Institutional independence of public media services
The draft amendments to the Law on public media services introduce several changes to the institutional framework and governing bodies of RTS and RTV. While some provisions formally clarify the responsibilities of key actors, the amendments do not represent a substantive step forward in reducing political influence over public broadcasters.
The most significant change concerns the election of Programming Council members, which is placed entirely under the control of the relevant parliamentary committee. This reinforces political influence over a body that is supposed to represent the public interest and guarantee editorial pluralism. Although eligibility criteria for governing body members have been tightened, their broad and imprecise formulation does not ensure that qualified and independent candidates will be selected.
A positive development is the more explicit requirement that the Director General actively protect the institutional autonomy and editorial independence of the public broadcaster. However, without systemic changes to the appointment process and stronger oversight mechanisms, these provisions remain largely declaratory.
The most significant change concerns the election of Programming Council members, which is placed entirely under the control of the relevant parliamentary committee. This reinforces political influence over a body that is supposed to represent the public interest and guarantee editorial pluralism. Although eligibility criteria for governing body members have been tightened, their broad and imprecise formulation does not ensure that qualified and independent candidates will be selected.
A positive development is the more explicit requirement that the Director General actively protect the institutional autonomy and editorial independence of the public broadcaster. However, without systemic changes to the appointment process and stronger oversight mechanisms, these provisions remain largely declaratory.
Election and powers of the Programming Council
The draft reduces the Programming Council of RTS and RTV from 15 to 11 members. Members are elected by the relevant committee of the National Assembly and the Assembly of AP Vojvodina through an open public competition, launched six months before the expiry of existing mandates and open for 30 days.
Eligibility criteria are broadly defined, allowing candidates from the fields of culture, arts, and science, as well as representatives of organizations working in human rights and democracy. While the law introduces incompatibility rules, the vague provisions on which institutions may nominate candidates - and the wide scope of qualifying criteria - leave room for arbitrary decisions and politicization.
Council members serve four-year terms with no possibility of re-election. A new power is granted to the Council: the election of the Audience Ombudsman. Given the composition and appointment process of the Council itself, the independence of this new body remains uncertain.
Transitional provisions stipulate that current Council members' mandates will end within six months of the law entering into force, after which new elections will be held under the amended procedure.
Eligibility criteria are broadly defined, allowing candidates from the fields of culture, arts, and science, as well as representatives of organizations working in human rights and democracy. While the law introduces incompatibility rules, the vague provisions on which institutions may nominate candidates - and the wide scope of qualifying criteria - leave room for arbitrary decisions and politicization.
Council members serve four-year terms with no possibility of re-election. A new power is granted to the Council: the election of the Audience Ombudsman. Given the composition and appointment process of the Council itself, the independence of this new body remains uncertain.
Transitional provisions stipulate that current Council members' mandates will end within six months of the law entering into force, after which new elections will be held under the amended procedure.
Management board
Management Board members continue to be elected by the Council of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) by a two-thirds majority. The draft specifies updated eligibility requirements: candidates must have at least ten years of experience in relevant media or academic fields and 240 ECTS credits from their academic career.
The Management Board retains the authority to appoint the Director General but no longer elects Programming Council members or appoints editors-in-chief - these responsibilities are transferred to the Director General. This reshapes the internal decision-making structure without introducing clear oversight mechanisms or safeguards against political interference.
The Management Board retains the authority to appoint the Director General but no longer elects Programming Council members or appoints editors-in-chief - these responsibilities are transferred to the Director General. This reshapes the internal decision-making structure without introducing clear oversight mechanisms or safeguards against political interference.
Director General
The draft specifies eligibility criteria for the Director General that are nearly identical to those for Management Board members. The Director General gains additional responsibilities, including the appointment of editors and programme directors, the appointment of the internal auditor, and the submission of statute proposals to the Management Board.
A notable new provision explicitly requires the Director General to protect the institutional autonomy and editorial independence of the public broadcaster, and to uphold the public interest, transparency of operations, and non-discrimination in content. These provisions represent a formal step forward, but their practical value depends on consistent and independent implementation.
The law also clarifies the rules for acting directors, including a maximum mandate of six months and the obligation to simultaneously launch a competition for a permanent Director General. These provisions support governance stability but do not address the underlying problem of political influence over leadership appointments.
A notable new provision explicitly requires the Director General to protect the institutional autonomy and editorial independence of the public broadcaster, and to uphold the public interest, transparency of operations, and non-discrimination in content. These provisions represent a formal step forward, but their practical value depends on consistent and independent implementation.
The law also clarifies the rules for acting directors, including a maximum mandate of six months and the obligation to simultaneously launch a competition for a permanent Director General. These provisions support governance stability but do not address the underlying problem of political influence over leadership appointments.
Core principles of public media services (transparency and content pluralism)
The draft amendments introduce two new principles for public media services - pluralism of content and opinion, and cooperation with the audience - but the normative provisions remain largely declaratory. On pluralism, no concrete mechanisms are introduced to strengthen it within the programming policies of public broadcasters.
On audience cooperation, the amendments establish the position of Audience Ombudsman, tasked with protecting the rights of viewers, listeners, and readers. The stated goal is to increase accountability and enable greater public participation in editorial policy. However, the law fails to ensure the Ombudsman's full independence or to define its powers with sufficient precision.
