Observation methodology in an election year
CRTA Election Observation Mission is not an activity confined to election day; it is a permanent, independent civic infrastructure that brings together long-term observation of the pre-election period, statistically based observation of election day, observation of every step up to the closing of the final election results, legal analysis and support, robust and secure systems for collecting and processing data, and regular public reporting.
A comprehensive approach of this kind is not an option but a necessity: as oversight of election day itself becomes more developed, actors with an interest in shaping the electoral outcome irregularly increasingly direct their activity at the period preceding the official calling of elections. Manipulation of the voter register, influence over the media, the misuse of public resources and public office, the erosion of the line between the state and a political party contrary to the OSCE's 1990 Copenhagen Document, and restrictions on political competition or on various human and civil rights can all undermine the equality of political contest and the right of citizens to choose freely well before voting begins. Credible observation therefore cannot begin only at the moment elections are called; it must also cover the practices and institutional changes that shape electoral conditions months, and even years, in advance.
The working methodology of CRTA Election Observation Mission rests on internationally recognised standards for non-partisan and impartial election observation: the Declaration of Global Principles for Non-partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations and the accompanying Code of Conduct for Non-partisan Citizen Election Observers and Monitors, adopted at the United Nations in 2012, and the complementary Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers. These standards are recognised and supported by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and other international bodies.
In line with this approach, in ordinary circumstances CRTA begins long-term observation at the start of the election year Carries over from the Serbian document. and widens its scope further once elections are officially called. This report covers precisely that period of long-term observation before elections are called - in this case snap elections - from March to the end of August, and in some cases from the beginning of 2026. CRTA Election Observation Mission followed: the quality of political and media pluralism and reporting; the quality of the legislative and institutional framework for elections; the conduct of holders of public office, of political parties and of other actors in the field; the conditions for equal political contest; respect for human and civil rights; and the integrity of the voter register.
A comprehensive approach of this kind is not an option but a necessity: as oversight of election day itself becomes more developed, actors with an interest in shaping the electoral outcome irregularly increasingly direct their activity at the period preceding the official calling of elections. Manipulation of the voter register, influence over the media, the misuse of public resources and public office, the erosion of the line between the state and a political party contrary to the OSCE's 1990 Copenhagen Document, and restrictions on political competition or on various human and civil rights can all undermine the equality of political contest and the right of citizens to choose freely well before voting begins. Credible observation therefore cannot begin only at the moment elections are called; it must also cover the practices and institutional changes that shape electoral conditions months, and even years, in advance.
The working methodology of CRTA Election Observation Mission rests on internationally recognised standards for non-partisan and impartial election observation: the Declaration of Global Principles for Non-partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations and the accompanying Code of Conduct for Non-partisan Citizen Election Observers and Monitors, adopted at the United Nations in 2012, and the complementary Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers. These standards are recognised and supported by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and other international bodies.
In line with this approach, in ordinary circumstances CRTA begins long-term observation at the start of the election year Carries over from the Serbian document. and widens its scope further once elections are officially called. This report covers precisely that period of long-term observation before elections are called - in this case snap elections - from March to the end of August, and in some cases from the beginning of 2026. CRTA Election Observation Mission followed: the quality of political and media pluralism and reporting; the quality of the legislative and institutional framework for elections; the conduct of holders of public office, of political parties and of other actors in the field; the conditions for equal political contest; respect for human and civil rights; and the integrity of the voter register.
Observation of the legal and institutional framework
The legal team of CRTA Election Observation Mission followed and analysed the amendments to five electoral laws and to the Law on Prevention of Corruption and the Law on Financing of Political Activities adopted over the summer of 2026, assessing their alignment with ODIHR's recommendations and with international standards. CRTA also analysed the readiness of the competent institutions - the Republic Electoral Commission, the Agency for Prevention of Corruption, the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media, the judiciary and the Ministry of the Interior - to apply the laws effectively. The mission also followed the work of the Commission for the Audit, Verification and Control of the Accuracy and Updating of the Voter Register, including the information and complaints concerning the voter register that 97 citizens submitted to CRTA between March and the beginning of September 2026.
On the basis of the irregularities established, the legal team of CRTA Election Observation Mission submitted seven complaints to the Agency for Prevention of Corruption during the observation period, as well as an initiative and requests for access to information addressed to other bodies, which are reported on in more detail in the relevant chapters of this report.
