Context and legislative process
The draft amendments to the Law on electronic media entered parliamentary procedure in May 2025. The government submitted the draft without a prior public debate. The draft was subsequently presented to the interested public, but only after it had already been submitted to parliament.
The amendments cover five articles in total. One is a purely terminological correction: the existing law contains misspelled names of two independent institutions - the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, and the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality. The fact that such an error exists in primary legislation reflects the attention the responsible ministry devotes to the legislative drafting process.
The remaining four amendments are, literally and exclusively in linguistic terms, a response to recommendations made by the European Commission in its opinion on the Law on electronic media. Even in the explanatory note accompanying the draft, the government as the authorized proposer provides no indication of how the introduced changes might positively affect the financial or functional independence of the regulator.
The amendments cover five articles in total. One is a purely terminological correction: the existing law contains misspelled names of two independent institutions - the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, and the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality. The fact that such an error exists in primary legislation reflects the attention the responsible ministry devotes to the legislative drafting process.
The remaining four amendments are, literally and exclusively in linguistic terms, a response to recommendations made by the European Commission in its opinion on the Law on electronic media. Even in the explanatory note accompanying the draft, the government as the authorized proposer provides no indication of how the introduced changes might positively affect the financial or functional independence of the regulator.
Listing cases of regulatory accountability to the National Assembly
The amendment lists the cases in which the regulator is accountable to the National Assembly of Serbia: during the election and dismissal of Council members, when the Assembly gives consent to the regulator's statute and financial plan, and when it reviews annual and periodic work reports.
This is a more precise systematization of existing legal mechanisms and changes nothing substantively relative to the current legal framework. Although it may appear at first glance to clarify the division of responsibilities, the provision introduces no new obligations and does not prevent the existing patterns of abuse and disregard for legal deadlines. It will not, for example, compel the relevant parliamentary committee to timely advertise a competition for new Council members when mandates expire, nor will it prompt the Assembly to finally review and adopt the regulator's statute - a process that has been pending for over a decade.
In practice, the provision could at best serve as an additional argument in a future procedure that the regulator itself might initiate to challenge obstruction and assert its institutional independence from political influence. Without changes to the working practices of the National Assembly and its committee, and without stronger oversight mechanisms, its practical significance remains negligible.
Without changes to the working practices of the National Assembly and its committee, and without stronger oversight mechanisms, its practical significance remains negligible.
This is a more precise systematization of existing legal mechanisms and changes nothing substantively relative to the current legal framework. Although it may appear at first glance to clarify the division of responsibilities, the provision introduces no new obligations and does not prevent the existing patterns of abuse and disregard for legal deadlines. It will not, for example, compel the relevant parliamentary committee to timely advertise a competition for new Council members when mandates expire, nor will it prompt the Assembly to finally review and adopt the regulator's statute - a process that has been pending for over a decade.
In practice, the provision could at best serve as an additional argument in a future procedure that the regulator itself might initiate to challenge obstruction and assert its institutional independence from political influence. Without changes to the working practices of the National Assembly and its committee, and without stronger oversight mechanisms, its practical significance remains negligible.
Declaratory affirmation of budget autonomy
The introduction of the sentence "The regulator has full autonomy in budget management, which cannot be arbitrarily reduced or increased by other institutions" declaratively affirms one of the principles set out in European standards - the financial independence of a regulatory body. However, this formulation introduces no new mechanisms to protect that autonomy, nor does it remove the existing institutional dependencies of the regulator on the National Assembly.
Shifting responsibility for harmful content from the regulator to media service providers
Two further amendments concern articles 71 and 72 of the law, which address the obligation to prevent hate speech and other harmful programme content. The previous formulation defined the regulator's responsibility to "ensure" that media service providers do not broadcast content inciting hatred, discrimination, terrorism, sensationalism, pornography, criminal behaviour, and so on. The new formulations directly prohibit media service providers in their own right - for example, "A media service provider must not..." - improving the precision of the norm and placing responsibility on the provider directly.
It is worth noting, however, that this was precisely the kind of change that expert stakeholders had proposed before the law was originally adopted, including through concrete amendments. The ministry responded to those proposals only after the European Commission explicitly recommended clearer regulation of prohibited forms of speech in its comments.
While the change improves the legislative text, it carries no practical significance - the previous formulation was already sufficient to sanction prohibited conduct by media service providers. The government made no attempt to use this amendment to address the actual problem: the consistent and fair enforcement of sanctions.
It is worth noting, however, that this was precisely the kind of change that expert stakeholders had proposed before the law was originally adopted, including through concrete amendments. The ministry responded to those proposals only after the European Commission explicitly recommended clearer regulation of prohibited forms of speech in its comments.
While the change improves the legislative text, it carries no practical significance - the previous formulation was already sufficient to sanction prohibited conduct by media service providers. The government made no attempt to use this amendment to address the actual problem: the consistent and fair enforcement of sanctions.
