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On 21 April 2026, proposals to amend four laws entered parliamentary procedure - the Law on the election of members of parliament, the Law on local elections, the Law on the Constitutional Court, and the Law on the election of the president of the Republic. The Law on the prevention of corruption and the Law on the financing of political activities were not included in the proposals submitted to parliamentary procedure, although their drafts had been prepared. The process of amending electoral laws was initiated on 2 February 2026, despite the Reform Agenda having stipulated that amendments to five key laws in this area should be completed by the end of 2025.
The preparation process is accompanied by serious procedural and institutional shortcomings, including lack of clarity about who drafted the initial proposal and on what criteria they were based. The proposals were forwarded to an inactive Working Group, whose members from civil society and the opposition had previously withdrawn due to non-transparency and procedural violations, repeating the same patterns. Following multiple revisions based on ODIHR opinions, the proposals were formally submitted to parliamentary procedure.
Although the amendments are formally presented as aligning with recommendations from ODIHR and the Council of Europe, their scope and content point to a selective approach.
The preparation process is accompanied by serious procedural and institutional shortcomings, including lack of clarity about who drafted the initial proposal and on what criteria they were based. The proposals were forwarded to an inactive Working Group, whose members from civil society and the opposition had previously withdrawn due to non-transparency and procedural violations, repeating the same patterns. Following multiple revisions based on ODIHR opinions, the proposals were formally submitted to parliamentary procedure.
Although the amendments are formally presented as aligning with recommendations from ODIHR and the Council of Europe, their scope and content point to a selective approach.
Within the four laws under amendment, key provisions relating to the prevention of electoral abuses and electoral engineering remain unchanged. The proposed solutions largely amount to partial and technical interventions, while recommendations addressing structural problems in the electoral process are largely bypassed.
In this context, three proposed solutions stand out as particularly risky, given the current socio-political context in Serbia. Although these solutions are grounded in comparatively accepted democratic practices, their application under existing institutional conditions may produce the opposite effects - from additional abuses in the electoral process to further erosion of trust in the judiciary.
First, the removal of the restriction "one voter - one declaration of support for an electoral list," viewed in the context of longstanding and documented abuses of support declarations in previous electoral cycles, carries a significant risk of further electoral engineering and additional erosion of electoral integrity. Such an amendment may facilitate the nomination of so-called phantom lists and further encourage manipulative practices. Nevertheless, despite these negative implications in the domestic context, the removal of this restriction is generally regarded in comparative practice as a measure that can contribute to strengthening political pluralism; however, under the existing circumstances in Serbia, such a solution can hardly be applied in a way that would achieve these positive effects.
Second, the proposal allowing a group of citizens to stand as a national minority list opens additional space for manipulation. Given that national minority lists are subject to more favorable conditions for candidacy and seat allocation (fewer supporting signatures and a lower natural threshold), this amendment may lead to an artificial increase in the number of electoral lists and influence the distribution of seats in a way that does not reflect genuine political representation of minority communities.
Third, introducing urgency in proceedings before the Constitutional Court in electoral disputes is a normatively justified solution. However, its practical effectiveness remains questionable in light of the court's longstanding problems, including inefficiency and the perception of its institutional bias, especially given recent changes in the composition of judges.
Additionally, certain solutions that CRTA assessed positively - such as specifying the body to which appeals may be submitted in the electoral process and more clearly defining deadlines for contesting decisions on electoral lists - although envisaged in the initial phase, did not ultimately enter parliamentary procedure.
First, the removal of the restriction "one voter - one declaration of support for an electoral list," viewed in the context of longstanding and documented abuses of support declarations in previous electoral cycles, carries a significant risk of further electoral engineering and additional erosion of electoral integrity. Such an amendment may facilitate the nomination of so-called phantom lists and further encourage manipulative practices. Nevertheless, despite these negative implications in the domestic context, the removal of this restriction is generally regarded in comparative practice as a measure that can contribute to strengthening political pluralism; however, under the existing circumstances in Serbia, such a solution can hardly be applied in a way that would achieve these positive effects.
Second, the proposal allowing a group of citizens to stand as a national minority list opens additional space for manipulation. Given that national minority lists are subject to more favorable conditions for candidacy and seat allocation (fewer supporting signatures and a lower natural threshold), this amendment may lead to an artificial increase in the number of electoral lists and influence the distribution of seats in a way that does not reflect genuine political representation of minority communities.
Third, introducing urgency in proceedings before the Constitutional Court in electoral disputes is a normatively justified solution. However, its practical effectiveness remains questionable in light of the court's longstanding problems, including inefficiency and the perception of its institutional bias, especially given recent changes in the composition of judges.
Additionally, certain solutions that CRTA assessed positively - such as specifying the body to which appeals may be submitted in the electoral process and more clearly defining deadlines for contesting decisions on electoral lists - although envisaged in the initial phase, did not ultimately enter parliamentary procedure.
Proposed electoral law amendments
CRTA analysis - 21 April 2026
