Update
Education inspection into University of Belgrade statute cha...
Summary Following reports published in Informer about a proposed change to a provision of the Univer...
Latest update · 17 July 2026
Progress has been made in establishing the conditions to begin the substantive audit of the voter register.
1. Access to data. Commission members have been given access to the Unified Voter Register, including the history of changes. A secure technical environment to analyse it efficiently is still being set up.
2. Cross-checking with source records. Work with the Office for IT and eGovernment on cross-checking the register against source records - primarily civil registries, residence records and the citizenship register - is under way, with first results on the model for this cooperation expected during July.
3. Local audits. The audit of the parts of the register for the municipalities that held elections in March has begun; the first three are expected to be completed by the end of July.
A substantive audit can proceed only once the technical environment is in place and full access is confirmed in practice.
Progress has been made in establishing the conditions to begin the substantive audit of the voter register.
1. Access to data. Commission members have been given access to the Unified Voter Register, including the history of changes. A secure technical environment to analyse it efficiently is still being set up.
2. Cross-checking with source records. Work with the Office for IT and eGovernment on cross-checking the register against source records - primarily civil registries, residence records and the citizenship register - is under way, with first results on the model for this cooperation expected during July.
3. Local audits. The audit of the parts of the register for the municipalities that held elections in March has begun; the first three are expected to be completed by the end of July.
A substantive audit can proceed only once the technical environment is in place and full access is confirmed in practice.
CRTA+
Voter register audit: 24 of 69 checks are now fully or partly possible as data access widens
CRTA's July 2026 assessment maps the full audit methodology against the data access granted to the Commission. Following an expansion of access, 12 checks can now be carried out in full and 12 more in part, while 45 remain blocked. Full access, required by Article 22j of the UVR Law, has still not been provided.
The four aims
AccuracyDo entries match the real, lawful situation?
ResilienceIs the system protected from error and abuse?
EfficiencyAre records kept and updated in time?
AccountabilityCan a fault be traced to its cause?
How the audit creates impact
Findings are not the end point. Each one feeds a step that changes the register and the system around it — and contributes to confidence-building in the UVR.
The audit program at a glance
The structure of the methodology. Colours show whether the procedures in each phase/level can be performed with the current access granted; no phase or level is yet fully possible. Each box is clickable — select one to jump to that part of the detailed program below.
every procedure fully possible — not yet reached by any groupsome procedures possible or partialnone can run
The access story over time
Through the first half of 2026 the Commission's access stayed at record-by-record queries. In July it widened — some aggregate profiling and partial cross-checks became possible — but it still falls short of the full access the law provides, and the deadlines and reporting obligation continue to run. The graph shows the access actually provided against the full access the law mandates (dashed).
Click to enlarge
Select a point on the timeline for detail.
How much of the audit can be performed
Data access
17%
17%
65%
12checks performable in full
12partially performable
45cannot be performed (of 69)
100%
69checks performable in full
0partially performable
0cannot be performed (of 69)
Select a bar segment or a figure above to list the checks it covers.
