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The Commission for the Revision, Verification and Control of the Accuracy and Updating of the Voter Register is intended to be a permanent and independent expert body, set up by the National Assembly under the amendments to the Law on the Unified Voter Register adopted in November 2025. It has 10 members and 10 deputy members, nominated by the ruling majority, the opposition, and civil society, and a five-year mandate to audit the Unified Voter Register (UVR) and address its structural weaknesses.
On paper, its purpose is substantive rather than procedural. Persistent doubts about the accuracy of the voter register - from deceased or absent people listed as active voters, to short-term migration of voters before elections - have eroded public confidence over years. CRTA's observation mission documented this kind of organised voter migration ahead of the December 2023 elections. The Commission is meant to examine such problems on a documented, fact-based basis and to recommend corrections, rather than to confirm that the register is sound by its mere existence.
On paper, its purpose is substantive rather than procedural. Persistent doubts about the accuracy of the voter register - from deceased or absent people listed as active voters, to short-term migration of voters before elections - have eroded public confidence over years. CRTA's observation mission documented this kind of organised voter migration ahead of the December 2023 elections. The Commission is meant to examine such problems on a documented, fact-based basis and to recommend corrections, rather than to confirm that the register is sound by its mere existence.
UVR Commission
The Commission is meant to ensure the integrity of the Unified Voter Register. Decisions should require a qualified majority of seven votes, including at least two from each group: ruling majority, opposition, and civil society.
Institutional guarantees
Independence and transparency
Mandate duration, legal status, and funding clearly defined. Independent communication with the public. Observers present at all sessions.
Expertise and accountable decisions
Clear eligibility criteria and balanced composition. Decisions taken close to consensus. Clear deadlines for authorities to implement recommendations, with political accountability for non-implementation.
Powers the Commission holds
1
Full data and audit trail access
Access to all UVR-relevant records, databases, activity logs, and the full history of software modifications held by any state authority.
2
Software forensics
Expert forensic assessment of UVR software security. Authority to engage third parties for complex technical tasks.
3
Order corrections and initiate proceedings
Authority to order institutions to remedy irregularities within 8 days and initiate proceedings against persons responsible for unlawful actions.
4
Field inspections, audits, and citizen complaints
Supervision of field inspections with the Ministry of Interior, periodic audits of corrective measures, and authority to receive reports from citizens.
Risks to watch
Administrative suffocation
Bureaucratic constraints that prevent the Commission from performing its core functions.
Institutional neutralization
Limited data access or delayed cooperation from state authorities that blocks substantive investigation.
Artificial progress
Token or partial data access presented publicly as full systemic reform.
Its design is intended to guard against one-sided control. Decisions should require a qualified majority of seven votes, including at least two from each of the three groups, so that no single bloc can decide alone or rubber-stamp findings. Under the law, the Commission can analyse register data, cross-check it against source registries, request corrections within set deadlines, conduct field checks together with the Ministry of Interior, initiate accountability proceedings, and receive complaints from citizens. State authorities are formally obliged to cooperate.
The Commission is also meant to operate under firm deadlines and reporting duties. It should complete its first audit within nine months of being constituted and report to Parliament, with audit reports due each February thereafter. But its findings carry weight only if it is actually given the access the law guarantees; without that access, the body risks becoming a mechanism that exists on paper but cannot carry out its core task.
The Commission is also meant to operate under firm deadlines and reporting duties. It should complete its first audit within nine months of being constituted and report to Parliament, with audit reports due each February thereafter. But its findings carry weight only if it is actually given the access the law guarantees; without that access, the body risks becoming a mechanism that exists on paper but cannot carry out its core task.