On audience cooperation, the amendments establish the position of Audience Ombudsman, tasked with protecting the rights of viewers, listeners, and readers. The stated goal is to increase accountability and enable greater public participation in editorial policy. However, the law fails to ensure the Ombudsman's full independence or to define its powers with sufficient precision.
Protest in front of the RTS. Photo: Marko Dragoslavić, Fonet.
Election of the Ombudsman
The Programming Council elects the Ombudsman through an open public competition, for a four-year term with no possibility of re-election. The decision requires a two-thirds majority of all Council members. Since all Council members are elected exclusively by the relevant parliamentary committee, the Ombudsman's election remains within the sphere of political influence, without genuine institutional guarantees.
Candidates must hold Serbian citizenship and residence, have at least ten years of journalism or editorial experience in media, and hold 240 ECTS credits. Incompatibility rules prohibit holding public office, positions within public broadcaster bodies, or other roles that could create conflicts of interest.
While nominal functional independence is introduced, the dismissal mechanism undermines the Ombudsman's position. The same Programming Council that appoints the Ombudsman may also dismiss them on grounds including negligent performance, breach of conflict-of-interest rules, illness, or a prison sentence exceeding six months. This creates conditions for political manipulation, given how the Council itself is composed.
Candidates must hold Serbian citizenship and residence, have at least ten years of journalism or editorial experience in media, and hold 240 ECTS credits. Incompatibility rules prohibit holding public office, positions within public broadcaster bodies, or other roles that could create conflicts of interest.
While nominal functional independence is introduced, the dismissal mechanism undermines the Ombudsman's position. The same Programming Council that appoints the Ombudsman may also dismiss them on grounds including negligent performance, breach of conflict-of-interest rules, illness, or a prison sentence exceeding six months. This creates conditions for political manipulation, given how the Council itself is composed.
Powers of the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman's powers are defined in general terms, without binding procedures or concrete authority. The law provides that the Ombudsman receives, reviews, and records complaints, proposals, and suggestions from viewers, listeners, and readers, notifies editors-in-chief, and submits quarterly reports to the Director General, Management Board, and Programming Council.
In practice, this risks reducing the Ombudsman's role to an administrative function - receiving complaints and informing other bodies - without any real capacity to influence editorial content or give effect to audience feedback. The Ombudsman may proactively propose improvements, but the law imposes no obligation on the broadcaster to respond, and no sanctions for ignoring its findings.
The absence of procedural deadlines, a clear complaints-handling methodology, and binding authority means the Ombudsman risks being a symbolic institution - without real power to protect audience rights or contribute to genuine transparency in public media operations.
In practice, this risks reducing the Ombudsman's role to an administrative function - receiving complaints and informing other bodies - without any real capacity to influence editorial content or give effect to audience feedback. The Ombudsman may proactively propose improvements, but the law imposes no obligation on the broadcaster to respond, and no sanctions for ignoring its findings.
The absence of procedural deadlines, a clear complaints-handling methodology, and binding authority means the Ombudsman risks being a symbolic institution - without real power to protect audience rights or contribute to genuine transparency in public media operations.
Financing of public media services
The proposed financing model brings some improvements - particularly through a more predictable fee adjustment mechanism tied to objective economic indicators. However, the absence of full independence in determining the fee level, and the retention of budget co-financing, continue to leave room for political pressure.
Fee as the primary source of funding - new adjustment model
The draft introduces an annual adjustment mechanism for the licence fee, the primary source of funding for RTS and RTV. This replaces the previous practice of passing a separate law each year - an unpredictable and politically dependent system. The fee is set at 349 dinars per month at the time of the law's entry into force, and adjusted annually as follows: in line with the inflation rate from the previous year, with a guaranteed floor of no less than 0.6% of the minimum monthly wage for that year.
The Management Boards of RTS and RTV jointly propose changes to the fee level; the Ministry makes the final decision.
Compared to the previous model, this system is more predictable and stable - it removes the need for annual legislation and reduces the scope for political intervention. The automatic adjustment mechanism also supports financial sustainability. However, the Ministry retains executive control over the final fee level, leaving open the possibility of political pressure - particularly if proposals from the Management Boards are rejected or ignored on political grounds.
The Management Boards of RTS and RTV jointly propose changes to the fee level; the Ministry makes the final decision.
Compared to the previous model, this system is more predictable and stable - it removes the need for annual legislation and reduces the scope for political intervention. The automatic adjustment mechanism also supports financial sustainability. However, the Ministry retains executive control over the final fee level, leaving open the possibility of political pressure - particularly if proposals from the Management Boards are rejected or ignored on political grounds.
Budget co-financing retained
The draft retains budget co-financing for public broadcasters but clarifies and expands the permitted purposes. In addition to the existing categories - production and distribution of programmes for foreign audiences, the diaspora, and the territory of AP Kosovo and Metohija; development of new technologies, digitization of archives, and equipment; projects of special social significance - budget funds may now also be used for capital investment. This expansion may support modernization and infrastructure development, but also increases dependence on political decisions over budget allocation. The draft does include a provision aimed at preventing institutional dependence and financial conditionality, though its effectiveness will only be assessed in practice.