On the basis of the irregularities established, the legal team of CRTA Election Observation Mission submitted seven complaints to the Agency for Prevention of Corruption during the observation period, as well as an initiative and requests for access to information addressed to other bodies, which are reported on in more detail in the relevant chapters of this report.
Methodology for observing actors' activities in the field
CRTA Election Observation Mission began long-term observation in the field on 7 May 2026. This report is based on some 8,000 observations by observers and more than 100 conversations with relevant political actors and citizens.
The observation covers the daily monitoring of 318 online sources - the websites and accounts of public institutions, officials, political parties and other political actors, as well as regional and local portals. The fieldwork covers the direct monitoring of events across Serbia and conversations with citizens and relevant actors, in order to gather testimony, document cases and verify allegations.
The data collected are analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively, with a focus on the activities of public authorities and political actors and on phenomena capable of undermining the principles of free elections. Cases of particular significance are examined further through document analysis, fieldwork and consultation with experts, with sources cross-checked.
On the basis of the irregularities established, the legal team of CRTA Election Observation Mission submitted seven complaints to the Agency for Prevention of Corruption during the observation period, as well as an initiative and requests for access to information addressed to other bodies, which are reported on in more detail in the relevant chapters of this report.
The observation covers the daily monitoring of 318 online sources - the websites and accounts of public institutions, officials, political parties and other political actors, as well as regional and local portals. The fieldwork covers the direct monitoring of events across Serbia and conversations with citizens and relevant actors, in order to gather testimony, document cases and verify allegations.
The data collected are analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively, with a focus on the activities of public authorities and political actors and on phenomena capable of undermining the principles of free elections. Cases of particular significance are examined further through document analysis, fieldwork and consultation with experts, with sources cross-checked.
On the basis of the irregularities established, the legal team of CRTA Election Observation Mission submitted seven complaints to the Agency for Prevention of Corruption during the observation period, as well as an initiative and requests for access to information addressed to other bodies, which are reported on in more detail in the relevant chapters of this report.
Methodology for observing pluralism in the media
A distinct part of the long-term observation concerned monitoring political pluralism in the programming of Radio Television of Serbia. The observation covered the main news programme Dnevnik 2 on RTS 1, broadcast at 19:30, between 1 April and 31 August 2026. The unit of analysis was the time political actors were presented in the programme, expressed in seconds, and the total size of the sample analysed was 80,377 seconds of programming.
For every appearance of a political actor in the programme, the role in which they appeared was also recorded, in two categories: an active role, where the political actor addresses the audience directly in the first person, whether through a statement, an address or a studio appearance; and a passive role, where the political actor is only mentioned by another political actor or by a journalist in an item, without addressing the audience directly. This distinction allowed CRTA Election Observation Mission to assess not only the total presence of individual actors and political options but also the quality of that presence - that is, whether political actors shape their own media narrative or are reported on indirectly, through the statements of other actors or of journalists.
For every appearance of a political actor in the programme, the role in which they appeared was also recorded, in two categories: an active role, where the political actor addresses the audience directly in the first person, whether through a statement, an address or a studio appearance; and a passive role, where the political actor is only mentioned by another political actor or by a journalist in an item, without addressing the audience directly. This distinction allowed CRTA Election Observation Mission to assess not only the total presence of individual actors and political options but also the quality of that presence - that is, whether political actors shape their own media narrative or are reported on indirectly, through the statements of other actors or of journalists.
Methodology for tracking media narratives
Alongside the quantitative monitoring of pluralism, between 1 January and 31 August 2026 CRTA Election Observation Mission also carried out systematic tracking of dominant narratives and of manipulative content in the media. The monitoring covered the front pages of nine daily newspapers - Informer, Kurir, Večernje novosti, Politika, Alo!, Srpski telegraf, Danas, Nova and Blic - and the teasers of the main news programmes of five television stations: RTS 1, Pink, Prva, Informer TV and B92. The unit of analysis was the individual headline, or the teaser in a main news programme, identified as manipulative, with every appearance recorded separately, including repetitions of the same or similar content.
Every manipulative headline was processed from the perspective of three independent dimensions. The first is the subject, coded at two levels - a broader category (for example domestic politics, the rule of law and the judiciary, media and information, Kosovo, foreign policy and international relations) and a more specific subject within it (for example the election campaign, the misuse of public powers and resources, the law on foreign agents, disinformation and information integrity). CRTA developed 24 categories and 99 specific subjects in total.
