, long-term and country-wide observation presence: in a polarised environment it can strengthen public confidence, deter irregularities and provide an independent benchmark against manipulation. But the size of an observation mission is a response to risk, not a remedy for it. The reforms adopted since 2023 have addressed a number of technical recommendations while leaving the systemic ones - the fusion of state and ruling party, administrative resources, pressure on voters, campaign finance oversight, media balance, dissuasive sanctions - unresolved. The credibility of these elections will depend not on how many recommendations were formally checked off before the vote, but on whether they are implemented in good faith. A robust ODIHR mission raises the cost of manipulation; only genuine reform removes it.