The National Assembly adopted the Law Amending the Law on Prevention of Corruption in late August 2026; it was published in the Official Gazette of RS No. 80/2026 of 31 August and entered into force on 1 September 2026. The law is part of a package of electoral-law changes envisaged by the Reform Agenda, within its second composite step, under which . As before, the process went through under urgent procedure, without a genuine public debate or consultations with domestic stakeholders - at odds with the on broad political consensus and an inclusive process.
The amendments implement four ODIHR recommendations (, , and ) and several recommendations. The law more precisely defines the concept of a public official and expands the range of persons to whom it applies, regulates officials' campaigning (public appearances, social media, public authorities' promotional activities) and introduces Agency monitoring throughout the campaign, with mandatory monitoring of the President of the Republic and members of the Government. Procedural guarantees and the sanctions system are strengthened.
Relative to the earlier drafts, the adopted law removed two major concerns: the Agency's monitoring now covers the whole campaign (from when elections are called), and differentiated sanctions were introduced. Even so, the essence remains: the definition of a public official and the asset-declaration rules were not improved, the definition of "promotional activities" is still too broad, so the real effect will depend on the Agency's so-far weak practice. A detailed comparison of the previous and the adopted rules, by area, follows below.
Tap a highlighted term (orange) or recommendation (teal) to see its explanation here.This overview reflects the adopted law. For the reform timeline - the drafts and the ODIHR opinion - see the previous analysis →
CRTA assesses that the adopted law brings progress and that, relative to the earlier drafts, it removed two major concerns - monitoring now covers the whole campaign, and differentiated sanctions were introduced. Even so, the key problems remain: the definition of a public official and the asset-declaration rules, as well as certain provisions open to discretionary interpretation by the Agency.
Concerns Where CRTA sees problems
- The definition of a "public official" should be framed so as to primarily cover those who actually exercise power and make decisions - otherwise a large number of persons with no real influence will be registered as officials, and the Agency will lack the capacity to oversee them.
- The new asset-declaration provisions are a step backward: instead of legal certainty they introduce further ambiguity and make application harder.
- The definition of "promotional activities" remains too broad ("creating a favourable perception"); the broadening to a party/entity is only a terminological alignment with the Law on the Financing of Political Activities, so it still leaves room for inconsistent application and discretionary interpretation.
- The extension of the Director's mandate is capped at one year, but that is still too long - CRTA suggests no more than six months - and the acting director's mandate is not time-limited, leaving room for abuse.
- The five-day deadline for the Agency to decide during the campaign, without a hearing of the parties or the gathering of evidence, could lead to unlawful decisions; urgent but balanced deadlines are needed (including for the Administrative Court).
Positive Where CRTA sees progress
- The Agency's monitoring covers the whole campaign (from when elections are called), with mandatory monitoring of the President of the Republic and members of the Government and risk assessment in selecting the sample.
- Differentiated sanctions - the penalty is set according to the gravity of the violation, the extent of public resources used, repetition, the official's position, and the impact on the equality of contestants.
- A stronger mechanism for the Agency's opinions on legislation - if a body does not respond, the Agency informs the Prime Minister and the competent Assembly committee; everything is published.
- Expanded post-employment restrictions and greater transparency (a list of promotional activities, publication of misdemeanour judgments, an obligation on media to correct the false presentation of officials).
- Clarification of proceedings before the Agency and decision-making by formal ruling in line with the Law on General Administrative Procedure (ZUP) - the final assessment depends on practice.
- The obligation to label social-media accounts and the expansion of the range of public officials - subject to finding a balance.
A "public official" is any elected, appointed or nominated person in a public authority (except representatives of private capital). By an authentic interpretation of the National Assembly from February 2021, the term was narrowed to persons directly elected and to persons elected/appointed/nominated by the Assembly, the President of the Republic, the supreme courts and councils, the Government, and provincial/local bodies.
Official status is explicitly extended to senior civil servants in appointed positions, the Deputy Director of the Agency, chiefs of cabinet and advisors to the President and Deputy Prime Ministers, and special advisors to ministers; directors and members of supervisory/executive boards of public enterprises and legal entities with majority or controlling public ownership; and state representatives in the assemblies of legal entities in which the state has ownership.