The second dimension is the narrative, also coded at two levels - through 18 principal narrative frames (such as discrediting those who hold different political views; glorifying the current authorities and President Aleksandar Vučić; criticising and discrediting the authorities and President Aleksandar Vučić; self-victimisation; and discrediting or glorifying the European Union, the United States, Russia, China and the neighbours of Serbia) and the specific subjects that make up each frame.
The third dimension is the source of the content, coded through the origin of the information (state institution, branch of government, independent institution, political party or movement, civil society organisation, expert or analyst, citizen, media outlet, anonymous source and other) and the channel through which the information was conveyed, that is the specific outlet or agency carrying the content, whether domestic, regional or international.
This multidimensional approach enabled CRTA Election Observation Mission to track not only the frequency and intensity of manipulative content but also its distribution across subjects, the dominant narrative patterns and their sources, providing a precise and verifiable basis for assessing the integrity of the information space in an election year.
Every manipulative headline was processed from the perspective of three independent dimensions. The first is the subject, coded at two levels - a broader category (for example domestic politics, the rule of law and the judiciary, media and information, Kosovo, foreign policy and international relations) and a more specific subject within it (for example the election campaign, the misuse of public powers and resources, the law on foreign agents, disinformation and information integrity). CRTA developed 24 categories and 99 specific subjects in total.
The second dimension is the narrative, also coded at two levels - through 18 principal narrative frames (such as discrediting those who hold different political views; glorifying the current authorities and President Aleksandar Vučić; criticising and discrediting the authorities and President Aleksandar Vučić; self-victimisation; and discrediting or glorifying the European Union, the United States, Russia, China and the neighbours of Serbia) and the specific subjects that make up each frame.
The third dimension is the source of the content, coded through the origin of the information (state institution, branch of government, independent institution, political party or movement, civil society organisation, expert or analyst, citizen, media outlet, anonymous source and other) and the channel through which the information was conveyed, that is the specific outlet or agency carrying the content, whether domestic, regional or international.
This multidimensional approach enabled CRTA Election Observation Mission to track not only the frequency and intensity of manipulative content but also its distribution across subjects, the dominant narrative patterns and their sources, providing a precise and verifiable basis for assessing the integrity of the information space in an election year.
The next phases of election observation
Once snap parliamentary elections are called, CRTA's observation methodology will widen its scope in line with established standards. Long-term observation will continue until the final results are declared, with additional monitoring of the work of the Republic Electoral Commission and of the local electoral commissions, of the candidacies of candidate lists, and of the protection of electoral rights.
Election-day observation will be carried out on a scientifically determined, random and representative sample of around 500 polling stations, where statistically based observation of the course of voting will be accompanied by a parallel vote tabulation (quick count) in order to verify the officially announced results independently. At each polling station in the sample, up to four observers are to be deployed in two shifts, morning and afternoon, ensuring continuous monitoring of the entire course of voting, quality control of the data and greater safety for observers. After election day, observation continues through electoral forensics and legal monitoring of proceedings for the protection of electoral rights, up to the declaration of the final election results.
CRTA secures the independence and impartiality of its observation through non-partisan recruitment and conflict-of-interest screening of observers, mandatory training and a code of conduct, independent statistical design of the sample, multi-stage verification of the data collected, a clear separation of observation findings from political interpretation, a transparent methodology and public reporting, and diversified and transparent funding.
Election-day observation will be carried out on a scientifically determined, random and representative sample of around 500 polling stations, where statistically based observation of the course of voting will be accompanied by a parallel vote tabulation (quick count) in order to verify the officially announced results independently. At each polling station in the sample, up to four observers are to be deployed in two shifts, morning and afternoon, ensuring continuous monitoring of the entire course of voting, quality control of the data and greater safety for observers. After election day, observation continues through electoral forensics and legal monitoring of proceedings for the protection of electoral rights, up to the declaration of the final election results.
CRTA secures the independence and impartiality of its observation through non-partisan recruitment and conflict-of-interest screening of observers, mandatory training and a code of conduct, independent statistical design of the sample, multi-stage verification of the data collected, a clear separation of observation findings from political interpretation, a transparent methodology and public reporting, and diversified and transparent funding.
