Position of observers

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Numerous direct and indirect actions and messages from the authorities during the first half of the campaign have seriously jeopardised the position of domestic observers, as well as the prospects for international observation of the elections. Representatives of the authorities and the outlets close to them have continued the campaign, begun months before the calling of the elections, which encourages intolerance towards independent citizen observers.

The attack on an observer of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (ACAS) illustrates a climate in which suspicion of any form of observation of pre-election activities can escalate into physical violence. Although observers formally have access to all stages of the electoral process, attempts to discredit them make observation more difficult in practice and relativise and deny in advance the facts that observers place before the public.

CRTA Election Observation Mission called on all participants in the elections to refrain from violence, expressing concern for the safety of its long-term observers who follow and document pre-election activities in the field.⁷⁵ It recalled that attacks on observers in earlier electoral cycles had gone unpunished.⁷⁶

75 CRTA Election Observation Mission, “A campaign marked by violence, threats and fear”, https://link.crta.rs/13k.

76 “The most recent such case was recorded in March 2026 at the local elections in Bor, where observers of CRTA’s mission were physically attacked, and numerous serious physical incidents against citizens and journalists in Bor and other cities were recorded that same day. Similarly, at the local elections in Mionica in November 2025, CRTA’s observers faced a serious breach of their safety after being left surrounded in a vehicle. In neither of these two cases have the competent authorities imposed any formal measure on the perpetrators to date. The attack on CRTA’s observers in Odžaci, committed on the day of the parliamentary elections in December 2023, has not been adequately prosecuted. The observers were then physically attacked in the yard of the police station, immediately after they had attempted to report an observed case of circular voting. The competent prosecution office subsequently classified the attack as the criminal offence of violent conduct. Almost three years later, in May 2026, CRTA was informed that the Basic Public Prosecution Office in Sombor had dismissed the criminal complaint filed in connection with this attack “on the grounds that there is no reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence prosecuted ex officio has been committed”: CRTA Election Observation Mission, Campaigning without the paperwork, 8 September 2026, link.crta.rs/131

Addressing the public on the occasion of his resignation from the office of President of the Republic, Aleksandar Vučić said of CRTA “shame on them” and called it “the worst participant in the ‘colour revolution’”. CRTA’s observation mission observes the entire electoral process in line with international standards of non-partisan and independent observation, and it sees the attacks to which it is exposed as an attempt to undermine the trust it has earned with the domestic and international public, in order to compromise the assessment of the outcome of election day that it will publish in accordance with its observation methodology.

Formation of the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) remains uncertain

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has accredited the largest mission of the last several electoral cycles in Serbia. However, up to the closing of this report CRTA’s observation mission had received no information from the electoral authorities as to whether the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA OSCE), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Parliament - the missions that customarily join the ODIHR mission and thereby form the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) - had received an official invitation to observe the elections in Serbia.

The deadline for the accreditation of international observers expires on 14 October, while the deadline for the accreditation of domestic observers is 17 October.

The first institutional threat to freedom of expression and of association came at the very start of the election campaign. The intimidation of CRTA and of other civil society organisations and media outlets gained momentum at that point with the publication of an analysis in which the Higher Public Prosecution Office concludes that no “sound cannon” was used in Belgrade on 15 March 2025. On that occasion the Higher Public Prosecution Office announced the initiation of criminal proceedings against all those who had “spread disinformation”, stating that the evidence which civil society organisations, CRTA among them, had submitted to domestic and international bodies was not authentic. The same day, President Aleksandar Vučić stated that the evidence had been fabricated “in order to bring Serbia down”. Although the prosecution office did not name the persons against whom it was announcing proceedings, the media directed the statement against civil society organisations, and against CRTA in particular.

The announcement of criminal prosecution points to a serious risk of the criminalisation of the work of observers and of independent organisations that follow respect for human and electoral rights.

In addition, during the election campaign the claim that CRTA would withdraw its observation mission on election day or report falsely on the results was placed in outlets close to the authorities on a number of occasions. Claims were put forward that former members of CRTA’s team, as well as participants in its training programmes or individuals who had taken part in any way in CRTA’s earlier observation missions or activities and have now chosen to engage with opposition electoral actors such as the Student List, were one of the proofs that CRTA “stands behind the ‘blokaderi’ movement” - “blokaderi” (blockaders) being the label the authorities apply to the demonstrators. Manipulation of information about CRTA usually appears first on some marginal social media account, only to be carried within minutes by the most influential outlets close to the authorities, and by state officials as well. Attempts to discredit CRTA have been placed in the context of advocacy for the adoption of a law on foreign agents.

The five most frequent manipulative claims about CRTA repeated during the election campaign

None of them contests CRTA’s observation methodology. All of them contest the identity of the organisation.

CRTA is a political party in disguise

A manipulation originating from a social media account claims that CRTA avoids registering as a political party and therefore uses the Student List to take part in the elections in its place.

Representation of the Student List in the Republic Electoral Commission (REC)

Because a former member of CRTA’s legal team was nominated to the Republic Electoral Commission by the Student List, a social media account presented this as proof that “there are no students and there is no student list, but that it is a front for CRTA”.

Foreign funding as proof of intent

An intention to bring Serbia down and install a puppet government is inferred from the published list of donors. The technique is the use of publicly available data as proof of an unprovable claim.

CRTA is preparing to contest the elections

In the run-up to the calling of the elections, a social media account announces that CRTA will withdraw its observation mission in the middle of election day, say that the elections are invalid and bring people out onto the streets. Over the following weeks that claim is repeated through outlets favourable to the authorities, and President Aleksandar Vučić gives it momentum at the moment of his resignation.