“That the scope of the Law on Prevention of Corruption be extended to cover all persons entrusted with top executive functions, including the chiefs of cabinet of the President and Deputy Prime Ministers, as well as special and government advisors.”
Expanding the range of public officials is positive and essential for the Agency's work. However, there is a risk that a large number of persons will be registered as officials while most of them hold no real or de facto power - and that the Agency, given its lack of capacity and technical resources, will not be able to oversee them all.
It is therefore essential to strike a balance: those who make the most important decisions for society should be under constant Agency oversight, rather than the Agency's reports being reduced to statistics about a "random sample" of officials whose actual power is less than their office, while those with the greatest influence - but a less prominent title - remain beyond oversight.
The definition should also be supplemented with private-sector representatives who take part in decision-making or in managing and allocating public resources, and with persons who can in practice influence the formulation, coordination or implementation of public policy (expert bodies, external consultants, persons engaged under service contracts). The decisive criterion should be the nature of the function and the influence exercised, not the formal title. The expanded definition should be accompanied by integrity screening before taking office and public disclosure of information about advisors and consultants.
On expiry of the mandate the director's office ends; until a new director takes office, an acting director performs the role (the deputy, or - if there is none - an assistant). The Ministry of Justice announces a competition three months before the mandate expires.
The director continues in office for at most one year after the mandate expires; if a new director is not elected, the competent Assembly committee appoints an acting director from among the assistant directors.
Capping the extension at one year and appointing an acting director from among the assistants is an improvement over a solution with no time limit. CRTA still considers one year too long - no more than six months would be more appropriate - and warns that the acting director's mandate is not time-limited, which again leaves room for abuse.
The amendment should set clear limits on the duration of any mandate extension and safeguards ensuring that interim arrangements are strictly time-bound. The law should ensure the timely, transparent and predictable appointment of a successor, with a mechanism to address a prolonged failure by the National Assembly to appoint one.
An official must unambiguously state in what capacity they are appearing and may not use public resources to promote parties. There are no rules on labelling social-media accounts, nor any special restrictions on public authorities' promotional activities during the campaign.
A presumption is introduced that the official presents the body's position (unless they unambiguously state otherwise), and an obligation to label social-media accounts (no party content). After the candidacy deadline, public authorities' promotional activities are banned with three exceptions; "promotional activity" is defined as creating a favourable perception of a party/entity, candidate or list. The body must notify the Agency of planned activities, and the Agency publishes a list. Statements promoting a party are banned (MPs and councillors exempt) and media are obliged to correct the false presentation of officials. For MPs/councillors, the ban on party activities "during working hours" applies to the time of assembly sessions and their working bodies.
The law should ensure a clear separation of public office from the campaign activities of office-holders; prevent the misuse of position and state resources; and address violations proactively through proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
The amendments to Article 50 are an improvement, particularly on social media and on limiting officials' campaigning, but certain provisions leave room for interpretation in officials' favour. Further clarification is needed:
- Public appearances. The presumption that the official presents the body's position "unless they unambiguously" signal otherwise is not precise enough; it should be specified when an official is deemed to be acting on behalf of a party (party insignia, flags, the name or number of the list).
- Social-media accounts. A positive novelty; the fact that accounts are run by other persons must not be an exonerating circumstance.
- Ban on promotional activities. The exceptions are too broadly set and open to abuse; the conditions for applying them should be specified.
- Definition of "promotional activities". Still imprecise ("favourable perception") - an official can claim that an activity was not aimed at voters but served a "public-benefit purpose". It should be reformulated so that the prohibitions are clear.
- Working hours. The provision should be clarified to prohibit political activity while the official is acting in an official capacity.
Positive novelties are the obligation on public authorities to notify the Agency of promotional activities, with publication of a list, and the obligation on media to correct the false presentation of officials. Still, no sanction is provided for media, and it is unclear whether the Agency substantively reviews the conditions upon receiving notification or merely records the activities. Attention should also be paid to procedural deadlines - they must be urgent during the campaign, yet allow the parties to be heard and evidence to be gathered.
The exceptions (activity planned before the elections were called, "established practice", international relations) can be interpreted extensively; as a safeguard, notification of the Agency with evidence of planning and publication of a list of "established practice" events should be required. The definition of "promotional activities" should be broadened to cover both direct and indirect forms of electoral advantage, and the exceptions interpreted restrictively - only where the activity is objectively necessary and excludes political messaging, party symbols and the promotion of candidates.