The position of observers under the law
Election observation by domestic observation missions in Serbia has been carried out since the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1997 and has been recognised ever since as one element of the electoral process and as an indicator of how democratic it is. Even so, the position of observers was only grounded in the electoral laws in 2022, after 16 electoral cycles. Until then the scope of observers' powers, and the timeliness with which accreditation was issued, depended entirely on secondary legislation and on the willingness of the election administration to apply democratic standards in its work, which made it harder for observers to access particular stages of the electoral process and the electoral documentation.
Accredited observers must be adult citizens of Serbia and may not be members of the bodies administering the elections, nor candidates. Observers have the right to follow the work of polling boards, local electoral commissions and the Republic Electoral Commission, and to be present at the printing, counting and packing of ballot papers. The status of domestic observer may be granted to representatives of associations registered in Serbia whose objectives are pursued in the field of elections, while the status of foreign observer is granted to representatives of foreign states and of international and foreign organisations and associations. The most recent local elections, held in 2025 and 2026, were marked by a multiplication of domestic and foreign observation missions connected with the authorities, but also with the opposition, which led CRTA Election Observation Mission to warn of the increasingly frequent misuse of the institution of independent observation.
Accredited observers must be adult citizens of Serbia and may not be members of the bodies administering the elections, nor candidates. Observers have the right to follow the work of polling boards, local electoral commissions and the Republic Electoral Commission, and to be present at the printing, counting and packing of ballot papers. The status of domestic observer may be granted to representatives of associations registered in Serbia whose objectives are pursued in the field of elections, while the status of foreign observer is granted to representatives of foreign states and of international and foreign organisations and associations. The most recent local elections, held in 2025 and 2026, were marked by a multiplication of domestic and foreign observation missions connected with the authorities, but also with the opposition, which led CRTA Election Observation Mission to warn of the increasingly frequent misuse of the institution of independent observation.
The treatment of observers and of independent observation by the authorities and political actors
Despite the position of election observers being grounded in law, it has been seriously undermined across several electoral cycles. The most recent such case was recorded in March 2026 at the local elections in Bor, where observers of CRTA's mission were physically attacked; numerous serious physical incidents against citizens and journalists were recorded in Bor and in other towns on the same day. Similarly, at the local elections in Mionica in November 2025, CRTA's observers faced a serious breach of their safety after being surrounded in their vehicle. In neither of these two cases have the competent authorities imposed any formal measure against the perpetrators to date.
The attack on CRTA's observers in Odžaci, committed on the day of the parliamentary elections in December 2023, has not been adequately prosecuted. The observers were physically attacked in the yard of a police station, immediately after they had attempted to report an observed case of circular voting. The competent prosecution office subsequently classified the attack as the criminal offence of violent conduct. Almost three years later, in May 2026, CRTA was informed that the Basic Public Prosecution Office in Sombor had dismissed the criminal complaint filed over the attack "on the grounds that there is no basis for suspicion that a criminal offence prosecuted ex officio has been committed". Such an outcome - after almost three years of waiting and without a single conviction or even an indictment - further confirms the pattern of ineffective institutional protection of observers.
Beyond physical violence, the position of domestic observers is further undermined by the multiplication of missions whose observation is reasonably suspected of being inauthentic, something CRTA has pointed to in earlier reports as well. In previous cycles, newly formed observation organisations close to the authorities and with no prior experience of election observation were engaged - such as the Centre for European Values and the Institute for European Freedoms. Members of these organisations actively interfered in the work of polling boards, contrary to the rules of election observation, and at the same time worked very closely with polling board members drawn from the parties in power - at as many as 70 per cent of polling stations in Kosjerić and 40 per cent in Zaječar. CRTA (2025), Finalni izveštaj o posmatranju lokalnih izbora u Kosjeriću i Zaječaru, July 2025, available at: https://crta.rs/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/CRTA_Finalni-izvestaj_Lokalni-izbori-Kosjeric-i-Zajecar.pdf At the most recent elections this phenomenon multiplied further: the number of such observation missions rose to six. This trend indicates that the institution of independent election observation is increasingly exposed to instrumentalisation, in which the form of observation is used as a screen for legitimising the electoral process instead of serving its original purpose - the impartial verification of compliance with electoral rules.
