Belgrade Elections 2024: Election Observation Report – Summary

The legal framework for conducting elections can be assessed as compliant with the requirements of democratically organized societies, which is necessary but insufficient for a good electoral process. The inter-party dialogue on improving electoral conditions, which occurred, bafflingly, alongside the election campaign, did not result in a better environment for the June elections.

CRTA's observation mission noted the spread of previously known election practices, which systematically influenced voters' will, created an illusion of pluralism, and seized the electoral infrastructure in favor of ruling parties. This again confirms that the line between the state and ruling parties is all but erased. Electoral engineering was once again documented, used to abuse and undermine electoral rules. Due to electoral engineering combined with a lack of accountability, the June elections cannot be considered free and fair.

Since the announcement of these elections, CRTA has emphasized that these elections must be viewed as a continuation of the December elections - those that were severely compromised by proven manipulation of the electoral will of the citizens of Belgrade, first and foremost, through illegal and illegitimate electoral engineering.

In this context, election day on June 2nd can be seen as the second, slightly less egregious half of a match that was played in a dramatically dirty manner in its first part on December 17th. However, in terms of the number and types of irregularities and individual incidents, especially bearing in mind recorded cases of voting secrecy violations at every third polling station in Belgrade, vote-buying, and tense situations that even led to violence, the quality of election day was worse than, for example, the Belgrade elections held just over two years ago, on April 3, 2022, or the Belgrade elections held on March 4, 2018.

The decline in quality is clearer when considering the entire electoral process, not just election day. All chronic problems that have plagued elections for many years continued to grow and became normalized - from the fact that, as citizens, we cannot trust the voter register, to the extreme media inequality of election participants, the abuse of state institutions and public resources, and the intensification of pressure on voters.

These elections did not contribute to restoring citizens' trust in the electoral process.

Main features of the election campaign:

The campaign for local elections was overshadowed by a national campaign focused on the “defense of national interest”. It unfolded in an environment where the distinctions between the dominant party and state institutions, especially the institution of the president, were almost completely erased. Local issues were neglected in favor of imposed "existential" questions about the survival of the nation (especially in light of the vote on the UN Resolution on the genocide in Srebrenica).
Widespread voter pressures, electoral corruption, abuse of state resources, and extreme media inequality are the essential features of these Belgrade elections.
Despite proven severe manipulations of the voters’ register in the previous election cycle, and although a comprehensive audit of the voters’ registry was one of ODIHR's priority recommendations, and insistence of the Serbian Government on its commitment to implementing ODIHR recommendations, the elections proceeded without an effective audit of the voters’ registry. The perpetrators of voters’ registry abuses remained protected by the principle of impunity for election-related criminal acts. Under pressure from civil society representatives and part of the opposition, a legal provision was adopted as a short-term measure, returning citizens who changed their residence in the last 11 months to their previous polling places on the voters' registry. Unfortunately, CRTA, as a part of the working group overseeing the implementation of this measure, found that it was not implemented fully or in good faith. On election day, June 2, voter migrations from other territories to Belgrade were not as visible as in December, but due to unaddressed problems and incomplete implementation of the new legal provision, public trust in the validity of the basic document for conducting elections was again lacking. This is evidenced by the fact that CRTA was contacted by around 1,000 Belgrade citizens regarding these elections, with almost every other citizen reporting problems and seeking advice regarding the voters’ registry. Elections conducted with an inaccurate voters’ registry, susceptible to manipulation by corrupt elements of the state apparatus, cannot reflect the true electoral will of the citizens.
Attempts at organized voter migrations were recorded this time within Belgrade - between city municipalities. A measure by the Ministry of State Administration and Local Self-Government, introduced without public oversight, allowed voting in local elections for the Belgrade City Assembly based on the secondary residence for the first time. It was used to transfer almost 500 voters from one city municipality to another during the 20 days it was in effect before being withdrawn due to reactions from CRTA and part of the public. The analysis found that every fourth voter was transferred to the same polling station - Zemun 26. Almost all of them voted “from home”. There are grounds to claim that the majority of these voters voted for the ruling party's electoral list.
This is the third campaign in the past two years during which major changes to polling station territories in Belgrade were carried out non-transparently, without clear criteria or public information. This raises suspicion that the real reason for the changes was not to reduce crowding at polling stations but to facilitate manipulation of voters, as identified in previous election processes. Confusion among voters was also created, as it was noted on election day that voters could not find themselves on the voters’ registry at almost every fifth polling station in Belgrade
This is the third campaign in the past two years during which major changes to polling station territories in Belgrade were carried out non-transparently, without clear criteria or public information. This raises suspicion that the real reason for the changes was not to reduce congestion at polling stations but to facilitate the manipulation of voters, as identified in previous election processes. There was confusion among voters, as many of them could not find themselves on the voters’ registry, at almost every fifth polling station in Belgrade.
Political actors of questionable authenticity once again found their place on the ballot under suspicious circumstances. Ruling parties benefited from such actors as they assured easier control over the work of the City Election Commission and polling boards. The nomination phase, as in previous election cycles, raised well-founded doubts about the validity of the citizen support signatures necessary for the election lists
to be approved, i.e. the way they were collected and certified, as well as indications of the misuse of citizens' personal data. Additional doubts were raised by the participation of minority parties with significant populist potential, whose minority status had previously been contested by the election administration, but who were once again allowed to participate in the Belgrade elections.

Main features of election day:

In terms of the type and prevalence of the most frequent incidents, election day on June 2 was not significantly better than December 17. Voting results were compromised at 14 percent of polling stations, far greater contamination than any election day (except December 17) that CRTA’s observation mission has monitored since 2016, clearly indicating a threat to voting freedom
CRTA conducted an analysis of vote distribution by turnout and voting patterns by place of residence, identifying a minimum of eight thousand additional votes in favor of the ruling party's electoral list. The determined number somewhat corresponds to the increase in the number of voters who voted outside their polling station.
Suspicions of manipulations related to remote voting (voting from home) were expressed. In these elections, 35 percent more voters voted “from home” than six months ago, and this increased number can be linked to better electoral results for the list Aleksandar Vučić - Belgrade Tomorrow. At polling stations where more than 10 percent of voters voted from home, that list achieved 10 percent better results compared to its average performance.
Blurring lines between the state and the party also affected the work of polling boards in Belgrade. Instead of ensuring the proper implementation of laws, protecting voting secrecy, and ensuring free elections, polling board members used access to voters' registry extracts for keeping party records and estimating the number of voters to bring to the polls. At 12 percent of polling stations, parallel records of voters were kept, contrary to the law.
There are concerns about a widespread practice of "correcting" polling board records after election day, often justified by the weak capacities of the polling boards. There are reports of the corrections serving to change election results in municipal elections in Belgrade, as well as in some other cities in Serbia, in favor of non-authentic election actors.

Read the full Election Observation Report here

Belgrade Elections 2024: Election Observation Report – Summary

Main features of the election campaign:

Main features of election day:

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