There is no mechanism for monitoring officials during the campaign - Article 50a did not exist.
The Agency monitors compliance with officials' obligations "after the elections are called" - that is, throughout the campaign. The sample is selected by a combined method: random selection (software) and risk assessment (past decisions and complaints). Minimums: 60 (parliamentary/presidential), 40 (provincial/Belgrade), 20 (local). Beyond the sample, the President of the Republic and members of the Government are monitored as a matter of obligation. The weekly findings cover the types of activities, officials' appearances, proceedings initiated and measures taken; where a violation is suspected, the Agency initiates proceedings ex officio without delay.
Separation of public office from the campaign and proactive sanctioning; timely publication of decisions on violations during the campaign; monitoring of compliance as a task of the Agency's field observers - complementing random sampling with a risk-based approach and targeted monitoring of the President, Prime Minister and ministers.
The adopted solution removes CRTA's main concern: monitoring now covers the whole campaign (from when elections are called), mandatorily includes the President of the Republic and members of the Government, and combines the random sample with a risk assessment, along with greater transparency of the findings. This is a direct response to the concern and to ODIHR's recommendation.
What remains is to ensure that the weekly findings do not stay at the level of statistics, but allow insight into the specific activities of officials and the Agency's response, and that the Agency acts in good time in established cases.
Strengthen the monitoring framework by complementing random sampling with a risk-based approach and targeted monitoring of higher-risk categories - the President, the Prime Minister and all ministers - taking into account past decisions and patterns of violations, while ensuring the Agency has adequate human, technical and financial resources.
Where there were no grounds to act, the Agency decided informally (by letter, a "notice of outcome"), without a formal ruling and without an explicit right of appeal.
The concept of a complaint is clarified; the Director issues a formal decision rejecting a complaint or request where there are no grounds to act, and the complainant has the right to appeal to the Agency's Board within 15 days.
The legislation should be amended to require the Agency to publish, in a timely manner, decisions on violations of the law during the election campaign, including accompanying lawsuits.
Advantage: the obligation to issue a formal decision with the possibility of appeal strengthens legal certainty and removes the past practice of deciding by letters, which did not comply with the Law on General Administrative Procedure (ZUP).
Shortcoming: the law does not clearly enough regulate the Agency's time limits - in particular the deadline to open and to conclude proceedings - which leaves room for inconsistent and ineffective application.
No ODIHR opinion on this part. CRTA notes that proceedings before the Agency have in practice been contentious (lack of transparency, interpretation contrary to ZUP, long delays), so it would be desirable for ODIHR to set out its observations in a supplementary opinion.
The Director issues a "decision" on a violation; appeal to the Board within 15 days; the Board's decision is final, with the possibility of an administrative dispute - but with no prescribed deadlines for the Board to decide.
The term "decision" is replaced by "ruling"; deadlines are set for the Board to decide on appeals - 30 days in ordinary circumstances, 15 days during the campaign. The Board's decision is final; in an administrative dispute the Administrative Court is required to resolve the matter by judgment.
Timely publication of decisions on violations of the law during the election campaign, including accompanying lawsuits.
The 15-day deadline for the Board to decide on appeals during the electoral period is too long; shortening it to 7 days should be considered. An urgent deadline should also be set for the Administrative Court to act in campaign-related cases, so that judicial protection is effective in the real time of the electoral process. In addition, it should be explicitly provided that the complainant has the right to appeal to the Agency's Board.
No ODIHR opinion on this part.
The Agency's final decisions are published; there are no special urgent publication rules during the election campaign.
A terminological alignment ("final ruling"). During the campaign, the operative part and a concise reasoning of first-instance and final rulings on officials' campaigning are published within one day; appeals are published within one day of receipt; a measure of public disclosure is also published in the Official Gazette.
Timely publication of decisions on violations of the law during the election campaign, including accompanying lawsuits.
It is a shortcoming that the law does not require the publication of the Agency's Board decisions on the Agency's website, which reduces transparency. Nor is there an obligation to publish Administrative Court decisions, even though these are crucial for understanding practice and reviewing the legality of the Agency's work.
No ODIHR opinion on this part.
Alongside clear allegations, attached evidence is also required with a complaint (Article 91).