12 checks that can be performed in full
2.1.2 Whole-register quality scan
- Aggregate profile of the register by category
- Outlier rate of changes per individual voter
- Identification of missing data
- Logical-consistency checks
- Arithmetic-consistency checks
- Field syntax and meaning checks
- Referential-integrity checks
2.4.3 Handling citizen complaints
- Preliminary examination of a complaint’s data
2.2.3 Legality of entry and deletion decisions
- Legal validity of the decisions underlying register changes
2.1.1 Legal review — central-register framework
- Full review of laws, by-laws, arrangements and controls governing the register
2.2.1 Legal review — local-update framework
- Full review of competences, deadlines, remedies, decision trails and controls in updating
2.3.1 Legal review — source-register framework
- Full review of the normative framework governing source registers
12 checks that are partially possible
2.1.2 Whole-register quality scan
- Outlier number of voters per address / household
2.3.2 Quality scan of the source registers
- Outlier permanent-residence changes
- Outlier temporary-residence changes
2.3.5 Match register against source records
- Consistency with residence records
- Consistency with civil registries
- Consistency with the citizenship register
2.3.3 Legality of the residence basis
- Legal basis for establishing residence, incl. naturalised citizens
2.1.3 Verify register extracts and historical displays
- Process of public display by polling station
- Pre-election closing of the register
- Consistency of displayed data with the register
- Consistency of extracts used with the register
- All current and historical data, by period
45 checks that cannot be performed
2.3.2 Quality scan of the source registers
- Aggregate profile of civil, residence and other registers
- Outlier passivisation changes
- Outlier citizenship changes
- Outlier border-police data
- Outlier civil-registry data
2.3.5 Match register against source records
- Consistency with the IDP register
- Consistency with legal-capacity, sanctions and military-service records
- Consistency of changes, register vs source
- Statistical analysis of mismatches
2.3.6 Verify against census, address and other registries
- Consistency with census data (SORS)
- Consistency with other central-registry data
- Addresses vs the Address Register (RGA / Post)
- Consistency with household data from other records
- Consistency with other relevant registers
- Spatial clustering of mismatches
2.4.1 Field check — register to citizens
- Verify register entries against citizens’ real circumstances
2.4.2 Field check — citizens to register
- Verify citizens’ real circumstances against the register
2.1.4 Security of the central IT environment
- Access management
- Change controls
- Action logging and audit trail
- Data integrity and quality
- Stability, availability and continuity
- Change and maintenance management
- Legal and organisational maintenance framework
- General security and data protection
2.2.2 Abuse risk in change authorisation
- Map of entry / deletion / amendment rights by authorisation
- Quality of access-log security during updating
2.2.5 Officials’ authority and training
- Legal review of officials’ authorisations
- Process of receiving changes, drafting and forwarding decisions
- Quality of training vs required competences
2.2.6 Resources for updating
- Material and financial resources for updating and how they are used
2.2.7 Integrity of hiring
- Recruitment and engagement of officials who maintain the register
2.2.4 Review of inspection supervision
- The inspection process and follow-up on ordered measures
2.3.7 Security of the source-register IT
- Access management
- Protection against unauthorised changes
- Action logging and traceability
- Data integrity and quality
- Stability and continuity
- Change and maintenance management
- Legal and organisational maintenance framework
- General security and data protection
2.3.4 Officials’ conduct in residence and civil changes
- Recording life-fact changes into source registers
- Recording residence changes
- Dual-citizenship acquisition process
- Data exchange with competent authorities
Progress has been made in establishing the conditions to begin the substantive audit of the voter register. Following the expansion of access, 12 of the 69 checks can now be carried out in full — the three legal reviews, the intake of citizen complaints, the legality of entry and deletion decisions, and most of the whole-register quality scan. A further 12 can be done in part, chiefly the cross-checks against source registers and the review of register extracts and historical displays. The remaining 45 — everything that needs the register’s full change history, the deep cross-referencing against other registers, the field sample, and the security of the IT systems — still cannot be performed.
With the full access the law provides (Art. 22j), all 69 checks across the 21 procedures could be carried out — the audit could be completed as the methodology designed.
The audit program and its coverage
The methodology defines 69 individual checks under 21 procedures. Each row shows the evidence a procedure requires and whether that evidence has been made available. Select any row to see the checks within it.