CRTA is behind the violence

The claim that CRTA’s associates advise the “blokaderi” that it is best to be masked if they attack the police. GONGO associations join in by calling for CRTA’s arrest.

The creation of circumstances that lead to the criminalisation of independent observation may discourage observers and citizens who report electoral irregularities, and amounts to a serious threat to the right of citizens to observe elections. It is of particular concern that the encouragement of intolerance could carry over into election day, when observers at polling stations are at their most visible and most exposed to possible risks.

The position of domestic election observers in law and in practice

Domestic observers have been observing elections in Serbia since 1997, but it was only with the 2022 electoral laws that they acquired the status of a statutory category, at both national and local elections. Under the framework in force, the status of domestic observer may be obtained by representatives of associations registered in Serbia whose aims of activity lie in the field of elections. Accredited observers are adult citizens who are neither members of the bodies administering the elections nor candidates. They may follow the work of polling boards, of local election commissions and of the Republic Electoral Commission, as well as the printing, counting, packing and delivery of ballot papers. Observers cannot, however, themselves initiate proceedings for the protection of electoral rights, so it is formally difficult for their findings to reach the institutions.

The regulation of the status and of the accreditation procedure in law was a major step forward. In substance, however, the position of observers is deteriorating. The most senior state officials and outlets close to the authorities systematically discredit and target them, among other things with claims that CRTA’s work is aimed at “overthrowing the constitutional order of Serbia”.

In earlier electoral cycles too, CRTA’s observers were exposed not only to verbal challenges but also to physical attacks. On election day in 2023, CRTA’s observers were attacked in the yard of the police station in Odžaci while they were attempting to report circular voting, and the absence of an effective institutional response leaves an impression of impunity. Statutory guarantees do not in themselves guarantee a safe environment for independent observation, and with it the building of public trust in the integrity of the electoral process.

The most recent local elections, held in 2025 and 2026, were marked by a proliferation of domestic and foreign observation missions linked to the authorities, but also to the opposition, which led CRTA’s observation mission to warn of the increasingly frequent misuse of the institution of independent observation

During this campaign CRTA’s observation mission also received an invitation from Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) to be the third participant in a debate between Aleksandar Vučić, the holder of the “United Serbia” list, and Ilija Srdanović, first among the candidates of the “Students Are Winning” list. That invitation is one more in a series of examples of the creation of confusion about the roles of the different actors in the elections, through which the public service broadcaster contributes to manipulations about independent observation and about the work of CRTA.

The attack on an observer of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption

The physical attack on a field observer of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption points to a threat to the safety of observers in the course of following the election campaign. On 30 September, N1 reported⁸⁵ that the observer had been attacked near a Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) stand in Novi Beograd and had been given medical assistance at the Military Medical Academy. The Agency subsequently relayed his statement that he had been photographing a banner on the overpass by the Sava Centar when unknown persons demanded that he delete the photographs and, after he refused, struck him several times. According to the police report relayed by the Agency⁸⁶ on 2 October, the incident was not detected on the available video surveillance footage, and as of the previous day the observer had not filed a report at a police station together with a medical injury certificate.

85 N1, “Observer of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption beaten while officially photographing an SNS stand in Belgrade”, 30 September 2026, https://link.crta.rs/13u.

86 Agency for Prevention of Corruption, statement concerning the reported attack on a field observer, 2 October 2026, 2 October 2026, https://link.crta.rs/13v.

Citizens’ contacts with CRTA’s observation mission

Since the calling of the elections, almost 1,000 citizens have contacted CRTA. At least 600 people contacted CRTA after the REC adopted its decision designating polling stations abroad. Before that, the largest number of contacts, almost 50 per cent, concerned problems with checking and establishing the number of persons registered at citizens’ addresses. Around 21 per cent of contacts concerned the exercise of voting rights from abroad, while around 12 per cent concerned various technical questions. Around 9 per cent of the enquiries received concerned accounts of various forms of political pressure, while the remaining contacts concerned other questions relating to the electoral process.

The largest number of reports concerned the checking of persons registered at citizens’ addresses. In a large number of cases citizens pointed out that, when carrying out a check, they do not have access to complete data on the voters registered at their address. In some cases only the total number of voters registered at the address is shown, while data on individual flats and on the number of voters registered in them are unavailable or are not shown for all flats. The limited availability of data, together with the existing distrust among citizens in how up to date and accurate the voter register is, makes it more difficult to check the data on persons registered at addresses and encourages suspicions of possible irregularities. Some also stated that persons who do not in fact live there are registered at their addresses.

Communication with citizens also revealed inconsistent practices in the updating and exchange of data between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government and the bodies of local self-government units, which makes checking the data more difficult still.

As an isolated instance, on a single day, after the REC adopted its decision designating polling stations abroad, more than 600 citizens made contact about the same problem - no polling station had been opened in their cities even though, according to the information available to them, the number of registrations to vote was considerably higher than the 100 needed for a polling station to be opened.

Next, around 21 per cent of the 380 contacts concerned the exercise of the voting rights of citizens living abroad. The largest number of these reports concerned communication with diplomatic and consular missions when submitting requests to vote abroad. Citizens most often stated that they received no reply to their requests or enquiries concerning the exercise of their voting rights within the prescribed deadline, or that they received no reply at all. The largest number of reports related to China and Germany.

Around 12 per cent of contacts concerned various technical questions, the most frequent among them being questions about voting at a place of temporary residence and changes to data in the Unified Voter Register.

Around 9 per cent of the enquiries received concerned accounts of various forms of political pressure. The largest number of these contacts concerned employees of public enterprises, while reports were also recorded concerning employees in the private sector. Citizens most often cited pressure to attend political rallies and to work at stands, while reports were also recorded concerning the possible misuse of personal data, particularly in homes for the elderly.

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