The requirement for attached evidence is removed; the Agency does not act on an anonymous complaint that does not contain clear allegations raising a suspicion of corruption.
Easing the requirement (a suspicion of corruption is enough, without attached evidence) is in line with ODIHR's observation that the complainant should not be required to prove wrongdoing, and relieves the professional service. The provision should strike a balance between complaints that can be acted upon and those that are unclear or lack the information needed to act.
The question arises whether the information submitted is sufficiently concrete and credible to enable verification, without requiring the complainant to submit evidence of the alleged wrongdoing.
The exemption from re-filing a declaration could be read broadly - to also cover moving to a different public office without a new report.
The exemption applies only where, after leaving office, an official is immediately re-elected, re-appointed or re-nominated to the same public office.
“That asset and income declarations of persons entrusted with top executive functions be subject to regular substantive review and that the Agency be provided with adequate resources for that purpose.”
The law does not define what the "same public office" is (the same type, the same body, the same post, or the same competences), leaving room for varying interpretation and for avoiding the obligation (e.g. moving from acting status to a full mandate). Nor is the aim of the restriction clear: if there is no change in the data, there is no justification for treating officials re-elected to the same office differently from those appointed to a different one.
A "material change" was tied to changes relative to the previous declaration, largely on an annual cycle.
A continuous timeframe is introduced - a material change exists if increases/decreases occurred in any year after the declaration, up to a new declaration or the start of a review. The structure of assets also covers movable property subject to registration. For post-office reporting, a reference point is added as of the expiry of the two-year period after leaving office.
“That asset and income declarations of persons entrusted with top executive functions be subject to regular substantive review and that the Agency be provided with adequate resources for that purpose.”
The formulation about "any year ... up to the start of the review of the declaration" is complex and imprecise. Particularly problematic is the undefined notion of "the start of the review of the declaration", which the law does not define and of which the official need not be aware - opening the door to legal uncertainty and abuse. The "change in the structure of assets" is not adequately regulated. CRTA assesses that these changes are a step backward - instead of legal certainty they introduce further ambiguity and make application harder.
The trigger criterion for extraordinary reporting remains unclear (how it applies to loans, safe-deposit boxes, entrepreneurial activity; how the threshold is calculated for changes in stakes or increases in value; per transaction or cumulatively). Given the difficulties in defining a "material change", ODIHR recommends considering a system of regular annual declarations, with a risk-based verification framework, clarification of "digital assets", and a review of the EUR 5,000 threshold.
There was no mandatory protective measure of publicly disclosing the judgment for misdemeanours under this law.
For misdemeanours under the law, a protective measure of publicly disclosing the judgment is mandatory - for public officials, responsible persons in a public authority, and for misdemeanours by natural and legal persons.
The measure increases transparency.
- Agency's opinions on legislation (Art. 35): a body must respond within deadlines to the Agency's initiatives and opinions; if it fails to respond or to provide a reasoned statement, the Agency informs the Prime Minister and the competent Assembly committee; everything is published on the Agency's website.
- Post-employment restrictions (Art. 55): extended to cases where the official decided (or took part in deciding) on the business of a legal entity/entrepreneur/international organization, or where their body supervised it.
- Clarifies the deadline (15 days) for filing a request for approval to perform another job or activity (Art. 46).
- Deletes the "danger in delay" exception for participating in a matter despite a conflict of interest (Art. 42).
- Extends the deadline within the ban on holding another public office; extends the deadline for surrendering gifts and introduces the possibility of purchasing gifts.
- Regulates the handling of matters once a dismissal recommendation becomes final and clarifies the reporting of violations to the competent authorities.
- The Agency's training plan is extended to cover the misuse of public resources.
ODIHR recommended a differentiated approach to sanctions. The adopted law implements it: it introduces two fine brackets for violations of Article 50 and explicit criteria for determining the penalty - the gravity of the violation, the type and extent of public resources used, the duration and repetition, the official's position, and the impact on the equality of electoral contestants.
The adopted law deletes the "danger in delay" exception, but does not specify the measures if an official nonetheless takes part in a matter despite a conflict of interest, nor the consequences for decisions, contracts or acts adopted in such circumstances.
The Agency should be provided with adequate powers, resources and institutional capacity to oversee the newly covered categories of persons - including integrity screening, declaration obligations and conflicts of interest - given the reported shortage of human and technical resources.

