Update
Governing boards of RTS and RTV lose quorum due to the REM b...
As of Tuesday, 14 July 2026, the governing boards of both national public broadcasters are left with...
On 8 July, EU member states, meeting in Coreper II, declined to open Cluster 3 (Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth) in Serbia's accession negotiations. The decision came despite a European Commission note, published by POLITICO, that credits Belgrade with "recent progress" across the fundamentals. Read closely, much of that progress consists of the authorities putting out fires they recently started.
The note praises Serbia for "remedying the backsliding of January 2026" and for lifting the organised-crime prosecution back to full capacity. Both problems were self-inflicted. The ruling majority rammed the judicial laws through in January over warnings from professional associations, the EU and civil society, and the same authorities terminated the prosecutors' secondments on 11 March 2026 before re-hiring them - a reshuffle that returned prosecutors to a large backlog and signalled to every judge and prosecutor that the separation of powers is optional. None of this appears in the note, nor does the fact that the same apparatus is being turned on critics: an opposition MP, a journalist, an analyst and a lawyer were questioned over the sound cannon used on protesters.
On media, the note welcomes an end to the REM "deadlock" in place since November 2024. That deadlock was engineered: the ruling majority kept the regulator's selection unlawful to retain control, and the resolution now praised as "constructive" rests on an "authentic interpretation" of the law that CRTA considers an abuse of that instrument. On elections, the May amendments the note calls "significant progress" were pushed through by a single MP with no genuine debate - breaching ODIHR's priority recommendation for an inclusive process - and left the real problems untouched: phantom lists, falsified support signatures, and the fused line between state and ruling party.
Left out entirely: the financing and anti-corruption laws, dropped from the May package despite ready drafts. The rewritten financing law makes it harder for new and opposition actors to raise money while preserving the ruling party's public-funding advantage in an election year. On the voter register, the authorities were credited for "committing" to grant the audit commission access to data they are already legally required to provide under the November 2025 law. The pattern repeats across every chapter: set the fire, put it out under pressure, ask for a reward.
The note praises Serbia for "remedying the backsliding of January 2026" and for lifting the organised-crime prosecution back to full capacity. Both problems were self-inflicted. The ruling majority rammed the judicial laws through in January over warnings from professional associations, the EU and civil society, and the same authorities terminated the prosecutors' secondments on 11 March 2026 before re-hiring them - a reshuffle that returned prosecutors to a large backlog and signalled to every judge and prosecutor that the separation of powers is optional. None of this appears in the note, nor does the fact that the same apparatus is being turned on critics: an opposition MP, a journalist, an analyst and a lawyer were questioned over the sound cannon used on protesters.
On media, the note welcomes an end to the REM "deadlock" in place since November 2024. That deadlock was engineered: the ruling majority kept the regulator's selection unlawful to retain control, and the resolution now praised as "constructive" rests on an "authentic interpretation" of the law that CRTA considers an abuse of that instrument. On elections, the May amendments the note calls "significant progress" were pushed through by a single MP with no genuine debate - breaching ODIHR's priority recommendation for an inclusive process - and left the real problems untouched: phantom lists, falsified support signatures, and the fused line between state and ruling party.
Left out entirely: the financing and anti-corruption laws, dropped from the May package despite ready drafts. The rewritten financing law makes it harder for new and opposition actors to raise money while preserving the ruling party's public-funding advantage in an election year. On the voter register, the authorities were credited for "committing" to grant the audit commission access to data they are already legally required to provide under the November 2025 law. The pattern repeats across every chapter: set the fire, put it out under pressure, ask for a reward.
