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How the process unfolded
The legislative process began on 2 February 2026. The amendments were submitted to parliamentary procedure not by the government, but by a single member of parliament - a procedural choice that bypassed the standard process for government-sponsored legislation and the obligations it entails, including genuine inter-institutional consultation.
The proposals were formally sent to ODIHR for its opinions, and the text was revised multiple times in response. However, the views of domestic stakeholders - opposition parties, civil society organizations, and independent experts - were not meaningfully incorporated. The Working Group for the Improvement of Electoral Conditions, the formal body through which inclusive deliberation was supposed to take place, had effectively ceased to function over a year earlier, after civil society and opposition representatives withdrew precisely because of a lack of transparency, inclusiveness, and respect for procedure. The same shortcomings that prompted their withdrawal were repeated in this process.
ODIHR has issued, over multiple electoral cycles, a standing recommendation that electoral legislation in Serbia be adopted through a broad consultative process and with the consensus of relevant political actors. That recommendation was not followed.
The proposals were formally sent to ODIHR for its opinions, and the text was revised multiple times in response. However, the views of domestic stakeholders - opposition parties, civil society organizations, and independent experts - were not meaningfully incorporated. The Working Group for the Improvement of Electoral Conditions, the formal body through which inclusive deliberation was supposed to take place, had effectively ceased to function over a year earlier, after civil society and opposition representatives withdrew precisely because of a lack of transparency, inclusiveness, and respect for procedure. The same shortcomings that prompted their withdrawal were repeated in this process.
ODIHR has issued, over multiple electoral cycles, a standing recommendation that electoral legislation in Serbia be adopted through a broad consultative process and with the consensus of relevant political actors. That recommendation was not followed.
What the amendments failed to address
Although the changes are formally presented as implementing ODIHR and Council of Europe recommendations, their scope reflects a selective approach. The amendments are largely technical and procedural in nature. They leave untouched the structural problems that CRTA has consistently documented through its observation of every electoral cycle: the use of phantom electoral lists, the falsification of voter support signatures, the unequal position of electoral contestants, the absence of a genuine boundary between the state and the ruling party, and the ineffective protection of electoral rights.
Three of the adopted solutions carry particular risk in the current context. The removal of the restriction limiting each voter to one declaration of support for an electoral list - while consistent with comparative democratic practice in principle - creates new opportunities for electoral engineering given Serbia's well-documented history of abusing support declarations. The opening for groups of citizens to nominate national minority lists expands the space for manipulation, given the more favorable candidacy and seat allocation thresholds that apply to such lists. And while introducing urgency in Constitutional Court proceedings for electoral disputes is normatively justified, its practical value is doubtful given the court's longstanding inefficiency and perceived institutional bias.
Additionally, certain solutions that CRTA assessed positively in its analysis of the initial proposals - including clearer rules on where to submit appeals and more precisely defined deadlines for contesting decisions on electoral lists - did not survive into the final text adopted by parliament.
CRTA's full analysis of the proposals as submitted to parliamentary procedure is available here.
Three of the adopted solutions carry particular risk in the current context. The removal of the restriction limiting each voter to one declaration of support for an electoral list - while consistent with comparative democratic practice in principle - creates new opportunities for electoral engineering given Serbia's well-documented history of abusing support declarations. The opening for groups of citizens to nominate national minority lists expands the space for manipulation, given the more favorable candidacy and seat allocation thresholds that apply to such lists. And while introducing urgency in Constitutional Court proceedings for electoral disputes is normatively justified, its practical value is doubtful given the court's longstanding inefficiency and perceived institutional bias.
Additionally, certain solutions that CRTA assessed positively in its analysis of the initial proposals - including clearer rules on where to submit appeals and more precisely defined deadlines for contesting decisions on electoral lists - did not survive into the final text adopted by parliament.
CRTA's full analysis of the proposals as submitted to parliamentary procedure is available here.