To this is added the discrediting of independent observation by senior state representatives, but also by actors from the opposition. CRTA Election Observation Mission has been subjected to speculation that it will not declare an accurate projection of the election results in order to support one side or the other. The most senior representatives of the authorities go a step further, accusing CRTA of standing behind alleged plans to provoke chaos and violence on election day, that is to carry out a "colour revolution". It is worth recalling that after the 2023 elections CRTA Election Observation Mission was publicly accused for the first time by the then Prime Minister, Ana Brnabić, of "directly destabilising Serbia and attempting to overthrow the constitutional order".
In addition, the current campaign against civil society in Serbia - "NGO Hydra" - advocates the adoption of a law on foreign agents, and in the course of it frequently claims falsely that independent election observation and CRTA Election Observation Mission work against the interests of Serbia and that they will "cause bloodshed" on election day. This campaign and its author have received public institutional support and access to the most influential media. On two occasions in August 2026, the person behind this campaign met the Speaker of the National Assembly on Assembly premises.
An environment of this kind runs counter to the international standards Serbia has taken on as an OSCE participating State: the Copenhagen Document obliges States to invite and enable election observation, while the Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice requires that domestic and foreign observers have the widest possible opportunity to take part in the electoral process, without being exposed to security risk. Unimpeded and safe election observation is not a privilege the authorities grant at their own discretion; it is a legal right and an international obligation of the State.
The attack on CRTA's observers in Odžaci, committed on the day of the parliamentary elections in December 2023, has not been adequately prosecuted. The observers were physically attacked in the yard of a police station, immediately after they had attempted to report an observed case of circular voting. The competent prosecution office subsequently classified the attack as the criminal offence of violent conduct. Almost three years later, in May 2026, CRTA was informed that the Basic Public Prosecution Office in Sombor had dismissed the criminal complaint filed over the attack "on the grounds that there is no basis for suspicion that a criminal offence prosecuted ex officio has been committed". Such an outcome - after almost three years of waiting and without a single conviction or even an indictment - further confirms the pattern of ineffective institutional protection of observers.
Beyond physical violence, the position of domestic observers is further undermined by the multiplication of missions whose observation is reasonably suspected of being inauthentic, something CRTA has pointed to in earlier reports as well. In previous cycles, newly formed observation organisations close to the authorities and with no prior experience of election observation were engaged - such as the Centre for European Values and the Institute for European Freedoms. Members of these organisations actively interfered in the work of polling boards, contrary to the rules of election observation, and at the same time worked very closely with polling board members drawn from the parties in power - at as many as 70 per cent of polling stations in Kosjerić and 40 per cent in Zaječar. CRTA (2025), Finalni izveštaj o posmatranju lokalnih izbora u Kosjeriću i Zaječaru, July 2025, available at: https://crta.rs/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/CRTA_Finalni-izvestaj_Lokalni-izbori-Kosjeric-i-Zajecar.pdf At the most recent elections this phenomenon multiplied further: the number of such observation missions rose to six. This trend indicates that the institution of independent election observation is increasingly exposed to instrumentalisation, in which the form of observation is used as a screen for legitimising the electoral process instead of serving its original purpose - the impartial verification of compliance with electoral rules.
To this is added the discrediting of independent observation by senior state representatives, but also by actors from the opposition. CRTA Election Observation Mission has been subjected to speculation that it will not declare an accurate projection of the election results in order to support one side or the other. The most senior representatives of the authorities go a step further, accusing CRTA of standing behind alleged plans to provoke chaos and violence on election day, that is to carry out a "colour revolution". It is worth recalling that after the 2023 elections CRTA Election Observation Mission was publicly accused for the first time by the then Prime Minister, Ana Brnabić, of "directly destabilising Serbia and attempting to overthrow the constitutional order".
In addition, the current campaign against civil society in Serbia - "NGO Hydra" - advocates the adoption of a law on foreign agents, and in the course of it frequently claims falsely that independent election observation and CRTA Election Observation Mission work against the interests of Serbia and that they will "cause bloodshed" on election day. This campaign and its author have received public institutional support and access to the most influential media. On two occasions in August 2026, the person behind this campaign met the Speaker of the National Assembly on Assembly premises.
An environment of this kind runs counter to the international standards Serbia has taken on as an OSCE participating State: the Copenhagen Document obliges States to invite and enable election observation, while the Venice Commission's Code of Good Practice requires that domestic and foreign observers have the widest possible opportunity to take part in the electoral process, without being exposed to security risk. Unimpeded and safe election observation is not a privilege the authorities grant at their own discretion; it is a legal right and an international obligation of the State.