Detail
Show
| Area 1 — Is the data accurate?From the first signal of an inaccuracy to a confirmed or dismissed conclusion. | ||
| Phase 1 · Find the signals | ||
| 2.1.2Whole-register quality scan | The register analysed as a whole (aggregate access) | ◑Partially 8 |
| 2.4.3Handling citizen complaints | Individual look-up of present data only — no history of changes per voter | ●Can be performed 1 |
| Phase 2 · Cross-check the registers | ||
| 2.3.2Quality scan of the source registers | Aggregate view and change history of source registers | ◑Partially 7 |
| 2.3.5Match register against source records | Cross-referencing at scale; citizenship, IDP, legal-capacity, sanctions records | ◑Partially 7 |
| 2.3.6Verify against census, address and other registries | Census (SORS), Address Register, other datasets | ○Cannot be performed 6 |
| Phase 3 · Legal validation | ||
| 2.2.3Legality of entry and deletion decisions | Decision records and supporting documents | ●Can be performed 1 |
| 2.3.3Legality of the residence basis | Previous addresses and basis documents | ◑Partially 1 |
| Phase 4 · Field verification (the final step) | ||
| 2.4.1Field check — register to citizens | A representative sample drawn from the full register; field access | ○Cannot be performed 1 |
| 2.4.2Field check — citizens to register | A representative sample; field access | ○Cannot be performed 1 |
| Area 2 — Is the system resilient?Whether the legal, organisational and IT framework prevents, detects and corrects error and abuse. | ||
| Level 1 · The central register | ||
| 2.1.1Legal review — central-register framework | Publicly available legal norms | ●Can be performed 1 |
| 2.1.4Security of the central IT environment | ICT access logs, configuration and change controls | ○Cannot be performed 8 |
| 2.1.3Verify register extracts and historical displays | Historical and change records | ◑Partially 5 |
| Level 2 · Local updating | ||
| 2.2.1Legal review — local-update framework | Publicly available legal norms | ●Can be performed 1 |
| 2.2.2Abuse risk in change authorisation | Access logs and change records | ○Cannot be performed 2 |
| 2.2.5Officials’ authority and training | Internal change records and training documents, held by the authorities | ○Cannot be performed 3 |
| 2.2.6Resources for updating | Internal resource records, held by the authorities | ○Cannot be performed 1 |
| 2.2.7Integrity of hiring | Recruitment / HR records, held by the authorities | ○Cannot be performed 1 |
| 2.2.4Review of inspection supervision | Inspection-supervision reports | ○Cannot be performed 1 |
| Level 3 · The source registers | ||
| 2.3.1Legal review — source-register framework | Publicly available legal norms | ●Can be performed 1 |
| 2.3.7Security of the source-register IT | Access logs and controls of the source systems | ○Cannot be performed 8 |
| 2.3.4Officials’ conduct in residence and civil changes | Change records and records of officials’ actions | ○Cannot be performed 4 |
What this means
Partial scope — analysis can begin
With the wider access now granted, the audit can begin substantive work: the legal framework can be reviewed in full and the register can be profiled as a whole. But on the evidence available it still cannot reach a firm conclusion on the accuracy or integrity of the register — the deep cross-checks, the full history of changes and a representative field sample remain out of reach. The scope is now partial rather than blocked.
What can be done now
- Legal review of the rules governing the register, at all three levels
- A quality scan of the register as a whole — profiling, consistency and integrity checks
- Intake and review of citizen complaints, and the legality of entry and deletion decisions
- Partial cross-checks against residence, civil and citizenship records
What is still missing
- The full history of changes — basis, date, official, decision number
- Deep cross-referencing against source and check registers (IDP, legal capacity, sanctions, census, address)
- System logs and security configuration
- A statistically representative field sample
The methodology’s own threshold. Data from any single register are not sufficient grounds for a conclusion where cross-checking with another register is technically possible. The access now available therefore cannot, on its own, meet the standard the Commission set for a finding — it can frame the work and begin the analysis, not complete it.
Annex — data access on record
View = can be seen, one record at a time. Aggregate = can be analysed across the register. Verify = can be independently confirmed. Following the July expansion, limited aggregate access has been granted for some categories (marked Partial); full aggregate analysis and independent verification remain unavailable. Cells marked Partial reflect the July expansion and are provisional, pending confirmation of the Commission’s current access record.
| Data / record | View | Aggregate | Verify |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unified Voter Register | |||
| Individual current voter data (name, JMBG, residence, polling station, passivisation, IDP) | Yes | Partial | No |
| Record of changes (basis, date, official, decision number) | Partial | No | No |
| Legacy reporting module (missing / incorrect data) | No | No | No |
| ICT system logs (traces of unauthorised access) | No | No | No |
| Source registers | |||
| Current residence — permanent and temporary | Yes | Partial | No |
| Previous residence; passivisation of addresses | Partial | No | No |
| Civil registries — births, deaths, marriages | Yes | Partial | No |
| Citizenship — yes/no search by JMBG | Yes | Partial | No |
| Citizenship — full records; IDP; legal capacity; prison sanctions | No | No | No |
| Cross-check registers | |||
| Inspection reports; statistics (SORS); address register; pension; health; tax; ID and passport | No | No | No |
